Title
Villaruel, Jr. vs. Ferdo
Case
G.R. No. 136726
Decision Date
Sep 24, 2003
Former ATO official's failure to reinstate CATC employees led to a final court judgment awarding damages, upheld despite Ombudsman's findings and OSG's negligence.
mandamus
damages
reinstatement
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 136726)

Factual Background

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 detailing respondents to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal, effective 2 May 1995. On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner, requesting reconsideration of the detail order. Despite the pending request, respondents complied with the detail by reporting to the Office of Undersecretary Cal on 7 May 1995. Petitioner then, on 19 July 1995, issued a memorandum placing Abarca under “preventive suspension” for ninety days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.

As the detail continued without action on their request for reconsideration, respondents requested on 10 August 1995 that Secretary Garcia lift the detail order and order their return to their mother unit. They also sought Ombudsman intervention. The Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia regarding respondents’ request, and on 22 November 1995 Secretary Garcia replied that petitioner had been directed by a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 to recall respondents to their mother unit, stating that the law did not sanction respondents’ continuous detail. Even with repeated demands, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit.

Mandamus and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in the Trial Court

On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0139. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered, pending resolution, to recall them within twenty-four hours to CATC, ATO, DOTC, and to allow them to assume their functions, with damages and attorney’s fees after hearing.

On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. After Judge Aurora Navarette-Recina was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the case was re-raffled to Branch 231, the trial court issued an order on 12 April 1996 modifying the earlier order. The court then directed petitioner to comply with Secretary Garcia’s 9 November 1995 directive recalling respondents to their mother unit until further orders. Petitioner continued to refuse compliance, prompting respondents to move for citation in contempt and to declare petitioner in default for failing to file an answer within the period set by the trial court’s order dated 26 January 1996.

On 28 May 1996, the trial court found petitioner guilty of indirect contempt and issued a bench warrant. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the indirect contempt order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41263. In the meantime, the trial court rendered a Decision on 11 July 1996, finding for respondents and declaring mandamus permanent, ordering petitioner to pay moral damages (P100,000.00 each), exemplary damages (P25,000.00 each), temperate damages (P25,000.00 each), and attorney’s fees (P50,000.00).

Appeals, Dismissals for Failure to File Memorandum, and Execution

Petitioner appealed the 11 July 1996 decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42447. With the filing of that appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the certiorari case in CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December 1996 to file petitioner’s memorandum, but the OSG failed to file it. The case was later handled by another Solicitor due to the reassignment of counsel, yet on 13 March 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the dismissal became final and executory on 14 June 1997.

Respondents then moved for execution. Despite service of the motion, the OSG filed no opposition. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 22 September 1997. On 3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued a notice of sheriff’s sale scheduled for 23 February 1998, covering petitioner’s real property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83030. On 17 February 1998, petitioner—through new counsel—filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and to suspend the sheriff’s sale. He argued that the trial court’s decision never became final and executory because petitioner’s right to due process was allegedly violated by the OSG’s failure to file the memorandum in the appeal and by alleged failures of the OSG to inform him of the dismissal and execution-related orders. He further asserted that an Ombudsman Resolution in OMB-ADM 0-96-0090 superseded the trial court’s decision.

On 23 February 1998, the trial court quashed the writ for noncompliance with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but then issued an alias writ of execution. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 April 1998.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Denial of Due Course

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48233, assailing the execution of the 11 July 1996 decision. On 30 September 1998, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition, and it denied reconsideration on 3 December 1998, which led to the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

Petitioner assigned multiple grounds for relief. He argued: first, that the award of moral, exemplary and temperate damages had no legal basis; second, that the negligence of the OSG should not bind him and should not prevent the trial court’s decision from becoming final and executory; third, that petitioner had been denied due process when the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum; and fourth, that an Ombudsman Resolution finding Abarca guilty under Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713) rendered execution of the trial court’s decision unjust and inequitable.

The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the damages issue for three stated reasons: the trial court’s decision had already attained finality; the certiorari petition attacked the execution only as a consequence of the default judgment and writ of execution; and petitioner did not raise the damages validity issue before the Court of Appeals.

Threshold Requirement for Certiorari Under Rule 65

The Court held that petitioner failed to plead the essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner neither alleged that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, nor alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, nor alleged that there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court thus ruled that, on this procedural deficiency alone, dismissal of the certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals was proper.

Nevertheless, it addressed the principal issues raised by petitioner.

No Denial of Due Process: Effect of OSG’s Negligence

Petitioner’s principal due process argument was that the trial court’s judgment was void because he was not given the chance to be heard and to submit evidence. The Court noted that petitioner, formerly represented by the OSG, failed to file an answer to respondents’ petition, which led to a declaration of default. Petitioner’s subsequent filing of a notice of appeal did not cure the default because the OSG failed to submit the required memorandum in the Court of Appeals, causing dismissal of the appeal. Petitioner characterized the OSG’s negligence as “virtually abandoning” his case and insisted that such negligence should not bind him.

The Court rejected the argument. It explained that due process is the opportunity to be heard, and that opportunity was not denied petitioner. The Court observed that petitioner had opportunities in both the trial and appellate proceedings to present his side but failed to do so. It held that the OSG’s negligence, while regrettable, bound petitioner and could not relieve him of the consequences of counsel’s failure to act. The Court invoked the principle articulated in Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz that, although it is unfortunate that counsel neglects responsibilities, the client is bound by counsel’s mistake except only upon a showing of serious injustice. Petitioner made no such showing. The Court further noted that petitioner did not attempt to refute respondents’ allegations in the mandamus and damages petition. In addition, petitioner was not entirely without fault, because after the OSG’s failure to file the answer and to have the default lifted, petitioner could have replaced the OSG but retained its services until the trial court’s decision became final.

The Court also emphasized that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that they may sit back and await outcomes. It warned that accepting petitioner’s stance would permit parties to render adverse judgments inutile by invoking counsel negligence, which would contradict established doctrines in trial and procedural law.

Ombudsman Resolution Not a Supervening Event and Not a Ground to Stay Execution

Petitioner further contended that the Ombudsman’s finding against Abarca for violation of Section 7(d) of RA 6713 rendered execution unjust and inequitable. The Court disagreed. It reaffirmed the settled rule that once a judgment becomes final, it is immutable and unalterable except for clerical errors or similar narrow except

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