G.R. No. 102342 - Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 102342)

Key Dates and Constitutional Basis

Offense: May 11, 1990.
Complaint to prosecutor: May 30, 1990.
Information filed in court: October 2, 1990.
Decision date: July 3, 1992 — the Court applied the 1987 Philippine Constitution (noting Article VIII, Section 5(5) limitation on rule-making that cannot alter substantive rights).

Applicable Law

Rule on Summary Procedure (1983/1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), especially Section 1 (scope) and Section 9 (how commenced). This Rule covers violations of municipal or city ordinances and provides that such cases are to be commenced by filing complaint or information directly in court without need of prior preliminary examination or investigation.
Act No. 3326 (periods of prescription for violations penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances): violations penalized by municipal ordinances prescribe after two months; prescription begins to run from commission of the violation; prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party, and begins to run again if proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. The Act refers to "judicial proceedings."
Rule 110, Section 1, Rules on Criminal Procedure (as revised): contains the rule that institution of criminal action for offenses not subject to summary procedure may be by filing complaint with prosecutor and states that "in all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription."
Controlling principle on rule-making: the Court cannot, under the Constitution, by rule diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights — and prescription is a substantive right.

Issue Presented

Whether the filing of a complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990 interrupted the two-month prescriptive period for a municipal-ordinance violation committed on May 11, 1990, or whether prescription ran uninterrupted because the case was not filed in court until October 2, 1990.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner: The two-month prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 ran from May 11, 1990 and expired on July 11, 1990; because the information was filed only on October 2, 1990, the charge had prescribed.
Prosecution and respondent judge: Filing of the complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990 constituted an institution of proceedings that interrupted prescription; the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 applying to institution of criminal action interrupts prescription "in all cases."

Court’s Legal Analysis — Scope of the Rule on Summary Procedure

The Court determined that violations of municipal ordinances — punishable by penalties not exceeding six months or fines within the Rule’s parameters — fall squarely within the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because the offense in question is a municipal-ordinance violation (penalty cannot exceed six months under Section 447 of the Local Government Code), Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure is controlling: the case is commenced only when the complaint or information is filed directly in court, and the provision contemplates that the filing in court is the operative event for commencement even if the prosecutor may, as a matter of practice, conduct a preliminary investigation.

Court’s Legal Analysis — Meaning of “Proceedings” and the Effect of Filing with the Prosecutor

The Court distinguished between administrative or prosecutorial acts and judicial proceedings. Act No. 3326 refers to the suspension (interruption) of prescription when "proceedings are instituted" and the Court interpreted those to mean judicial proceedings. The filing of a complaint with the prosecutor’s office, while it may be an initiating act for investigation, is not a judicial proceeding that interrupts prescription for municipal-ordinance violations governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the prosecutorial filing does not constitute commencement of the case; the running of prescription is halted only when the case is actually filed in court.

Court’s Analysis — Relationship among Act No. 3326, Rule on Summary Procedure, and Rule 110

The Court held that if there is any conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110, the special law (Rule on Summary Procedure) governs municipal-ordinance cases. The Court further held that where there is a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110, Rule 110 must yield because the Court, in promulgating rules of procedure, cannot alter substantive rights (prescription being substantive) under the Constitution. The last-paragraph phrase in Rule 110 ("in all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription") was read in context: it applies to the cases within Section 1 (i.e., offenses not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure), not to summary-procedure offenses. Thus, the filing with the prosecutor does not interrupt prescription for municipal-ordinance violations governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Distinction from Francisco and Precedential Considerations

The Court examined Francisco v. Court of Appeals (promulgated before the Rule on Summary Procedure) and reasoned that Francisco’s dictum that filing of a complaint in Municipal Court, even for preliminary investigation, interrupts pres

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 102342)

Facts

The petitioner, Luz M. Zaldivia, was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.
The alleged commission date of the offense was May 11, 1990.
The police referral-complaint was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
The information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed; the motion was denied by the Municipal Trial Court and the denial was sustained by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal.

Procedural History

Complaint received by Provincial Prosecutor: May 30, 1990.
Information filed with Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez: October 2, 1990.
Motion to quash on ground of prescription: denied by Municipal Trial Court.
Appeal to Regional Trial Court: denial sustained by respondent judge (Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr.).
Petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court challenging the RTC order.

Issue Presented

Whether the applicable law suspends or interrupts the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances by the filing of a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, such that the information filed on October 2, 1990 was timely.

Statutory and Rule Provisions Invoked by Parties (as presented in the source)

Rule on Summary Procedure:
- Section 1. Scope — governs procedure in Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for, inter alia, "Violations of municipal or city ordinances" and "All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both" (emphasis supplied in source).
- Section 9. How commenced — "The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party." (emphasis supplied in source).
Act No. 3326, as amended ("An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run"):
- Section 1 — "Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months." (emphasis supplied in source).
- Section 2 — "Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy." (emphasis supplied in source).
- Section 3 — defines special acts for purposes of the Act as "acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (emphasis supplied in source).
Section 1, Rule 110, Rules on Criminal Procedure (as invoked by respondents and Solicitor General):
- Provides methods for instituting criminal action for offenses not subject to summary procedure in special cases; includes paragraph stating that "In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged." (emphasis supplied in source).

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner contends that the charge is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure because the offense is a violation of a municipal ordinance and the penalty cannot exceed six months.
Under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by municipal ordinances prescribe after two months from commission.
The information was filed well beyond the two-month statutory period (May 11, 1990 commission; October 2, 1990 information), and therefore the charge had prescribed.
The petitioner argues that the filing with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990 did not interrupt prescription because the Rule on Summary Procedure requires that such cases be commenced by filing directly in court, and only the filing in court can commence the case for purposes of prescription.

Prosecution and Respondent Arguments

The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint with the Office