G.R. No. L-48928 - De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.

Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera, a doctor of Medicine and recognized specialist in tuberculosis treatment, initiated the suit against the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (the Society) and various individuals associated with it.
The complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal on March 23, 1976, and later amended on April 12, 1976, to include Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as a party defendant.

Dr. Tavera had been designated as Acting Executive Secretary and was later officially appointed as Executive Secretary on April 27, 1973, following organizational meetings that also discussed the need for a "permanent" office.
The complaint alleged that on May 29, 1974, the previous Board of Directors summarily removed her from her position without being informed of any cause, declaring her office vacant by a simple majority decision, and subsequently appointing Alberto Romulo in her stead.
It was further alleged that certain defendants (Pardo, Nubla, Garcia, and Adil) were not qualified to be members of the Board of Directors at the time of their election.

Defendants denied any illegal removal, asserting that as an employee holding an office at the pleasure of the Board, the Executive Secretary’s tenure was inherently temporary and subject to termination at any time without cause.
They contended that the defendants’ actions in the board meeting, particularly on May 29, 1974, were valid and in accordance with the Society’s By-Laws, which provide that removals require no advance notice or justification if the office is held at the pleasure of the Board.
The defendants argued that the suit should be characterized as one for quo warranto and, thus, subject to a one-year period for filing, while also asserting that any dispute over board members' qualifications should have been raised at the time of their election and not in this collateral action.
Defendant Adil moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that it either stated no cause of action or had prescribed, specifically noting that an action for quo warranto should have been instituted within one year from the alleged ouster on May 29, 1974.

The trial court classified the suit primarily as one for quo warranto, holding that the action should have been commenced within one year since the alleged ouster, and found that Dr. Tavera’s removal was executed in compliance with the Society’s By-Laws as her appointment was at the pleasure of the Board.
Dr. Tavera, however, contended that her complaint is actually a suit for damages under Section 6, Article II of the Constitution in relation to Articles 21 and 32(6) of the New Civil Code, as well as a claim for violation of the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution.
On appeal, issues regarding the classification of the suit (quo warranto versus damages) and the proper application of the statute of limitations were raised, along with contentions on whether the respondents’ actions violated the applicable by-laws, laws, and the Constitution.

The records, including minutes from meetings and formal orders, reveal that although the term “permanent” was used in discussions and documents, the absence of a fixed term in the appointment letter confirmed that Dr. Tavera’s position was at the discretion (and pleasure) of the Society’s Board.
This discretionary nature meant that her removal, devoid of any contractual guarantee of tenure or due process as in classified service, was in line with the provisions stated in the by-laws.

Whether the case is properly categorized as a suit for quo warranto or as an action for damages arising from an alleged violation of rights under the Society’s By-Laws, the Civil Code, and the Constitution.

Whether the removal of Dr. Tavera from her position as Executive Secretary was illegal or if it constituted a mere expiration of a pleasure appointment.
Whether the manner of her removal adhered to the procedural and substantive requirements prescribed in the Society’s By-Laws.

Whether defendants who were allegedly not members of the Society at the time of their election to the Board of Directors can be disqualified post facto, and if such matters may be raised in a collateral action.

Whether the one-year period for filing a quo warranto action applies in this instance or if the proper period is four years as implied by related cases involving injury to contractual rights under the New Civil Code.

Whether Dr. Tavera’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were infringed upon by the manner of her removal, despite her holding an office at the pleasure of the Board.