Case Summary (G.R. No. L-74766)
Factual Background
The plaintiff alleged ownership of a commercial building comprising three sections, each occupied by the defendants as lessees on a month‑to‑month basis with rent originally PHP 350 later increased to PHP 450, and that the defendants defaulted in rental payments for many months. The plaintiff alleged that his lawyer sent each defendant a demand letter terminating the leases effective December 1985 for nonpayment and the plaintiff’s need of the property, demanding vacation by the end of December; the defendants replied by a joint letter acknowledging a verbal commitment to vacate but requesting a three‑month extension and one defendant made partial payment of arrears. The defendants later asserted that title to the land had been annulled in a separate case, that they occupied in the concept of owners as members of an association, and denied plaintiff’s ownership and the leases’ validity.
Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment
The plaintiff filed a verified motion for summary judgment supported by eight documents, asserting the defendants’ status as lessees shown by two written lease contracts, demand letters, an official receipt evidencing payment by one defendant, and the defendants’ own letters acknowledging the plaintiff’s demand and their commitment to vacate. The motion also relied on the absence of any binding effect of the separate reversion case, citing an order in that action indicating non‑binding status against the parties, and argued that the defendants were estopped from denying the plaintiff’s title.
Defendants’ Opposition and Trial Court Orders
The defendants filed an opposition and motion to dismiss contending that genuine issues of title and ownership precluded resolution by summary judgment, that their answer did not consist of a mere general denial because it specifically contradicted material averments, and that the Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction because the real controversy was one of title requiring accion reivindicatoria rather than accion interdictal. The Municipal Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling the action properly was one for unlawful detainer and that the court could consider ownership for the purpose of determining possession pursuant to Section 33, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the answer specifically denied material allegations and set up affirmative defenses and that the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment was only to determine whether there was an issue of fact to be tried.
Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis on Summary Judgment
The Supreme Court analyzed the nature and purpose of summary judgment under Section 1, Rule 34, distinguishing it from judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19, and explaining that a summary judgment may be rendered when the movant shows that except as to damages there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The Court held that the dispositive question is not merely whether issues are tendered by the answer but whether those issues are bona fide or are sham, fictitious, contrived, or set up in bad faith. Applying this standard, the Court found the defendants’ denials and defenses to be sham: their denials of personal circumstances and prior payments were implausible in light of longstanding occupancy and documentary proof; their professed ignorance of letters they authored was ineffectual as a denial; and their affirmative defense of ownership based on a separate annulment action in which they were not parties was tenuous, conjectural, and irrelevant to the ejectment action. The Court further observed that a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title at the inception of the tenancy, reinforcing the lack of a genuine factual issue.
Remedy and Appropriateness of Extraordinary Writs
The Court explained the proper remedial vehicle for correcting the respondent Judge’s action. It stated that mandamus issues only to compel performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty and that the decision to grant or deny summary judgment is within the trial court’s discretion and therefore ordinarily not subject to mandamus. The Court found, however, that the respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the summary judgment. It held that the writ of certiorari would lie to correct such abuse. The Court also addressed the prudential question of original resort to the Supreme Court for extraordinary writs and emphasized that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction should be sparingly exercised and generally reserved for matters not controllable by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts; nonetheless, the Court concluded that referring this action to the Regional Trial Court would work injustice given delay and the case’s pendency before this Court since 1986.
Disposition and Directions
The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the Municipal Trial Court orders dated April 15, 1986 and April 30, 1986 denying the motion for summary judgment and reconsideration. The respondent Judge was commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment in favor o
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-74766)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- DOMINGO VERGARA, SR. was the petitioner and landlord who filed an unlawful detainer action in the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 343-D-M.
- Manolito Guinoo, Romeo Montebon and Porferio Cabase were the private respondents and lessees occupying three sections of petitioner’s commercial building.
- HON. JOSE T. SUELTO, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City, Branch IV, issued two orders dated April 15, 1986, one denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and another denying petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.
- The petitioner filed a special civil action for an extraordinary writ in this Court challenging the April 15, 1986 order and a subsequent order dated April 30, 1986 declining reconsideration.
- The case reached the First Division of the Supreme Court by petition filed in 1986 and was decided by the Court on December 21, 1987.
Key Factual Allegations
- The petitioner alleged ownership of a commercial building consisting of three sections that were leased on a month-to-month basis and that rentals originally fixed at P350.00 were later increased to P450.00 per month.
- The petitioner alleged that the defendants defaulted in payment of rentals for many months and that his counsel sent demand letters terminating the leases effective end of December 1985 and demanding vacation.
- The defendants sent a joint letter dated December 6, 1985 requesting a three-month extension to vacate for economic reasons and defendant Montebon paid partial arrears evidenced by an official receipt.
- The defendants later refused to vacate and asserted that the lot on which the building stood was part of a tract ordered reverted to the public domain in Civil Case No. 16192 in which they claimed an association interest.
- The petitioner pursued barangay conciliation which failed, and thereafter instituted the ejectment suit alleging unlawful detainer due to nonpayment and refusal to vacate.
Pleadings and Evidence
- The petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 7, 1986 that was verified and supported by eight annexed documents including two written lease contracts, demand letters, an official receipt, and correspondence establishing ownership and tenancy.
- The petitioner attached as proof his non-party status in Civil Case No. 16192 by submitting the Order of the Court in that action dated February 24, 1986 as an annex.
- The defendants filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss asserting that genuine issues of title and ownership existed and that the case involved rei vindicatio rather than accion interdictal.
- The defendants’ answer generally denied material allegations, professed lack of knowledge on certain items, and asserted affirmative defenses based on their alleged association rights connected to Civil Case No. 16192.
Trial Court Orders
- The trial court issued an order dated April 15, 1986 denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and stating that the action was properly one for Unlawful Detainer and that the court could resolve ownership issues to determine possession in accordance with Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
- The trial court also issued an order dated April 15, 1986 denying the petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that defendants’ answer specifically denied material allegations and asserted affirmative defenses, and on the view that a controversy of fact remained requiring trial.
- The trial court denied reconsideration by order dated April 30, 1986.
Issues Presented
- Whether the appropriateness of a summary judgment may be so self-evident as to make it a duty of the trial judge to grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
- Whether it was proper for the petitioner to resort directly to this Court for an extraordinary writ against a municipal trial court instead of first seeking relief from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals when those courts share jurisdiction to issue such writs.
Contentions of Parties
- The petitioner contended that the pleadings and documentary