935 Phil. 477
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 26, 2013 marked as Exhibit "A"
| [T]: | So what happened in June 14, 2014? |
| [S]: | Again, he made me stand bending over and he went behind and shoved his penis into my butt and he also again tried to put his penis into my mouth. |
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 19, 2014 marked as Annex "A" of Exhibit "E"
| [T]: | And then what happened next? |
| [S]: | I heard Tito .........xx stand up and he locked the door. I was lying on my side my face away from him, pretending that I was fast asleep. |
| | |
| [T]: | And then what happened next? |
| [S]: | He went back beside me on the bed, and I can feel him moving. And then he wrapped his arms around me pinning me down while he pulled my pajama pants down. |
| | |
| [T]: | How did you feel when he was doing this? |
| [S]: | My heart was beating so fast I was afraid I could not say anything. His arms were too heavy on my body. It has been a while since he lad (sic) did this to me that I thought he wouldn't do it anymore. |
| | |
| [T]: | And then what happened next? |
| [S]: | He started to insert his penis on my butt, his hands was (sic) on the rest of his penis moving back and forth while some of it was inserting back and forth to my butt. |
| | |
| [T]: | How did you feel in your butt when he was doing this? |
| [S]: | It was painful. |
| | |
| [T]: | And then what happened? |
| [S]: | He carried me and turned me on my back, with my face on the bed. The (sic) he lifted me on my stomach so that my butt would be raised, and he inserted it again to me and he went up and down again. |
Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated February 10, 2016:
| Q: | So what were you doing on that day? |
| A: | Should I start with the beginning of that day? |
| | |
| Q: | Yes. |
| A: | So the beginning of the day, I was in a choir practice with my baby cousin ......x. After that, I went to the park with him and then yeah my uncle was also there with me with my cousin and two yayas, my yaya and my cousin's yaya. We play there for a while then we went back and then my uncle cooked burger steak for dinner with mushroom sauce. I remember. After that I took a shower while my Ate ......, that is my yaya, was watching me. And, then I went to the room because it was already time to sleep. Then my uncle had a massage from my Ate ...... because usually before he sleeps he gets a massage from my Ate ....... And, then after that Ate ...... and Ate ......, the Ate of my cousin left the room because they trusted my uncle with my cousin and I. Afterwards when they left he looked (sic) the room. My cousin was already asleep and I was about to sleep already. Then after that once again he made me touch his penis again and he made me shake it. And, after that he carried me and sit down on it and even tried to shove it into my mouth but I resisted, ma'am. |
In insisting his innocence, petitioner posited that AAA257134's testimony are replete with material inconsistencies given AAA257134's narration of different versions as to how he was sexually assaulted by petitioner. Moreover, petitioner questioned the time said sexual assault was committed. He argued that AAA257134 initially claimed that the incident happened at around 5:30 p.m. on June 14, 2014. However, after petitioner allegedly proved the impossibility of committing the same at said time, AAA257134 conveniently modified his testimony to the effect that the petitioner committed the dastardly act at nighttime instead.
The Court is not convinced.
Contrary to the view of petitioner, the Court finds no inconsistency in the testimony of AAA257134. That there are different versions as to how AAA257134 was sexually assaulted in just one night is not far removed from happening. As alleged by AAA257134, he was repeatedly abused by petitioner on the night of June 14, 2014, hence, the varied narration. In light of this, petitioner's defense of alleged material discrepancy on AAA257134's testimony which purportedly weigh heavily on his credibility deserves scant consideration. On this score, it is worth emphasizing that the "courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim narrates the details of a traumatic experience."
42 In fact, inconsistencies reflect candidness and the fact that the testimony was unrehearsed.
43Moreover, in
Ricalde v. People,
44 the Court, through Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, held that full weight and credit are accorded to testimonies of child victims as their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."
45 Even more, a child witness' testimony is enhanced when the accusations are directed against a close relative given the social stigma it may cause their entire family.
46In this case, considering AAA257134's age, it is unlikely that he would fabricate a story which would bring to the fore his harrowing experience in the hands of his very own uncle; more so, subject him and his family to trauma and humiliation arising from the public trial concomitant to the resolution of the case.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA when it ruled that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the lone and uncorroborated testimony of the victim, provided said testimony is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
47 Hence, petitioner's claim that the Medico-Legal Report revealed no evidence that AAA257134 suffered ano-genital injury or any sign of sexual abuse is of no moment.
