A.M. No. P-1356 - Zari vs. Flores

Case Summary (A.M. No. P-1356)

Procedural Background

Judge Zari transmitted a letter to the Supreme Court recommending the dismissal of Deputy Clerk Flores on three main grounds. The Supreme Court required Flores to answer and transferred the matter to the First Division. After pleadings, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation. District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol conducted the investigation, submitted findings and recommended separation from the service. The Supreme Court reviewed the investigative record, the parties’ pleadings, and the evidence and issued the final disposition.

Specific Charges Alleged

Conviction for libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 (Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Quezon City) — alleged to be a crime involving moral turpitude.
Persistent attempts to unduly influence or exert undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI — evidenced by handwritten notes directed to the presiding judge and the deputy clerk, and conduct while assigned to the branch.
Gross discourtesy and use of contemptuous language toward superior judges — exemplified by a letter dated March 11, 1976 addressed to the City Judges, and alleged insubordination and disrespect.
Additional charge arising in the investigation: making a false sworn statement in his personal affidavit (June 10, 1969) claiming no prior criminal record despite the libel conviction.

Respondent’s Defenses and Explanatory Allegations

Flores denied that his libel conviction involved moral turpitude and asserted that officials with prior libel convictions had been appointed to public positions. He denied influencing judicial disposition, contending instead that he effectively performed the work of the presiding judge and tutored the judge in legal matters. He recounted factual circumstances (trial-related ocular inspection, a lunch encounter, and alleged instructions to prepare or not prepare reports) to show his interactions were professional and not corruptive. Regarding his March 11, 1976 letter, he characterized the language as strong but justified expression of indignation due to what he considered an unlawful or unduly motivated transfer. He also argued that his reassignment was effected under Administrative Order No. 6 and PD 807 and thus was proper.

Investigation Findings (Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol)

The investigating judge found: (a) Flores had been convicted of libel in 1967 and paid a fine in 1974; (b) the handwritten notes and other writing by Flores evidenced intervention in pending cases and attempts to influence case disposition; (c) the March 11, 1976 letter contained gratuitously strong and contemptuous language toward superior judges; (d) Flores’s personal affidavit containing the assertion of no prior criminal record was untrue, constituting prevarication and potentially perjury; and (e) the combination of these actions amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) (including conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, falsification/false statements, discourtesy/insubordination, and other listed offenses).

Legal Analysis Applied by the Investigating Judge and the Court

Moral turpitude: The investigative report surveyed authorities and concluded that moral turpitude generally denotes conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals, and enumerated a range of crimes conventionally held to involve moral turpitude, including libel in the authorities cited. The report acknowledged that conviction for libel does not automatically mandate removal but observed that the conviction demonstrates a propensity to malign others and, together with subsequent disrespectful conduct, supports disciplinary measures.
Undue influence and interference: The handwritten notes (exhibits in the record) were treated as direct evidence of intervention in cases pending before Branch VI. The investigative judge relied on analogous authorities recognizing that attempts to influence a judge or court proceedings are gravely prejudicial to the administration of justice and may warrant exclusion from public service.
Discourtesy/insubordination: The March 11, 1976 letter’s content was described in detail by the record; its tone and passages were regarded as uncalled for and contemptuous toward fellow judges. The investigative analysis invoked standards that public servants, especially those involved in court administration, must maintain proper decorum and that disrespectful language toward the judiciary undermines public confidence and the administration of justice.
False sworn statement: Flores’s sworn declaration of no criminal record on his application was factually false given his libel conviction. The investigating judge treated this prevarication in a sworn instrument as an independent ground for serious discipline under provisions criminalizing falsification and under PD 807’s disciplinary categories.
Cumulative assessment: While a single allegation (e.g., the libel conviction) might not alone warrant dismissal, the court and investigative factfinder assessed the cumulative effect of the conviction, the handwritten notes indicating interference, the contemptuous letter, and the false sworn statement as demonstrating unfitness for continued public employment in the position of deputy clerk of court.

Supreme Court’s Conclusion and Disposition

The Supreme Court found the investigative findings supported by the record. It held that although conviction for libel alone did not necessarily require removal, in this record the conviction, together with the March 11 letter and the handwritten notes showing interference in pending cases, demonstrated a propensity to malign and impro

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. P-1356)

Case Citation and Panel

Citation: 183 Phil. 27; FIRST DIVISION; A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356; Decision dated November 21, 1979.
Member of the Court writing the decision: Fernandez, J.
Justices concurring in the decision: Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, JJ.
Procedural posture: Administrative matter filed by Presiding Judge Remigio E. Zari against Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores; case transferred to the First Division; investigated by an Executive Judge-appointed investigating judge; recommendation adopted by the Supreme Court leading to dismissal of respondent from the service.

