Title
Villanueva vs. Castaneda, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. L-61311
Decision Date
Sep 21, 1987
Vendors claimed occupancy rights to a public plaza in San Fernando, Pampanga, but the Supreme Court ruled the area as public dominion, upholding the mayor's demolition order for public welfare.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-61311)

Petitioner’s Claim

The petitioners asserted a right to remain and conduct business on the subject strip by virtue of prior municipal authorizations and alleged lease or space‑allocation arrangements. They relied on: (a) Resolution No. 218 (municipal council, Nov. 7, 1961) authorizing construction of permanent stalls for some original occupants; and (b) alleged space allotments made in 1971, for which they paid daily fees, claiming these arrangements established occupancy rights.

Respondents’ Position and Administrative Action

Respondents maintained the stalls were illegal constructions on public property. Acting on a petition by civic groups and after investigation by the municipal attorney, Officer‑in‑Charge Macalino issued an administrative resolution (June 14, 1982) directing demolition beginning July 1, 1982, to restore the area to its declared use as a public plaza and parking place. The municipal government denied the existence of valid leases.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

  • Resolution No. 218 authorizing stalls: Nov. 7, 1961.
  • Civil Case No. 2040 (lawsuit challenging construction) and writ of preliminary injunction: filed Nov. 10, 1961; injunction issued preventing construction.
  • Resolution No. 29 declaring area a parking place/public plaza: Jan. 18, 1964.
  • Decision in Civil Case No. 2040 holding the land public and beyond commerce of man; injunction made permanent: Nov. 2, 1968.
  • Space allocations and daily fee payments (per petitioners): 1971.
  • Petition by civic association for enforcement of Resolution No. 29: Jan. 12, 1982.
  • Macalino’s demolition order: June 14, 1982.
  • Petition for prohibition in CFI (Civil Case No. 6470): filed June 26, 1982; denied July 19, 1982; reconsideration denied Aug. 5, 1982.
  • Temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court to preserve status quo: Aug. 9, 1982.
  • Supreme Court decision dismissing petition and affirming lower court: Sept. 21, 1987.

Applicable Law and Precedents

  • Constitutional/administrative framework invoked by the Court: the municipality’s police power to promote health, safety, convenience and general welfare (as delegated under the Revised Administrative Code, Section 2238, cited in the decision).
  • Principle that public plazas and streets are res communes and are outside the commerce of man; therefore they cannot be subjects of lease or private contractual disposition. The decision relied on established precedents cited in the record: Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas; Muyot v. de la Fuente; Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio; and authorities on the inviolability of police power (including Stone v. Mississippi and Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank as cited).

Procedural History Before the Supreme Court

The petitioners sought certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance to restrain enforcement of Macalino’s demolition order; that petition was denied by the trial court. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court and obtained a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo pending resolution. The Supreme Court received pleadings and memoranda from the parties and later impleaded succeeding officers‑in‑charge of the mayor’s office as necessary.

Material Facts Found by the Courts

The trial court had previously found (Civil Case No. 2040) — on testimony including that of former Mayor Rodolfo Hizon — that the National Planning Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951, and the municipal council reaffirmed that intention by Resolution No. 29 (1964). Despite that finding and the permanent injunction in 1968, the area continued to be occupied; by 1971 space allotments were being made and daily fees collected, and by the early 1980s the number of stalls had expanded to nearly two hundred. The talipapa’s condition and configuration were shown by photographs and municipal investigation to present serious safety, sanitation, traffic obstruction, and aesthetic problems.

Issue Presented

Whether the petitioners had a valid proprietary or contractual right to occupy and operate stalls on the subject premises such that the municipal officer’s order to demolish and restore the area to a public plaza exceeded his authority or constituted grave abuse of discretion.

Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition for prohibition. The Court held that the municipal officer acted within his authority to enforce the prior judicial decision and municipal resolution declaring the area a public plaza and to order the demolition of the illegal structures. The temporary restraining order was lifted and the decision declared immediately executory, with costs against the petitioners.

Reasoning — Public Plaza Status and Invalidity of Leases

The Court accepted as binding the trial court’s earlier finding that the strip was a public plaza reserved for public use and thus beyond the commerce of man. Because plazas and streets are res communes, they cannot be validly leased or otherwise privately appropriated; any contract purporting to do so is null and void. The Court applied and cited prior rulings (Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas; Muyot v. de la Fuente; Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio) that municipal authorities cannot lawfully lease or alienate public plazas or sidewalks for private use. Consequently, the petitioners’ claimed leasehold or space‑allocation rights, even if alleged fee payments were made, could not confer a legal right to occupy the plaza.

Reasoning — Police Power and Supremacy over Private Contracts

The Court further reasoned that even if there had been any contractual arrangement, the municipality’s exercise of police power — including enactment of Resolution No. 29 and subsequent enforcement action — could validly terminate or abrogate such arrangements when necessary for the general welfare. Contracts affecting public interest carry an implied reservation of the police power and may be m

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