A.M. No. RTJ-94-1160 - Vito vs. Buslon, Jr.

Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-94-1160)

Factual Background

When Judge Buslon assumed office, Civil Case No. CEB-10222 was still pending decision, with an unresolved motion for reconsideration of an Order dated October 30, 1992. That order denied (i) the motion to suspend the giving of support pendente lite, and (ii) the motion to quash the writ of execution as to complainant.

Complainant alleged that, on June 7, 1993, the respondent rendered a decision without first resolving the outstanding motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 1992 Order. The appealed decision ordered the defendant (complainant) to pay support of P10,000.00 per month, reimbursement of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P10,000.00, and the costs of the suit. The Court noted that a timely appeal was taken from this June 7, 1993 decision.

Plaintiffs later filed a motion for execution pending appeal dated July 6, 1993, which the respondent granted on July 15, 1993. On July 23, 1993, complainant moved to quash the July 15, 1993 order, raising jurisdictional grounds and alleged lack of notice in violation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. The issue became moot when plaintiffs withdrew their motion for execution pending appeal because they could not afford to post the required supersedeas bond.

About a month after perfection of the appeal, on August 4, 1993, plaintiffs sought to cite complainant for contempt, alleging non-payment of support pendente lite despite an alleged October 28, 1991 order granting it and despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Complainant opposed on August 13, 1993, arguing that the contempt motion was unverified in violation of Section 6, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that the trial court had lost jurisdiction upon perfection of the appeal. Complainant further claimed that the respondent, without hearing, issued an order on August 24, 1993 finding him guilty of contempt and ordering his arrest without bail.

The respondent defended that the trial court retained authority notwithstanding the perfected appeal because the case involved support, a continuing obligation. The Court recalled Vasco v. Court of Appeals, which had held that after perfection of the appeal in support cases, the trial court lost jurisdiction except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties.

Allegations of Unjust Interlocutory Orders

Complainant also assailed interlocutory action relating to the issuance of a hold order. He alleged that on August 30, 1993, the respondent issued a hold order based on a non-existing motion and on a void contempt order. According to complainant, the basis of the August 30, 1993 hold order was a “hold order motion” dated August 31, 1993, filed by plaintiffs at 3:20 P.M. on August 31, 1993. Complainant argued that the date alteration to August 30, 1993 was a cover for supposed lack of jurisdiction after September 3, 1993, when respondent no longer served as presiding judge of RTC Branch 6. He also claimed he was not informed, since he allegedly received notice only on September 3, 1993, and that he was thereby denied his day in court when the motion was ruled upon before he received the notice.

In response, the respondent stated that the discrepancy in the date was a typographical error made in good faith by the stenographer who typed the questioned order. The Court treated this point as supported by an affidavit of Court Stenographer Esperanza A. Bascar dated November 18, 1993, accepting that she made the mistake in typing the date.

On the issue of whether a hold order may issue before the affected party received a copy of the motion, the respondent invoked an Order dated December 9, 1993 by Judge De la Victoria, who assumed office over the branch. That order reportedly declared that issuance of a hold order departure could be done ex parte because it was urgent, and that it did not require notice to the proper government agencies against the movant.

The Court, however, emphasized that even if a hold order is sought through a motion, the procedural rule on notice governs. It pointed to Section 24, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that notice of a motion shall be served on all parties concerned at least three days before hearing. The Court found no basis to justify ex parte action on the motion for issuance of a hold order. The Court further observed that complainant alleged that, during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the hold order, the respondent wrote a letter to Judge De la Victoria that caused the denial. Respondent denied writing an “influencing letter,” claiming he merely explained that the questioned order’s date was due to clerical error. The Court found this explanation adequate.

Allegations of Breach of Judicial Ethics

The complaint likewise alleged a violation of judicial ethics. It stated that after issuance of the Order dated August 31, 1993, the respondent served as a sponsor in the wedding of one of the plaintiffs’ daughter in the same Civil Case No. CEB-10222. Respondent did not deny acting as sponsor. He explained that he acted as sponsor after he assumed office as acting presiding judge of another branch (RTC Branch 23) and that he had accepted the invitation to meet the Vice-Mayor of Cebu City, whose father had been his professor in college.

