Title
XXXvs. People
Case
G.R. No. 252087
Decision Date
Feb 10, 2021
Petitioner acquitted of violating Anti-Violence Against Women Act; Supreme Court ruled no intent to cause psychological violence, citing PTSD impairing his ability to provide financial support.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 155407)

Core factual allegations and procedural posture

An Information (October 12, 2016) charged petitioner with violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 by allegedly willfully, unlawfully and feloniously depriving or denying his minor child, CCC, of financial support, thereby causing mental and emotional anguish to AAA. The RTC conducted a full trial after petitioner pleaded not guilty. The RTC convicted petitioner on March 19, 2018. The CA affirmed with modification (adding a fine and mandatory counseling) on November 5, 2019 and denied reconsideration. Petitioner filed a Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court seeking acquittal, which was granted.

Prosecution’s Evidence

Testimony and documentary proof supporting the charge

Prosecution witnesses included AAA and BBB. AAA testified that she and petitioner cohabited since 1997, CCC was born November 3, 2000, and petitioner and AAA were married May 17, 2001. AAA testified she had no independent income and was dependent on petitioner or her sister. Petitioner allegedly provided P1,000–P2,000 monthly before 2005, then suddenly stopped providing support in 2005. Barangay conciliation allegedly resulted in an agreement for petitioner to provide P4,000 monthly, which petitioner did not honor except for a single P1,000 payment. BBB corroborated that she financially supported AAA and CCC for years, covering schooling and remittances from her US pension. Documentary exhibits included CCC’s birth certificate and the couple’s marriage certificate.

Defense Evidence

Petitioner’s account, corroborating witnesses, and expert testimony

Petitioner admitted living with AAA and acknowledged prior intermittent support but asserted he stopped living with AAA in 2005 because of alleged violence and harassment by AAA (including an incident where AAA threw a stainless dustpan causing a scar). He testified he offered P1,000–P2,000 monthly and offered to pay for CCC’s education in public school, but AAA refused these offers during barangay and prosecutorial conciliation. Petitioner said he worked as a mechanic (including 2005–2010 in his father’s shop), later became unemployed, and was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease in 2011. Neighbors and a barangay official testified to petitioner’s physical capability but limited activity. Psychologist Jesselyn Mortejo conducted evaluations (clinical interviews and screening instruments) and diagnosed PTSD symptoms, including pronounced avoidance and paranoid ideations that, in her opinion, significantly impaired petitioner’s capacity to work and function outside a secure home environment. Mortejo clarified petitioner was not insane and retained moral reasoning and awareness of his support obligations; she opined symptoms could be managed with therapy and medication but not cured.

RTC Findings and Rationale

Trial court’s assessment and conviction

The RTC credited the prosecution’s evidence and found all elements of Section 5(i) proven, following the elements set out in Dinamling: (1) offended party is a woman and/or her child; (2) relationship element (wife, former wife, or woman with whom offender has a common child); (3) offender causes mental or emotional anguish to the woman/child; and (4) anguish is caused through denial of financial support. The RTC relied on documentary proof for elements (1) and (2), and on testimonial evidence (AAA’s distress, BBB’s support and observations, petitioner seen with another woman, barangay conciliation breakdown, and multiple complaints filed) to satisfy elements (3) and (4). The RTC found petitioner physically capable of supporting CCC (noting appearance, ability to post bail, and hire counsel) and rejected the defense of incapacity.

Court of Appeals Disposition

CA’s decision and modifications

The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction but modified the penalty by adding a fine of P100,000 and ordering mandatory psychological or psychiatric treatment with compliance reporting to the CA. The CA noted, however, that the trial court had not applied Section 6(f) of R.A. 9262, which the CA nonetheless deemed a curable procedural oversight.

Issue on Review

Legal question before the Supreme Court

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC’s judgment finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262—specifically whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s acts constituted psychological violence causing mental or emotional anguish and that the denial of support was intentional or voluntary.

Governing Legal Principles

Elements of Section 5(i) and standards of proof

Section 5(i) penalizes acts that cause mental or emotional anguish through denial of financial support. Two indispensable requirements identified: (1) psychological violence (the means employed), and (2) resultant emotional anguish or mental suffering (the effect on the offended party). Although R.A. 9262 punishes mala prohibita acts, the prosecution must still prove that the prohibited act was intentional or voluntary—i.e., that the accused’s conduct was not merely an involuntary failure to provide support. The Court distinguished psychological violence (Section 3(C)) from economic abuse (Section 3(D)) and noted jurisprudence (Melgar) holding economic abuse prosecuted under different subsections (e.g., Section 5(e)).

Analysis of Evidence on Psychological Violence and Causation

Court’s evaluation of whether mental anguish was proven and causation established

The Supreme Court found the prosecution established that petitioner failed to provide adequate support but concluded there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that such failure constituted psychological violence or caused AAA’s mental and emotional distress. The record showed petitioner made offers in 2005 to provide financial support (P1,000–P2,000 monthly, and proposals to open an account and pay schooling in public school), and that AAA refused these offers during barangay and prosecutorial negotiations. The Court emphasized that petitioner attempted to negotiate support within his means, and that AAA’s refusal and insistence on private schooling expectations were material to the parties’ impasse. Consequently, the Court could not conclude the failure to provide was willful or intended to inflict psychological violence upon AAA.

Mental Incapacity, PTSD Evidence, and Criminal Liability

Effect of petitioner’s PTSD diagnosis on voluntariness and criminal responsibility

The Court gave significant weight to Mortejo’s expert testimony that petitioner exhibited severe PTSD symptoms with pronounced avoidance and paranoid ideations, impeding his capacity to seek work or function outside a secure home environment. Although petitioner was not insane and retained moral awareness, the Court observed that his cognitive distortions and avoidance mechanisms effectively incapacitated him from performing the act (working and providing support) at the relevant time. Under criminal law principles cited (including People v. Lacerna), voluntariness of the prohibited act is a key inquiry even in mala prohibita offenses: if the accused did not, by volition, perpetrate the act, guilt cannot be established. The Supreme Court concluded that the combination of AAA’s refusal of petitioner’s offers and petitioner’s mental debilitation meant the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intentional or v

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