Title
Yamamoto vs. Nishino Leather Industries, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 150283
Decision Date
Apr 16, 2008
Yamamoto sought to recover machinery from NLII, claiming ownership. Courts ruled machinery as corporate property, rejecting veil-piercing and estoppel claims, upholding corporate legal separation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 175581)

Petitioner

Ryuichi Yamamoto

Respondents

Nishino Leather Industries, Inc. (formerly WAKO)
Ikuo Nishino

Key Dates

• 1983 – Organization of WAKO under Philippine law.
• 1987 – Memorandum of Agreement for 70% share acquisition by Nishino.
• October 30, 1991 – Atty. Doce’s letter offering Yamamoto the return of certain machinery, subject to valuation deduction.
• January 15, 1992 – Yamamoto’s replevin complaint filed before RTC Makati.
• June 9, 1995 – RTC decision awarding Yamamoto ownership of the seized machinery.
• May 30, 2001 – Court of Appeals decision reversing RTC and dismissing the complaint.
• April 16, 2008 – Supreme Court decision denying Yamamoto’s petition.

Applicable Law

– 1987 Philippine Constitution
– Corporation Code, particularly sections governing corporate powers and board authority (e.g., Section 23)
– Civil Code of the Philippines, Articles 1181 (conditional obligations), 1318–1319 (requisites for contracts)
– Jurisprudence on piercing the corporate veil (instrumentality and alter-ego doctrines)
– Trust fund doctrine concerning corporate capital and protection of corporate creditors

Facts

  1. Yamamoto organized WAKO in 1983 with a minority share.
  2. In 1987, the Nishinos acquired over 70% of WAKO, diluting Yamamoto’s equity to about 10%.
  3. Negotiations for a full buy-out ensued. On October 30, 1991, Atty. Doce sent a letter stating that Yamamoto could remove certain tanning machinery, “provided the value … is deducted from … capital contributions.”
  4. Yamamoto, relying on this letter, sought replevin of the machinery in January 1992.
  5. The RTC granted replevin and declared Yamamoto owner of the machinery.
  6. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the machinery to be corporate property, not subject to unilateral removal without board authorization, and rejecting promissory estoppel.

Issues

  1. Whether Atty. Doce’s letter bound NLII to allow Yamamoto to remove the machinery.
  2. Whether the corporate veil must be pierced to recognize Yamamoto’s claim.
  3. Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to compel NLII to honor the letter.
  4. Whether respondents are liable for attorney’s fees.

Decision

The petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

Corporate Authority and Board Resolution

Under the Corporation Code, corporate powers are exercised by the Board of Directors unless otherwise provided. A mere letter from corporate counsel, without a board resolution authorizing such act, cannot bind the corporation. Here, NLII’s board never approved the removal of machinery, so the letter constituted no binding corporate act.

Piercing the Corporate Veil

The alter-ego doctrine requires (1) complete domination of finances, policy, and practice; (2) use of that control to commit fraud or wrong; and (3) proximate causation of injury. Mere majority ownership, even near total control, is insufficient. There was no clear and convincing evidence that the Nishinos treated NLII as a sham or used its corporate form to perpetrate injustice against Yamamoto.

Promissory Estoppel

Promissory estoppel arises only from an unqualified promise intended for reliance, and reliance that would make failure to enforce the p

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster—building context before diving into full texts.