As regards the charge for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610, the prosecution likewise proved the concurrence of the above-enumerated elements. The testimony of AAA257134 revealed that petitioner started molesting him when he was six (6) years old. Particularly, during his seventh birthday, petitioner made AAA257134 touch his penis and shake it up and down inside a room where AAA257134 and his grandmother were asleep. Petitioner then left the room after.
Petitioner, nonetheless, questions his conviction for Acts of Lasciviousness due to the discrepancy in the year the act of molestation, as alleged in the information, was committed and thereafter proved on trial. According to petitioner, AAA257134 averred that he was molested in 2011 on his seventh birthday. Petitioner, however, argued that AAA257134's seventh birthday was in 2012, hence, the information failed to sufficiently inform him of the date of the commission of the crime.
This argument is untenable.
The CA, citing various jurisprudence, aptly explained that in rape cases, the exact date of commission of sexual abuse is inconsequential on the ground that it "is not a material ingredient of the said crime."
48 More importantly, petitioner did not deny that he was with AAA257134 on his seventh birthday. No sufficient proof was likewise offered showing the impossibility of committing the crime imputed against petitioner on said day. At this point, it is not amiss for the Court to point out that AAA257134 testified that petitioner started molesting him when he was six (6) years old and the incident that transpired on his seventh birthday is only one among the many abuses he experienced from petitioner.
In view of the foregoing discussions, the Court finds no reason to overturn the CA's findings, as there was no showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, petitioner's criminal liability in both Crim. Case No. 15-0425 and Crim. Case No. 15-0427 must be sustained.
Petitioner's criminal liability in both Crim. Case No. 15-0425 and Crim. Case No. 15-0427 having been established, the Court now goes to the proper nomenclature of the crimes that he committed, the imposable penalties, and his civil liability
ex delicto.
In
People v. Tulagan49 (
Tulagan), the Court, through Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, threshed out the "applicable laws and [consequent penalties] for the crimes of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct and rape by carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, in view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and Article 336 of the [RPC], as amended by [RA] 8353 and Section 5(b) of [RA] 7610."
50 For this purpose,
Tulagan provided a comprehensive table stating the proper nomenclature of crimes involving sexual abuse against children, to wit:
51 |
Crime Committed: | Age of Victim: | Under 12 years old or demented | 12 years old or below 18, or 18 under special circumstances | 18 years old and above
|
| Acts of Lasciviousness committed against children exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse | Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period | Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua | Not applicable |
| Sexual Assault committed against children exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse | Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period | Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua | Not applicable |
| Sexual Intercourse committed against children exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse | Rape under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC: reclusion perpetua, except when the victim is below 7 years old in which case death penalty shall be imposed | Sexual Abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua | Not applicable |
| Rape by carnal knowledge | Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC: reclusion perpetua, except when the victim is below 7 years old in which case death penalty shall be imposed | Rape under Article 266- A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC: reclusion perpetua | Rape under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC: reclusion perpetua |
| Rape through Sexual Assault | Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period | Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua | Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC: prision mayor |
Pursuant to
Tulagan, the nomenclature of the crime that petitioner committed in Crim. Case No. 15-0425 is "
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610" which has the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period,
i.e., fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), as well as the absence of any modifying circumstances in this case, the minimum term of the imposable penalty should be taken from
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which has the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months; whereas the maximum term of the imposable penalty should be taken from the medium period of the prescribed penalty, which has the range of fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and nine (9) days. Given the foregoing, the Court sentences petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, and in accordance with
Tulagan,
52 petitioner should also pay AAA257134 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until full payment.
However, as regards Crim. Case No. 15-0427, there is a need to modify certain aspects of the CA ruling.
First, it is well to point out that the CA found petitioner liable for
Qualified Sexual Assault, due to the existence of the qualifying circumstance of minority (
i.e., AAA257134 was just nine [9] years old when the crime occurred) and relationship (
i.e., petitioner is AAA257134's "uncle"). However, while such minority and relationship were indeed alleged in the information, a closer perusal of the records would readily show that their relationship is neither by consanguinity nor by affinity; rather, petitioner is a mere adoptive uncle of AAA257134. In
Reyes v. Elquiero (
Reyes),
53 the Court, through Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, held that "[t]he legal relationship created by adoption extends only to the adopter and the adoptee."
