QuestionsQuestions (Republic Act No. 8493)
RA 8493 is known as the “Speedy Trial Act of 1998.” It generally takes effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
It applies to all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, RTC, MTC, and MCTC.
Yes. After arraignment, the judge must order a pre-trial conference to consider: (a) plea bargaining, (b) stipulation of facts, (c) marking for identification of evidence, (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence, and (e) other matters promoting fair and expeditious trial.
They must be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements regarding matters under Sec. 2 require court approval.
Only when it is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
The pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
For covered criminal cases (with stated exceptions), trial must be set for continuous weekly or short-term calendar at the earliest time, ensuring the entire trial period does not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial (subject to Chief Justice-authorized exceptions under the Rules of Court).
Cases subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of P1,000 or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties.
Within 30 days from filing of the information or from the date the accused appears before the court where the charge is pending—whichever date last occurs.
The accused must have at least 15 days to prepare for trial, and trial must commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
The accused must state whether he or she interposes a negative or affirmative defense: negative defense requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence and may modify the order of trial.
Trial shall commence within 30 days from the date the order for new trial becomes final, but may be extended by the retrying court; in any case, it cannot exceed 180 days from the date the order for new trial becomes final, unless unavailability of witnesses or other factors from passage of time makes 30-day commencement impractical.
For the first 12 months: 180 days; second 12 months: 120 days; third 12 months: 80 days for the period from arraignment to trial.
Included are delays from other proceedings concerning the accused (e.g., competency/physical incapacity examination, certain trials/charges, interlocutory appeals, pre-trial motions limited to 30 days, inhibition/venue change/transfer, prejudicial questions, and periods under advisement not exceeding 30 days), delays from absence/unavailability of accused or essential witnesses, and delays from mental incompetence or physical inability to stand trial; also certain delays related to dismissed informations with refiling and reasonable delays for joining with co-accused not under jurisdiction/time run; and continuances granted under stringent conditions.
Only when granted motu proprio or on motion/request (per the provision) and the court finds that the ends of justice served outweigh the public’s and defendant’s interest in speedy trial. The court must set forth its reasons in the record, orally or in writing.
Among others: (1) failure to grant would likely make continuation impossible or result in miscarriage of justice; and (2) the case’s novelty/unusual/complex nature makes adequate preparation unreasonable within statutory time limits. The law also bars continuances due to general congestion, lack of diligent preparation, or failure to obtain available witnesses.
The information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused bears the burden to support the motion, while the prosecution bears the burden of going forward with evidence on exclusion of time under Sec. 10.
Yes. Failure to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty constitutes waiver of the right to dismissal under Sec. 13.