G.R. No. 228489 - City of Batangas vs. Tolentino

In 2010, pursuant to Section 219 of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Department of Finance (DOF) issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2010-01 directing local government units to revise their real property assessments every three years.
On November 25, 2013, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas enacted City Ordinance No. 20, series of 2013, updating the real property values within Batangas City using a new schedule of fair market values prepared by the City Assessor.
The Ordinance, intended to provide revised property values for computation of real property tax for revenue generation, was signed by then-City Mayor Eduardo B. Dimacuha on December 9, 2013.

Prior to the passage of the Ordinance, the Committee on Ways and Means of Batangas City conducted multiple public hearings on September 25, October 1–3, and November 11, 2013.
Notices for these hearings were sent to various stakeholders, yet controversies arose when some, including Faustino Caedo (Batangas Chamber of Commerce President), claimed non-receipt of such notice while attendees like Jose Virgilio Y. Tolentino voiced their objections.
The Ordinance was published in the Batangas Post on December 9–15, December 16–22, and December 22–31, 2013 as part of its promulgation.

On January 28, 2014, Tolentino filed an appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ), asserting that the Ordinance violated the due process clause of the Constitution by imposing “excessive, inequitable, and confiscatory” real property values without proper written notice.
On June 6, 2014, then-Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution declaring the Ordinance void for noncompliance with the notice requirements under Article 276(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC.
The Secretary’s findings were based on submissions from Caedo and affidavits from residents attesting that no proper notice was sent as mandated by law.

The City of Batangas appealed the Secretary’s Resolution before the Court of Appeals, contending that the Ordinance was not a revenue measure subject to the public hearing and notice requirements under Sections 186 and 223 of the LGC.
The Court of Appeals, on May 31, 2016, affirmed the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution by denying the appeal and declaring the Ordinance legally infirm due to procedural deficiencies in notice.
The City of Batangas then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, arguing that the procedural requirements appropriate for tax ordinances had been misapplied and that the presumption of validity should protect the Ordinance.

Petitioners (City of Batangas, Sangguniang Panlungsod, and City Assessor) maintained that the Ordinance is an ordinary legislative act updating market values and generating revenue, not imposing a tax or fee per se, and that it complied with the statutory requirements under Sections 212 and 219 of the LGC.
They further argued that the proper procedural framework for the revision of property assessments does not automatically mandate the public hearing and written notice requirements found in Article 276 of the Implementing Rules.
Respondents (Tolentino and the Secretary of Justice), on the other hand, maintained that the Ordinance, by virtue of its revenue-generating purpose, is a tax ordinance and must comply with the notice and public hearing requirements, and that the burden to show compliance lies with the petitioners despite the presumption of validity.

Whether City Ordinance No. 20, series of 2013, is properly characterized as a tax ordinance subject to the review of the Secretary of Justice under Section 187 of the LGC and whether its nature as such automatically subjects it to the notice and public hearing requirements under Sections 186 and 223 of the LGC and Article 276 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Whether the procedural requirements for enacting a general revision of real property assessments differ from those applicable to ordinary tax ordinances and, accordingly, whether the absence of mandatory written notice (and the accompanying public hearing procedure) invalidates the Ordinance.
Whether the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the enactment of ordinances, which shifts the burden of proving invalidity onto the challengers, was correctly applied or misapplied by the lower tribunals in striking down the Ordinance.