The Court held that respondent’s conduct violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Rule 2.01, requiring a judge to behave in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court relied on jurisprudential statements stressing that a magistrate must conduct himself so that his acts, whether inside or outside the court, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny.

The Parties’ Contentions and the Court’s Assessment

On ignorance of the law, complainant focused on respondent’s alleged failure to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 1992 order before rendering decision. On contempt and jurisdiction, complainant insisted that the trial court lost jurisdiction after perfection of the appeal. Respondent maintained that jurisdiction continued in support matters.

The Court distinguished between ordinary adjudication on the merits (which is inconsistent with the general rule of loss of jurisdiction upon appeal) and the limited authority recognized in support cases to protect and preserve rights of the parties. While acknowledging

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. RTJ-94-1160)

The case involved an administrative complaint filed by Alexander Vito against Judge Teofilo Buslon, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City, for ignorance of the law, breach or violation of ethics, and unjustly rendering interlocutory orders.
The Court considered the complaint in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-10222, entitled “Mibelen Singson-Vito, et al. v. Alexander Vito,” for support, where complainant was the defendant and the respondent acted as a presiding judge after the retirement of Judge Ramon Am. Torres.
The Court ultimately found respondent negligent in performing adjudicatory duties and incurred an ethical violation, and it imposed a fine.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Alexander Vito acted as the complainant, while Judge Teofilo Buslon, Jr. acted as the respondent in an administrative case.
The administrative complaint targeted multiple acts in connection with the handling of Civil Case No. CEB-10222 while the respondent was the acting presiding judge.
The Court resolved the matter by issuing a disciplinary WHEREFORE disposition that fined the respondent and warned of a harsher penalty for repetition.

Key Factual Antecedents

The respondent assumed office in 1992 upon the retirement of Judge Ramon Am. Torres, at a time when Civil Case No. CEB-10222 remained pending decision with an unresolved motion for reconsideration of the Order dated October 30, 1992.
The October 30, 1992 Order denied the motion to suspend the giving of support pendente lite and denied the motion to quash the writ of execution issued in complainant’s case.
Complainant alleged that the respondent rendered a decision on June 7, 1993 without first resolving the unresolved motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 1992 Order.
The decision in the support case ordered complainant to provide support of P10,000.00 per month, reimburse attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P10,000.00, and pay the costs of the suit, with support payable within stated monthly parameters and subject to deduction of support pendente lite.
After the decision, a timely appeal was taken, and plaintiffs filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the respondent granted on July 15, 1993.
Complainant filed a motion to quash the July 15, 1993 order on grounds that the respondent allegedly acted beyond jurisdiction after perfection of the appeal and allegedly failed to comply with Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Plaintiffs withdrew their motion for execution pending appeal because they could not afford the supersedeas bond, which mooted the motion to quash.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to cite complainant for contempt on August 4, 1993, asserting refusal to give support despite alleged issuance of an order granting support pendente lite on October 28, 1991.

Allegations on Ignorance of Law

Complainant alleged ignorance of the law by asserting that the respondent issued a decision on June 7, 1993 without resolving the pending motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 1992 Order.
Complainant’s central grievance tied to alleged procedural noncompliance and adjudicatory neglect regarding a still-unresolved motion.
The Court treated the accusation not as a mere error of judgment but as negligence in performing adjudicatory prerogatives.

Jurisdiction After Perfection of Appeal

In opposing the contempt charge, complainant invoked the principle that the trial court supposedly lost jurisdiction upon perfection of the appeal.
Respondent argued that the court was not deprived of jurisdiction because the case involved support, which imposed obligations of a continuing nature.
The Court referenced Vasco v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 762 (1978), which held that after perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over support cases except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties.
The Court clarified that respondent’s position was only correct regarding the amount of maintenance allowance, which is essentially provisional, citing Canonizado v. Benitez, 125 SCRA 610 (1984).
The Court ruled that even if a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for an error of judgment, that principle does not license negligence in adjudicating and acting within jurisdiction, citing Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 (1980).
The Court found respondent negligent in this regard and thus treated the acts as actionable under administrative standards rather than as harmless adjudicatory mistake.

Unjust Interlocutory Orders

Complainant alleged that respondent issued a hold order dated August 30, 1993