Reyes further reiterated the ruling in
Teotico v. Del Van Chan54 which declared that:
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and do not extend to the relatives of either.
55 (Emphasis supplied) In light of this, the qualifying circumstance of relationship between petitioner and AAA257134 is absent. As such, the Sexual Assault committed by petitioner against AAA257134 is not in its qualified form, but merely in its simple form. Furthermore, pursuant to
Tulagan, the proper nomenclature of the crime petitioner committed in Crim. Case No. 15-0427 is
Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, which has the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period,
i.e., fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Considering the provisions of the ISL, as well as the absence of any modifying circumstances in this case, the minimum term of the imposable penalty should be taken from
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which has the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months; whereas the maximum term of the imposable penalty should be taken from the medium period of the prescribed penalty, which has the range of fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and nine (9) days. Given the foregoing, the Court sentences petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, and in accordance with
Tulagan,
56 petitioner should also pay AAA257134 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until full payment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 3, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 1, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42290 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
- In Criminal Case No. 15-0425, petitioner XXX257134 is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610. Petitioner is thus sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay AAA257134 the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
- In Criminal Case No. 15-0427, petitioner XXX257134 is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay AAA257134 the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and
J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
1 The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, household members, and/or accused, shall be withheld pursuant to RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in
People v. Cadano, Jr.
, 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014] [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013] [Per J. Brion, Second Division]. See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.)
2 Rollo, 12-99.
3 Id. at 108-132. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (+) (former member of the Court) with Associate Justices Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin, concurring.
4 Id. at 135-136. Penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin with Associate Justices Maria Elisa Sempio-Diy and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.
5 Id. at 229-243. Penned by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray.
6 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992.
7 Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on September 30, 1997.
8 Rollo, p. 137.
9 Id. at 109, 137, and 158.
10 Id. at 109, 137, and 157.
11 Id. at 139.
12 See
id. at 110.
13 "June 24, 2014" in the CA Decision;
id.
14 See
id. at 110 and 138.
15 Id. at 249.
16 Id. at 111.
17 Id. at 116.
18 Id. at 111.
19 Id. at 111-112.
20 Id. at 112 and 143-144.
21 Id. at 46-49 and 117-180.
22 Id. at 137-151. Docketed as Crim Case Nos. 15-0425 and 0427, and penned by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray.
23 Id. at 151.
24 See
id. at 147-151.
25 See Appellant's Brief dated January 10, 2019;
id. at 152-226.
26 Id. at 108-133.
27 Id. at 131-132.
28 See
id. at 115-131.
29 Id. at 293-349.
30 Id. at 135-136.
31 People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247-248 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
32 See Ricalde v. People, 751 Phil. 793, 815 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
33 See People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. 839, 883 (2017) [Per J. Tijam,
En Banc]; and People v. Alfredo, 653 Phil. 435, 451-452 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division].
34 See People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 197-198 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
35 See People v. Jagdon. Jr., G.R. No. 242882, September 9, 2020 [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division].
36 See G.R. No. 249131, December 6, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, Third Division].
37 Id., citing People v. Egan, 432 Phil. 74, 84 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
38 Rollo, p. 139.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 41-44.
42 Fernandez v. People, 843 Phil. 745, 752 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
43 People v. Salaver, 839 Phil. 90, 104 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], citing People v. Descartin, 810 Phil. 881, 893 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, Third Division].
44 751 Phil. 793 (2015) [Third Division].
45 Id. at 805, citing People v. Olivia, 616 Phil. 786, 792 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
46 See People v. Esperanza, 453 Phil. 54 (2003) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr.,
En Banc].
47 People v. Alicante, 388 Phil. 233, 249 (2000) [
Per Curiam,
En Banc].
48 Rollo, p. 121, citing People v. Cinco, 622 Phil. 858 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
49 849 Phil. 197 (2019) [
En Banc].
50 Id. at 248.
51 Id. at 248-249.
52 See
id. at 292.
53 G.R. No. 210487, September 2, 2020 [Third Division].
54 121 Phil. 392 (1965) [Per J. Bautista Angelo,
En Banc].
55 Id. at 398; citation omitted.
56 People v. Tulagan,
supra note 49, at 292.