G.R. No. 202414 - Wee vs. Mardo

Case Summary (G.R. No. 202414)

Factual Background

Respondent Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo, was granted registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284 dated April 26, 1979 covering Lot No. 8348 located in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. Petitioner Josephine Wee alleged that on February 1, 1993 respondent conveyed to her a portion of Lot No. 8348 identified as Lot No. 8348-B through a Deed of Absolute Sale, for P250,000.00 that was fully paid. Petitioner further alleged that after the alleged sale, respondent refused to vacate and turn over the property, claiming that the sale was falsified.

On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration for Lot No. 8349 in Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. The application was amended on September 19, 1996 to cover Lot 8348-B. Petitioner claimed ownership of the unregistered land on the basis of the deed of absolute sale. Respondent opposed the amended application on September 19, 1997, asserting that she remained the true and lawful owner and alleging that petitioner’s deed of absolute sale was surreptitious.

RTC Proceedings and Grant of Registration

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 28, 2000, alleging that the land described in the application was different from the land claimed for titling. The RTC denied the motion. Respondent then filed motions for reconsideration and urgent motions for reconsideration, both of which the RTC likewise denied.

During the pendency of the case, petitioner completed presentation of evidence. On June 10, 2003, while the matter was still before the RTC, respondent was able to register the land in her name under OCT No. OP-1840. Petitioner annotated a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title on May 10, 2005.

Petitioner later sought to file a Supplemental Pleading and to admit an attached Supplemental Complaint for Reconveyance, but the RTC denied the request, reasoning that a reconveyance motion was different from an application for registration of title. Respondent then presented evidence through her counsel’s testimony that the parcel covered by the application was the property she bought about ten years earlier. Respondent did not name from whom she bought it. To show ownership, she presented copies of tax declarations, with the admitted absence of any deed of sale in her favor.

On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a decision granting petitioner’s application and directed the Administrator of LRA to issue the corresponding decree in petitioner’s name and the Register of Deeds of Cavite to issue title accordingly. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 96934.

Appellate Review in the Court of Appeals

On June 26, 2012, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It denied petitioner’s application for registration of Lot No. 8349 as described in the CA dispositive portion and set aside the RTC’s grant in LRC No. TG-647.

In its analysis, the CA focused first on possession and occupation. It ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The CA treated petitioner’s admissions that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her, due to objections and oppositions to her title, as indicating that she was not exercising the acts of dominion essential to the statutory element of possession and occupation.

A further and decisive consideration addressed by the Court’s later ruling was that the property was no longer unregistered land in view of the fact that it was already covered by respondent’s registered title under OCT No. OP-1840, issued as a consequence of a patent registered in the proper register.

Petitioner received the CA decision on July 2, 2012. She then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the CA judgment.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner assigned several errors, which, in substance, questioned both the CA’s assessment of compliance with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and the CA’s refusal to grant reconveyance in the same proceeding. She contended that she should be deemed in possession through her predecessor-in-interest, respondent, after the sale, and she argued that the lack of physical turnover should be treated as resulting from fortuitous circumstances that should not affect her right under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. She also claimed that respondent’s predecessor possessed the land under a bona fide claim since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Lastly, petitioner urged that the CA should have ordered reconveyance because respondent fraudulently secured the registration after petitioner’s purchase, to avoid multiplicity of suits and end the dispute.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Denial of Registration

The Court ruled that the petition deserved no merit. It reiterated that P.D. No. 1529 governs original registration of unregistered land, and that an application under Sec. 14(1) requires sufficient proof that the land is part of alienable and disposable public domain, that the applicant (or predecessor-in-interest) has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The Court recognized that the CA denied the application on the ground of failure to show the required possession and occupation, based on petitioner’s admission that the lot had not been physically turned over to her. However, the Court emphasized a more fundamental obstacle: respondent’s registered title.

The Court held that the subject land was already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 and that this arose from a registered patent. Citing Republic v. Umali and the legal consequence described therein, the Court declared that once a patent is registered and the certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be public domain and becomes private property. It also held that such a registered patent is a veritable Torrens title and becomes indefeasible as a Torrens title after the expiration of one year from the date of issuance, and that the same is embodied in Sec. 103 of P.D. No. 1529: after registration and issuance, the land is deemed registered land “to all intents and purposes” under the Decree.

Because the land had already been titled under respondent’s name, the Court stated that the RTC’s direction to issue a corresponding decree in petitioner’s name was null and void. It held that a land registration court lacks jurisdiction to order registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case under another’s name. A second decree for the same land would be null, since the Torrens system’s purpose is to register a parcel only once. The Court added that a certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse open and notorious possession and cannot be defeated by prescription. It anchored this in Sec. 47 of P.D. 1529, which provides that no title to registered land acquired by prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the registered owner’s title.

Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack

Petitioner maintained that the indefeasibility of title should not attach where the title had been fraudulently secured, and she alleged that respondent registered the land in her name after respondent had already sold a portion to petitioner. The Court rejected this contention, stating that issues regarding the validity of title may be assailed only through an action expressly instituted for that purpose and that a certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally.

The Court cited Sec. 48 of P.D. No. 1529, “Certificate not subject to collateral attack,” and applied the doctrine that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. It also cited Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, where the Court had held that a Torrens title may be attacked for fraud only within one year from the issuance of the decree and through a direct action. The Court further invoked Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, holding that an application for registration of already titled land is a collateral attack on the existing title.

Accordingly, the Court treated petitioner’s challenge—though premised on alleged fraud—as a collateral attack in the context of an application for original registration. It held that even assuming petitioner’s allegations were true, they could not be entertained in this proceeding because they necessarily sought to undermine the already issued Torrens title.

Reconveyance and Separate Remedies

Petitioner argued that, to avoid multiplicity of suits and to end the long pending dispute, the courts should have ordered reconveyance. The Court ruled against her. It characterized the claim of fraudulent alienation underlying the second application for registration as a collateral attack, which had to be raised in a separate direct proceeding. It also held that the RTC correctly denied petitioner’s motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading for reconveyance, because such reconveyance could not be allowed to operate within a collateral registration attack.

The Court nonetheless clarified that registration does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy. It distinguished between the certificate of title and ownership itself. It reiterated that a certificate of title is evidence of ownership and does not create ownership as a mode of acquiring it; it cannot be used to protect fraud or allow enrichment at the expense of another. The Court explained that one may still pursue remedies against the registered owner, subject to the rule that the certifica

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 202414)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Josephine Wee filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the June 26, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed an RTC ruling granting her Application for Original Registration of Title.
Felicidad Mardo appealed from the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, which denied the application and set aside the RTC judgment.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, leaving the Court of Appeals denial of the application in place, without prejudice to other remedies available to petitioner.

Nature of Original Registration

The case arose from petitioner’s application for original registration of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 8349 at first, and later amended to Lot 8348-B, both located in Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
The application proceeded in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City, Cavite, and culminated in a decision granting registration to petitioner.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the application failed the statutory requirement of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Key Factual Allegations

Respondent was initially granted a Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284 dated April 26, 1979, covering Lot No. 8348 in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
Petitioner alleged that on February 1, 1993, respondent conveyed a portion of Lot No. 8348, identified as Lot No. 8348-B, to petitioner through a Deed of Absolute Sale for P250,000.00, which petitioner claimed was fully paid.
Respondent refused to vacate and turn over the property, asserting that the alleged sale was falsified.
While the registration case was pending, respondent managed to register the land in her name under OCT No. OP-1840.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on May 10, 2005, which was annotated on the title.
At trial, respondent’s counsel testified that she bought the parcel about ten (10) years ago, but respondent did not state from whom she bought it.
Respondent presented only copies of tax declarations as proof of ownership, in the absence of any deed of sale in her favor.
Petitioner admitted that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to objections and oppositions to her title.

Statutory Framework

P.D. No. 1529 governed the original registration proceedings for unregistered land.
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 required applicants to prove that they, by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The Supreme Court emphasized the three-part sufficiency requirement for Sec. 14(1) applications: alienable and disposable character, qualifying possession and occupation, and bona fide claim of ownership since the statutory date.
Sec. 48 of P.D. No. 1529 provided that a certificate of title “shall not be subject to collateral attack,” and could be altered or canceled only in a direct proceeding.
Sec. 47 of P.D. No. 1529 barred acquisition of title by prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the registered owner’s title.
The decision also invoked Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act in connection with petitioner’s fortuitous-event argument, while ultimately rejecting petitioner’s overall theory.

Issues Framed by the Parties

The petition placed at issue whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding lack of compliance with the possession and occupation requirement under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
The petition also challenged whether petitioner’s lack of physical turnover could defeat her right to register, given petitioner’s reliance on fortuitous event and Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Petitioner further argued that respondent, as predecessor-in-interest, had qualifying possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioner asserted that because respondent’s registration was allegedly fraudulent, the Court of Appeals should have ordered reconveyance to end the dispute and prevent multiplicity of suits.

Arguments on Possession and Turnover

Petitioner argued that she must be deemed to be in possession and occupation through her predecessor-in-interest because respondent allegedly remained in physical possession after the 1993 sale and refused to turn over physical possession despite demands.
Petitioner contended that occupancy did not have to be exercised by the applicant personally and could be held by another in the applicant’s name.
Petitioner asserted that the possession period of a predecessor-in-interest could benefit and be credited to the applicant under the governing land registration rules.
The Court of Appeals rejected these contentions, focusing on the admission that the property was not physically turned over to petitioner, which suggested absence of dominio