G.R. No. L-48697 - Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz

Civil Case No. U-649 was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch IX, Urdaneta, where a judgment was rendered on June 1, 1965.
A copy of the judgment was sent by registered mail to the defendants’ counsel, Atty. Antonio M. Belen, who received it on August 5, 1965.

Atty. Belen filed a motion for reconsideration by registered mail on August 27, 1965, which was subsequently received by the trial court on August 30, 1965.
On September 21, 1965, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.
A copy of the denial order was sent by registered mail on September 30, 1965 to Atty. Belen at his Dagupan City address, and it was received at the Dagupan City post office on October 1, 1965.

The registered mail containing the denial order was later returned to the trial court because it remained unclaimed.
On the wrapper of the returned mail, the following annotations were noted: "R & S", "unclaimed", as well as a stamped box displaying "2nd notice" and "Last Notice" (each followed by a check mark).
A subsequent mailing occurred on November 28, 1965, whereby a "2nd true copy" of the September 21 order was sent; the accompanying registry return card indicates that a certain “N.R. Belen” received this copy on January 5, 1966.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint for the revival of the judgment on January 2, 1976, contending that the judgment became final and executory on January 23, 1966 (based on their assertion regarding the accrual of their right of action).
Defendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for revival on the ground of prescription under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, claiming that the judgment had become final and executory as of November 23, 1965.
The trial court issued an order on March 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint due to prescription of action.

The plaintiffs argued that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for the revival of judgment on the ground of prescription.
A further contention was that the court’s determination of the date when the judgment became final (November 23, 1965, rather than January 13, 1966) was erroneous, affecting the computation of the prescriptive period.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of prescription.

Specifically, did the court improperly apply the rules governing service by registered mail without conclusive evidence of notice being delivered?

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the judgment became final and executory on November 23, 1965, in contrast to the plaintiffs’ position that it became final on January 13, 1966.

How does the actual receipt of the mailed denial order by defendants’ counsel affect the computation of the prescriptive period?