G.R. No. 159699 - Acance vs. Court of Appeals

On May 23, 2001, respondents (Spouses Yolanda Quijano Tria, Ambrocio Tria, Epifania Quijano, Raphael Villanueva, Napoleon Paglicawan Quijano, and Pilar Z. Quijano), represented by their attorney‐in‐fact, Engr. Julius F. Villanueva, filed an amended complaint before the RTC of Muntinlupa (Civil Case No. 01-122). The complaint sought to annul an extra-judicial settlement concerning the estate of the deceased Jesus Acance, involving disputed real properties.

The disputed properties included two parcels of land with a combined area of 1,044 square meters in Muntinlupa City, originally under TCT Nos. 239998 and 242993, and improvements thereon (a 9-door apartment complex). After the extra-judicial settlement, these titles were cancelled and replaced with TCT Nos. 4365 and 4366 in the names of the Acance siblings.

On April 26, 2002, the court a quo declared the petitioners (Acance siblings and their spouses) in default for failing to file an answer to the amended complaint despite the issuance of a summons through publication and registered mail, given that the petitioners were nonresidents (U.S. citizens) and not physically present in the Philippines.

On May 13, 2002, petitioner Rosalino Acance, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact and administrator of the estate, filed a motion to lift the default order. He asserted that the Acance siblings had appointed him as their private prosecutor in a criminal case involving the properties and that his subsequent motion to represent them in Civil Case No. 01-122 was erroneously not included in the court calendar due to misinterpretation of procedural rules.

The RTC, in its Order dated June 27, 2002, denied the motion to set aside the default order, holding that the period for filing an answer had already expired despite the petitioners’ request for an extension.

Petitioners then elevated the matter through a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed it on November 29, 2002, on the ground that a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo had not been filed.

A subsequent motion for reconsideration before the CA was also denied on August 27, 2003, prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

The controversy centers on the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of deceased Jesus Acance and the subsequent issuance of new titles (TCT Nos. 4365 and 4366) to the Acance siblings.

Respondents argued that the properties in question were conjugal properties of Angela and Vernier Quijano, asserting that the Acance siblings’ acquisition of these properties by waiving Angela’s rights (through the settlement) was invalid, especially given allegations of forgery and lack of free consent on Angela’s part due to her alleged senility at the time of execution.

Petitioners countered that the extra-judicial settlement was validly executed and further bolstered their claim by presenting Angela’s Last Will and Testament (executed on December 6, 1996 in the United States) as evidence of her intent to transfer all her properties to the Acance siblings.

A significant procedural aspect arose regarding the service of summons on petitioners, who were nonresident U.S. citizens. The service was effected by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Muntinlupa City and by registered mail, but the petitioners later alleged defects in compliance with the requirements under Section 15, Rule 14 and Section 19, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners claimed that due to these defects in service—and the resulting misinterpretation of procedural deadlines by counsel—they were deprived of their right to file a timely answer, while respondents maintained that such service had been properly effected, citing registry receipts and affidavits (although the latter were not satisfactorily shown to the court a quo).

Petitioner Rosalino Acance contended that the erroneous reading of the court a quo’s calendar led him to believe that the process of filing an answer was tolled because his motion to represent the petitioners was pending.

He further argued that the failure to file the motion for reconsideration with the court a quo was justified by the urgency of the matter and the existence of similar jurisdictional issues already raised in his motion to lift the default order.

The petitioners stressed that the default order was entered without a complete showing of compliance with the extraterritorial service requirements, thus rendering the order void and warranting the setting aside of the default order to allow for a trial on merits.

Finally, petitioners asserted that any further delay or rigid adherence to technical requirements (such as the filing of a motion for reconsideration) would inflict grave injustice, given the urgency and perishable nature of the subject matter of the litigation.

Whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo, in light of the urgent necessity for relief.
Whether the failure of petitioners to file an answer was attributable to defects in the service of summons, particularly regarding the extraterritorial service requirements under Section 15, Rule 14 and Section 19, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Whether the exceptional circumstances claimed by the petitioners justify bypassing the mandatory prerequisite of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the special civil action of certiorari.
Whether a liberal interpretation of the rules governing orders of default is warranted to ensure that substantial justice is achieved in cases where technical defaults arise from factors beyond the parties’ control.