G.R. No. 170979 - Yu vs. Samson-Tatad

Case Summary (G.R. No. 170979)

Key Dates

May 26, 2005 – Conviction of petitioner for estafa by RTC
June 9, 2005 – Filing of motion for new trial
October 17, 2005 – Denial of motion for new trial
November 3, 2005 – Receipt of notice of denial
November 16, 2005 – Filing of notice of appeal invoking “fresh period rule”
January 26, 2006 – Filing of petition for prohibition
February 9, 2011 – Decision of the Supreme Court

Applicable Law

– 1987 Constitution of the Philippines (rule-making power of the Supreme Court)
– Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 39 (15-day appeal period in all cases)
– Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (15-day civil appeal period interrupted by motion for new trial)
– Rule 122, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (15-day criminal appeal period suspended by motion for new trial)
– Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, 469 SCRA 633 (2005) (enunciation of “fresh period rule” in civil appeals)

Factual Background

Spouses Casaclang filed a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC convicted Yu on May 26, 2005, sentencing her to arresto mayor for three months, a fine of ₱3,800,000 with subsidiary imprisonment, and payment of indemnity in the same amount.

Procedural History

Within 14 days of conviction, Yu filed a motion for new trial on June 9, 2005, alleging newly discovered evidence. The RTC denied the motion on October 17, 2005. Petitioner received notice of the denial on November 3, 2005, and, relying on the Supreme Court’s Neypes ruling, filed a notice of appeal on November 16, 2005—within 15 days of receipt. The prosecution moved to dismiss the appeal as late-filed, asserting Neypes did not apply to criminal cases. It also moved for execution of the decision. On January 26, 2006, Yu filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the RTC from acting on those motions.

Issue

Whether the “fresh period rule” established in Neypes for civil appeals extends to criminal appeals under Section 6 of Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Court’s Analysis

   Appeal is a statutory privilege, available only in the manner the law prescribes.

   Section 39 of BP 129 affords a 15-day appeal period in all cases, civil and criminal, counted from notice of final judgment.

   Rule 41, Section 3 and Rule 122, Section 6 both interrupt or suspend the 15-day period while a motion for new trial is pending, resuming the count upon service of the order denying the motion.

   In Neypes, the Court standardized appeal periods in civil cases by granting a fresh 15-day period from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

   BP 129’s uniform language, together with the functional identity of Rules 41 and 122, compels the same treatment of civil and criminal appeal periods. A distinction would unjustly favor civil lit

Case Summary (G.R. No. 170979)

Key Dates

Applicable Law

Factual Background

Procedural History

Issue

Court’s Analysis

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 170979)

Factual Antecedents

Procedural History

Petitioner's Contentions