Title
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Victorias
Case
G.R. No. L-21183
Decision Date
Sep 27, 1968
A municipality's ordinance imposing graduated license taxes on sugar centrals and refineries was upheld as valid, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, despite claims of double taxation and preemption by national law.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21183)

Plaintiff’s Claims and Relief Sought

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. sought a declaratory judgment that Ordinance No. 1 was null and void; demanded refunds of license taxes paid and to be paid under protest; requested direction to municipal and provincial officials to observe Section 357 of the Revised Manual concerning the handling of protested tax collections; and sought other appropriate relief. The plaintiff’s substantive objections were that: (1) the ordinance exceeded rates suggested in Provincial Circular 12‑A; (2) it was discriminatory because plaintiff was the only operator of both a sugar central and refinery in Victorias; (3) it constituted double taxation; and (4) the national government had preempted taxation in this field (relying on national internal revenue provisions).

Trial Court Ruling and Relief Denied

The trial court concluded the ordinance imposed license taxes that were, in effect, regulatory license fees and ruled that license fees must be limited to the cost of licensing, regulation, and surveillance. It found the ordinance’s rates unreasonable and determined the municipality could not impose taxes for revenue in the guise of regulatory license fees. The court invalidated Ordinance No. 1 but, exercising equitable discretion, declined to order refunds of P280,000 already paid under protest (covering first quarter 1957 through second quarter 1960), except to require observance of Section 357 prospectively after notice.

Issues on Appeal to the Supreme Court

The appeal presented two principal sets of issues: (1) whether Ordinance No. 1 was a regulatory license measure (subject to the limitation that license fees relate to regulatory costs) or a revenue measure (an occupation tax validly authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 472); and (2) whether the trial court correctly invalidated the ordinance for being unreasonable, discriminatory, preempted by national law, or constituting double taxation. The plaintiff also challenged the trial court’s refusal to order full refund of taxes previously paid under protest.

Threshold Legal Characterization: Regulatory Fee or Revenue Tax

The Supreme Court first analyzed the true nature of the imposition. Under Commonwealth Act No. 472 and established jurisprudence, municipalities may impose: (1) license fees for regulation (police power), (2) license for restriction of certain activities (police power), and (3) license taxes for revenue purposes (taxing power). The Court emphasized that nomenclature alone (the words “license tax”) is not dispositive; the substantive purpose and effect determine whether an imposition is regulatory or a revenue tax. The Court examined the ordinance’s recitals and the municipal Resolution No. 60 (which explained the municipality’s revenue needs, including wage obligations and public works) and concluded the ordinance was enacted for revenue-raising purposes rather than regulatory oversight. The Court also noted the magnitude of the maximum annual levies (P40,000) and the absence of regulatory mechanisms or supervision tied to the licensing — factors supporting characterization as a revenue (occupation) tax.

Statutory Approval Requirement and Compliance

The Court addressed the statutory requirement that license taxes in excess of certain amounts receive the Secretary of Finance’s approval (as required in paragraph 2, Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 472 and related administrative rules). Ordinance No. 1 was recommended by the Provincial Board and received approval from the Undersecretary of Finance on December 18, 1956, with a directive that the ordinance take effect at the beginning of the ensuing calendar year (1957) pursuant to Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court found the necessary approval formalities satisfied.

Preemption Argument Based on National Tax Law

Plaintiff argued the national government had preempted taxation of sugar centrals and refineries by imposing percentage taxes under Section 189 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court rejected this contention because Ordinance No. 1 imposed a fixed occupation tax tied to maximum annual output capacity — a non-percentage tax — and thus was different in kind from percentage taxes contemplated by national law. Moreover, Commonwealth Act No. 472 expressly conferred municipal authority to levy fixed occupation license taxes even where national internal revenue taxes applied, with specified exceptions not applicable here. Consequently, the Court found no statutory preemption.

Reasonableness and Excessiveness Claim

The Court applied the presumption of validity applicable to legislative enactments and noted that courts should defer to municipal discretion unless amounts are prohibitive, arbitrary, oppressive, or confiscatory. Factors relevant to reasonableness include municipal conditions and the nature of the business taxed. The Court observed that: (a) if a tax is indeed a revenue measure, the regulatory-cost proportionality test (license fee limited to cost of licensing and regulation) does not apply; (b) the municipality’s claim of increased revenue needs was supported by its Resolution; and (c) economic context (notably substantial increases in sugar prices since 1940) and the relatively modest per-output rates compared to price increases militated against a finding of confiscation. The Court also considered the plaintiff’s capital investment and reported net incomes (1956–1960) and concluded the P40,000 ceiling was not confiscatory or unduly oppressive. The Court therefore found plaintiff had not sustained its burden of proving excessiveness.

Discrimination Argument

Plaintiff asserted the ordinance was discriminatory because it effectively applied only to it as the sole operator of both a sugar central and refinery in Victorias. The Court rejected this argument: the ordinance was facially neutral and applied to any operator of a sugar central or refinery within the municipality. Precedent supports the principle that the mere fact an ordinance currently affect

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.