G.R. No. 179382 - Spouses Mamaril vs. Boy Scouts of the Philippines

The petitioner is the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and the respondent is Atty. Felina S. Dasig, who served as the Chief Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division and also as officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs Service (LAS) of the CHED.
Dasig was accused of engaging in anomalous activities during her tenure at CHED, notably attempting to extort money from students and her own staff under the guise of collecting attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

On 9 October 1998, the Director of the LAS submitted a memorandum detailing complaints against Dasig.

Complainants included students (Rosalie Dela Torre, Rocella Eje, and Jacqueline Ng) and CHED staff (Maximina Sister, Don Cesar Mamaril, Leysamin Tebelin, Joemar Delgado, and Ellen Grace Nugpo).
The students alleged that Dasig solicited money to “facilitate” the correction of names in their scholastic records to conform with their birth certificates.

Dasig’s former LAS staff also corroborated charges that she attempted to persuade them to participate in improper transactions.
Additional allegations arose regarding Dasig’s refusal to return an Official Record Book borrowed from a colleague, further coloring her administrative record.

CHED formed a hearing committee (Resolution No. 166-98) to investigate the complaints.

Some complainants were untraceable or chose not to participate; however, key witnesses including Mamaril, Tebelin, Delgado, and Nugpo testified about a closed-door meeting where Dasig allegedly solicited P20,000.00 from a student (Ng) and sought to benefit herself and her colleagues.

The hearing committee’s findings, supported by substantial evidence, held Dasig liable for dishonesty, gross misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the service.
Subsequent decisions by the CHED and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed her dismissal from service, cancellation of civil service eligibility, and other accessories penalties.

Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals, raising issues including:

Alleged denial of due process in the administrative proceedings.
The CSC’s failure to accord weight to a 1 June 1999 resolution by CHED Chairman Angel Alcala that purportedly absolved her.
The CSC’s omission of newly discovered evidence post-dismissal.
The proportionality of the penalty, given her extensive years of government service.

During the pendency of the petition, as the case was under review, the Supreme Court issued a resolution ordering Dasig’s disbarment in a separate proceeding, reaffirming that as a lawyer she committed acts of extortion and gross misconduct.
The disbarment case brought forward determinative findings that Dasig had solicited money from students in return for favorable action on their applications—findings that were later relied upon in evaluating her administrative misconduct.
The Court of Appeals, however, adopted a “moonlighting” theory—arguing that Dasig was merely offering her legal services outside the normal scope of her duties—thus downgrading her offense to simple misconduct.

The Court of Appeals’ “moonlighting” conclusion diverged significantly from the findings in the disbarment case.
The appellate court’s approach involved:

Asserting that Dasig’s solicitation for attorney’s fees was a private practice matter, given that correction of academic records did not require the application of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Relying on procedural arguments such as her non-participation in the disbarment proceedings and the principle that any evidence not presented in the administrative case could not be revisited on appeal.

Ultimately, this discrepancy in factual determination and legal interpretation became the focus of review in the petition before the Supreme Court.

Whether Dasig was deprived of due process in the administrative proceedings against her.
Whether the CSC erred in discounting the 1 June 1999 resolution of CHED Chairman Alcala that allegedly absolved Dasig from administrative liability.
Whether the CSC’s failure to consider post-dismissal evidence that might have materially affected the outcome constituted reversible error.
Whether the imposition of the penalty of dismissal (with accompanying administrative sanctions) was excessively harsh, considering Dasig’s long service in government.
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reduced Dasig’s offense to simple misconduct by adopting a “moonlighting” interpretation despite resolute findings to the contrary in the disbarment proceedings.