Title
Wilhensmina Coquia, et al. vs. Alfonso Cheong, et al.
Case
G.R. No. L-12288
Decision Date
May 30, 1958
Parents sued for damages after children's alleged food poisoning from ice cream; civil case dismissed due to failure to prosecute and improper suspension request.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-12288)

Factual Background

The action was brought by the parents of two minor children to recover damages for food poisoning which the children were alleged to have contracted by eating ice cream bought from the restaurant of one of the defendants but manufactured by the other defendants. The food poisoning was alleged to have been contracted on March 7, 1952. The plaintiffs did not file the civil case until March 12, 1955. After the defendants denied liability and the issues were joined, the case was set for hearing on May 17, 1955.

No actual trial took place on the first date. Trial commenced on June 16, after which plaintiffs had presented five witnesses. Thereafter, plaintiffs’ counsel, Atty. Gualberto Cruz, asked for a continuance, which the court granted, and the next hearing was set for June 20. On June 20, Atty. Cruz again sought postponement, citing illness. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing for June 24. The following day, June 21, Atty. Cruz filed a motion to withdraw, citing illness and an alleged conflict of opinion between him and his clients regarding how the case should be handled. Plaintiffs gave their conformity to the withdrawal and, on the same day, lodged a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila against the defendants alleging violation of the Foods and Drugs Act.

On June 23, plaintiffs invoked Rule 107, Section 1(c) and petitioned the trial court to suspend proceedings in the civil case until final judgment in the contemplated criminal case would have been rendered. The petition was set for hearing on June 24, which coincided with the date scheduled for the continuation of the trial. The trial court, in an order dated June 24, denied the petition, reasoning that Rule 107, Section 1(c) speaks of the suspension of the civil action after the criminal action has been commenced in court, and not merely after a complaint is filed with the prosecuting officer. In the same order, the court approved counsel’s withdrawal and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action with costs because plaintiffs failed to appear at the continuation of the hearing.

Procedural History

After the dismissal, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the amount involved exceeded P50,000.00. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal and raised multiple assignments of error.

The Parties’ Contentions

Plaintiffs contended first that the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on an alleged failure to comply with a requirement of three days notice concerning their petition to suspend. The Supreme Court observed that this contention proceeded from an erroneous premise, because the trial court did not dismiss the civil action on the notice defect alone. The trial court had noticed the violation of the rule on notice, yet it waived the technicality and denied the motion to suspend on the substantive ground that Rule 107, Section 1(c) does not operate before the criminal action is filed in court.

Plaintiffs also argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on supposed conclusions that plaintiffs intended to blackmail defendants and that liability was determined only on partial evidence. The Supreme Court reproduced the trial court’s reasoning: it perceived bad faith on the part of plaintiffs and a desire to coerce a settlement. The trial court noted that the civil action had been filed on March 12, 1955 for an act it referred to as committed on May 7, 1952, and it further observed that after the civil proceedings did not develop as plaintiffs expected and the evidence presented did not establish liability, plaintiffs filed a criminal action dated July 12, 1955, based on a record from the city fiscal (identified in the order as Slip No. 13217 of the City Fiscal’s Office). The trial court viewed the criminal complaint as a means to force defendants into a settlement, asserting that defendants had attempted to settle since May 7, 1955 and that the criminal complaint had failed to materialize as a real criminal proceeding.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed from and sustained the dismissal of plaintiffs’ civil action, with costs against the appellants.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court first addressed plaintiffs’ argument on the alleged failure to comply with the rule on three days notice. It held that the contention rested on an erroneous supposition because the lower court did not base the dismissal on that notice defect. Although the trial court noted the noncompliance, it waived the technicality. More importantly, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of Rule 107, Section 1(c). The Supreme Court held that the provision requiring suspension of the civil case applies only after the criminal action has been commenced in court, and not upon the mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting officer. Consequently, the denial of the petition to suspend was upheld.

On the trial court’s remarks about bad faith and attempted blackmail, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court’s characterization was not entirely groundless in context. It considered that the civil action was filed more than three years after the accrual of the cause of action, and it also took notice of the procedural moves for delay and the lower court’s impression regarding the strength of the evidence already presented. For that reason, the Supreme Court found the trial court’s “supposition” about pla

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