Title
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
Case
G.R. No. L-29646
Decision Date
Nov 10, 1978
A Manila ordinance requiring non-citizens to secure employment permits was declared void for violating uniformity in taxation, due process, equal protection, and improperly delegating legislative power.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-29646)

Ordinance No. 6537 — Substance, Exemptions, and Penal Provisions

Ordinance No. 6537 made it unlawful for any non‑citizen to be employed in specified positions or to engage in trade, business or occupation within Manila without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor and paying a prescribed fee of P50.00. The ordinance enumerated covered occupations and employment relationships (consultant, clerk, technician, teacher, theatrical performer, laborer, cook, etc.) and applied regardless of duration, source of compensation, or number of hours. Exemptions included persons employed in diplomatic or consular missions, persons employed under technical assistance programs agreed upon by the national government with foreign governments, household employees, and unpaid members of religious congregations. Violations carried criminal penalties (imprisonment for three to six months and/or fines of P100.00 to P200.00), and juridical persons were made liable through specified officers.

Procedural History

Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, employed in Manila, petitioned the Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 72797) for a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief to stop enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 and to declare it null and void. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring the ordinance null and void and making the injunction permanent. Mayor Villegas appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning errors attacking the trial court’s conclusions on uniformity of taxation, improper delegation of legislative power, and violations of due process and equal protection.

Grounds of Attack by Private Respondent (Trial Court and Affirmed Rationale)

Private respondent’s principal grounds for invalidation were: (1) the ordinance, insofar as it imposed the P50 fee on employed aliens, was a revenue measure that discriminated and violated the rule of uniformity in taxation; (2) as a purported exercise of police power the ordinance made no distinction among occupations and imposed a fixed fee out of proportion to registration costs and without guiding standards, amounting to an unlawful delegation of legislative power; and (3) the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive and denied aliens rights to life, liberty and property, thereby violating due process and equal protection guarantees.

Petitioner’s Arguments on Appeal and the Court’s Response on Nature of the Measure

Petitioner argued that Ordinance No. 6537 was an exercise of the city’s police power—a regulatory measure—and therefore the rule on uniformity of taxation did not apply. The Supreme Court rejected that characterization in part. The Court treated the permit requirement as containing two distinct elements: (a) a regulatory component (the requirement to secure a permit and the Mayor’s discretion in approval), and (b) a monetary component (the P50.00 fee). The Court held the P50.00 charge to be a revenue measure in substance, not merely incidental to regulation, and concluded that the fee was being exacted primarily to raise money “under the guise of regulation.”

Equal Protection and Uniformity Analysis — Flat Fee and Classification Problems

The Court applied the principle that although classification is permissible, it must rest on real and substantial differences reasonably related to the legislation’s objective. The P50.00 flat fee applied identically to all aliens without regard to status (casual vs. permanent, part‑time vs. full‑time, lowly employee vs. highly paid executive) and therefore failed to account for substantial differences among those taxed. Because the monetary requirement operated as a revenue measure and was imposed indiscriminately, the Court found it unreasonable and violative of the rule of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection component of the constitutional scheme.

Delegation, Lack of Standards, and Due Process Concerns

Beyond the revenue characterization, the Court held the ordinance defective for failing to prescribe standards to guide and limit the Mayor’s discretion in issuing permits. The ordinance neither articulated a policy objective nor set criteria or conditions for grant or refusal, thereby conferring arbitrary and unrestricted power on the Mayor. Relying on precedent, the Court emphasized that where an ordinance lacks standards guiding administrative discretion, it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and runs afoul of due process. The Court also reasoned that conditioning employment on a mayoral permit susceptible to arbitrary denial effectively deprived an alien of a means of livelihood without due process; consti

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