Title
Yam vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 104726
Decision Date
Feb 11, 1999
Petitioners claimed full loan payment, citing oral waiver of penalties, but SC ruled voucher notation insufficient; liability upheld due to lack of written condonation.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 104726)

Factual Background

On May 10, 1979, Manphil Investment Corporation extended a loan of P500,000.00 to petitioners under a Loan Agreement with Assumption of Solidary Liability secured by a deed of chattel mortgage on printing machinery and bearing terms of twelve percent annual interest, two percent monthly penalty, one and one-half percent monthly service charge, and ten percent attorney’s fees. Petitioners obtained a second Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund loan of P300,000.00 evidenced by promissory notes dated July 3, 1981 and September 30, 1981 and under a new loan agreement that increased annual interest to fourteen percent and reduced the service charge to one percent per annum; the deed of chattel mortgage was amended accordingly. Petitioners paid the first loan in full on April 2, 1985. After Central Bank placed Manphil Investment Corporation under receivership on November 4, 1985, with Ricardo Lirio and Cristina Destajo appointed receiver and in-house examiner respectively, petitioners made a partial payment of P50,000.00 on May 17, 1986 and wrote a settlement proposal dated June 18, 1986; Manphil, through counsel, replied on July 2, 1986 with a conditional offer to reduce penalty charges up to P140,000.00 if petitioners paid by July 30, 1986. As of July 31, 1986 petitioners’ total liability on the second loan computed to P727,001.35, and petitioners paid P410,854.47 by a Pilipinas Bank check; the corresponding voucher bore the notation “full payment of IGLF LOAN.” Manphil thereafter sent demand letters on September 4 and 25, 1986 for the balance of P266,146.88 and instituted suit in the Regional Trial Court for collection and, alternatively, foreclosure.

Trial Court Proceedings

In the Regional Trial Court, petitioners answered that they had fully paid their obligation pursuant to an alleged oral agreement in which Carlos Sobrepenas, president of Manphil, allegedly waived penalties and service charges provided petitioners paid principal and interest as of July 31, 1986 less the prior P50,000.00 payment; petitioners relied on the voucher notation and testimony to support the alleged condonation. On April 30, 1990, the trial court ruled against petitioners and ordered them to pay jointly and severally the principal loan balance of P266,146.88 as of September 4, 1986 plus interest at fourteen percent per annum, service charge at one percent per annum, penalty fees at two percent per month, attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount to be recovered, and costs, and declared the chattel mortgage foreclosed in the event of nonpayment.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. The appellate disposition left undisturbed the trial court’s order for payment of P266,146.88 plus the specified interest, service charges, penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs and the foreclosure remedy in case of nonpayment.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether petitioners remained liable for penalties and service charges on the second loan in the amount of P266,146.88 despite the July 31, 1986 payment and the voucher notation of “full payment of IGLF LOAN,” and whether petitioners' factual assertions—especially oral condonation and nonreceipt of demand letters—were sufficient to discharge the indebtedness.

Petitioners' Contentions

Petitioners contended that they had fully paid the loan pursuant to an oral agreement with Sobrepenas whereby penalties and service charges were waived if petitioners paid principal and interest, computed as of July 31, 1986 less P50,000.00; they relied on the voucher notation that their check was for “full payment of IGLF loan” as documentary proof of condonation and pointed to the signature of Central Bank examiner Cristina L. Destajo on the voucher as corroboration. Petitioners also alleged that they did not receive the two demand letters sent in September 1986.

Respondent's Position and Proof

Manphil Investment Corporation maintained that any express condonation must comply with the formalities of donation under the Civil Code and that no written condonation existed. Manphil argued that the notation on the voucher reflected petitioners’ intent in making payment and did not bind the corporation; it noted that the notation did not appear in a receipt issued by the receiver and that petitioners had not requested a certificate of full payment as they had in respect of the first loan. Manphil further stressed that after Central Bank’s appointment of a receiver on November 4, 1985, corporate officers lacked authority to condone debts; thus Sobrepenas had no power to bind the corporation, and Destajo’s countersignature only acknowledged receipt and did not constitute an assent to condonation.

Supreme Court's Analysis on Formalities of Condonation

The Court observed that Art. 1270, par. 2 of the Civil Code requires that express condonation comply with the forms of donation. The Court recalled that Art. 748, par. 3 of the Civil Code requires a written donation and acceptance for movables valued in excess of P5,000.00, and that under Art. 417, par. 1 of the Civil Code obligations, referring to credits, are movable property. Because the alleged condonation was not reduced to writing, the Court held it was void. The Court further explained that the voucher notation “full payment of IGLF loan” merely stated petitioners’ intention and did not bind Manphil; it would have been different if the notation had appeared in a receipt issued by the corporation through its receiver, which would operate as an admission against interest. The Court also remarked that petitioners knew the proper practice, having obtained a certificate of full payment for their first loan, and therefore had an avenue to secure written proof which they did not pursue for the second loan.

Supreme Court's Analysis on Authority under Receivership

The Court emphasized that Central Bank’s appointment of a receiver on November 4, 1985 suspended the authority of the corporation and of its directors and officers over corporate property and effects, such authority being reposed in the receiver. Relying on the doctrine in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 395 (1995), the Court concluded that Sobrepenas lacked authority to condone petitioners’ indebtedness after receivers

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