Parties and Positions

Complainant: Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City.
Respondent: Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City (later reassigned/transferred).
Role of investigating judge: District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol (Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City) conducted investigation, filed report and recommendation.

Origin and Initial Complaint

Date and form of complaint: Letter dated July 15, 1976 from Judge Remigio E. Zari addressed to the Supreme Court recommending dismissal of Diosdado S. Flores.
Grounds asserted by complainant in letter (as summarized in his July 15, 1976 submission):
- Conviction for libel (April 28, 1967, Criminal Case No. Q-7171, Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Quezon City), described as "a crime involving moral turpitude"; alleged fine and payment (complainant's letter states fine of P500.00 paid July 18, 1974, Official Receipt No. 4736418).
- Persistent attempts to unduly influence the presiding judge amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI, evidenced by handwritten notes to Judge Zari and to the then deputy clerk Atty. Reynaldo Elcano; asserted persistence of such conduct after respondent's relief/transfer on March 8, 1976 in at least three Branch VI cases.
- Gross discourtesy to superior officers manifested by uncalled-for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in a letter dated March 11, 1976 addressed to the City Judges.

Procedural Steps Taken by the Supreme Court

July 29, 1976: Supreme Court resolution required respondent to file answer to Judge Zari’s letter; case transferred to the First Division.
Respondent filed answer on August 12, 1976.
September 1, 1976: Supreme Court required Judge Zari to file reply to respondent’s answer within ten (10) days.
Administrative referral: Case referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation after City Judges Minerva Genovea and Aloysius Alday inhibited.
Investigation conducted by District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol, who submitted findings and recommendation.

Charges / Allegations (as framed in complaint and investigation)

Charge 1: Conviction for libel (allegedly involving moral turpitude) — Criminal Case No. Q-7171, April 28, 1967.
- Multiple references in record to the fine and official receipt: complainant’s letter refers to P500.00 paid July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 4736418; investigating judge’s report references a sentence to pay a fine of P5,000.00 paid July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418 (both entries appear in the record).
Charge 2: Persistent attempts to unduly influence complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI — evidenced by respondent's handwritten notes and other interventions in specific pending criminal cases.
Charge 3: Gross discourtesy to superior officers — use of strong, contemptuous and uncalled-for language in letter dated March 11, 1976 to the City Judges (Exhibit "D").
Additional charge arising in investigation: False sworn statements / prevarication — respondent’s affidavit dated June 10, 1969 stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record," which conflicts with existence of prior conviction(s) disclosed in the record.

Respondent’s Answer and Defenses (August 12, 1976)

Denied that his libel conviction involved moral turpitude.
Asserted that Commissioner Abelardo Subido, also convicted of libel and fined P5,000.00, had approved respondent’s appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court, implying appointment approval despite conviction.
Denied attempting to unduly influence Judge Zari in his official duties.
Defended the March 11, 1976 letter as strong but not contemptuous, characterizing it as the expression of "an aggrieved employee" deserving better treatment after "more than six years and nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service" in the City Court.
Claimed that any favors requested of complainant were done in the spirit of friendship, reflecting a prior rapport with Judge Zari before respondent left Branch VI on March 9, 1976.
Asserted that from October 15, 1975 to his transfer on March 8, 1976 he was "practically doing the work" of the complainant, tutoring him on finer interpretation and application of the law, and preparing decisions in criminal and civil cases — thus denying undue influence.
Alleged instances supporting claim of attempted corruption by complainant:
- On January 8, 1976, after trials in Criminal Case No. VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two cases vs. Emerito Lim, Judge Zari allegedly instructed respondent to conduct an ocular inspection and invited respondent to lunch at Alfredo’s Steakhouse, where respondent alleges he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja, and defense counsel; respondent alleges Zari later directed him not to prepare the ocular inspection report and that thereafter he did not see case records.
- In Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria Tolentino (estafa), respondent alleges he was instructed to convict the accused because complainant was related to a Judge Erochi.
- In Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 (theft), respondent alleges Judge Zari instructed him to convict Dominador Garcia y Orteza because the complainant is "AVESCO."
Contended the March 11 letter was provoked by what respondent termed an “engineered” illegal transfer from Branch VI pursuant to Exhibit "43" and Administrative Order No. 6 (reassignment authority), and that his language was a justifiable manifestation of indignation and disgust at the transfer.

Complainant’s Reply to Respondent’s Answer

Reiterated denial of allowing respondent to interfere in preparation of orders and decisions.
Asserted he was not naively tutored by a non-lawyer; denied instructing respondent to perform ocular inspection or inviting him to lunch; described seeing respondent in Alfredo’s in company of the accused and counseling him to be circumspect.
Admitted records for certain cases were removed from respondent’s access after observed conduct, explaining that he had records brought into his chamber to prevent manipulation.
Denied instructing respondent to convict in