G.R. No. L-30576 - Duncan vs. Court of 1st Instance of Rizal, Branch X

The petitioners, Robin Francis Radley Duncan (a British national) and Maria Lucy Christensen (an American citizen), are husband and wife residing in the Philippines.
They have no biological children of their own but have previously adopted a child.
They filed an adoption petition (Sp. Proc. No. 5457) seeking to adopt an infant previously baptized under the name Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

In May 1967, a newborn child (only 3 days old) was given to the petitioners for adoption by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez.
The infant was originally in the custody of Atty. Velasquez, who received the child from the natural, unwedded mother.
The natural mother instructed Atty. Velasquez to keep her identity confidential, citing future matrimonial plans and a desire to protect her future prospects.
Despite her role as attorney, Velasquez acted in a custodial capacity (loco parentis) by accepting the care of the abandoned child and subsequently giving her written consent for the adoption.

The petitioners filed their adoption petition in September 1967, relying on Velasquez’s written consent as crucial evidence in support of the adoption.
The trial court, presided over by Judge Herminio C. Mariano of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch X), rendered a decision on June 27, 1968, dismissing the petition.
The primary basis for dismissal was the contention that the written consent (exhibited as “Exhibit J”) was improper, as it did not meet the express requirement of the law under Article 340 of the Civil Code, which mandates the consent of the parent, guardian, or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

Atty. Velasquez testified that she was bound by privileged communications with the natural mother and, therefore, could not reveal the mother’s identity when pressed by the court.
The trial court rejected the defense of attorney-client privilege by noting that:

There was no established attorney-client relationship significant to this case.
The issue was not merely about revealing the identity but about the proper legal authority to give consent for adoption.

The privilege of attorney-client communications should not inhibit the disclosure where necessary.
Given that the natural mother had abandoned the child, a de facto guardian’s consent should suffice.

The natural mother, though alive, had neither provided for nor inquired about the welfare of her child from the time the infant was entrusted to Velasquez.
The abandonment of the child was evidenced by the mother’s refusal to participate in any aspect of the child’s care or support.
Over the subsequent years, the petitioners assumed full responsibility, as evidenced by:

The child’s baptism records listing them as the parents.
Continuous care and affection from the petitioners, thereby establishing a factual parental relationship.

Whether Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, acting in loco parentis, is the proper person legally empowered to give the consent required under Article 340 of the Civil Code for the adoption of the child.
Whether the natural mother’s abandonment of her child negates the need for her own consent under the mandatory requirements of the law.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the written consent provided by Atty. Velasquez did not meet the strict requirements of the law.
Whether the refusal to disclose the natural mother’s identity—invoked on the basis of attorney-client privilege—has legal merit in negating the consent obtained.

Whether a liberal, compassionate interpretation of the law is warranted to ensure that the child, who had been raised by the petitioners since infancy, is not deprived of the benefits of a stable family environment.
How the abandonment by the biological parent affects the interpretation and application of statutory requirements on consent for adoption.