Title
Ventura vs. Bernabe
Case
G.R. No. L-26760
Decision Date
Apr 30, 1971
Joaquina Ventura, acquitted of falsification, sued Eusebio Bernabe for malicious prosecution. SC ruled her complaint valid, allowing civil action without prior court declaration of malice.
malicious prosecution
damages
false accusation

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-26760)

Factual Background

The prosecution against appellant stemmed from a complaint filed by Bernabe with the fiscal’s office. The information alleged that, on or about October 4, 1958, in Caloocan, Rizal, appellant willfully and feloniously presented to Bernabe a supposed letter of Cmdr. Marcelino Calinawan, Jr., of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee, addressed to Bernabe and requesting a loan of P350.00. It further alleged that appellant represented that Cmdr. Calinawan was then in her residence waiting for the money and instructed the handover, which Bernabe allegedly complied with by issuing a Bank of America Check No. 703659, dated October 5, 1958, for P350.00. The information claimed that, upon verification, the referenced letter had never been made by Cmdr. Calinawan and that the signature appearing thereon was not his signature; it added that the check had been cashed on or about October 7, 1958, to Bernabe’s damage of P350.00.

After trial, appellant was acquitted by the same court in a decision which found the evidence of the accused more credible. The criminal court reasoned that Bernabe pointed at appellant during trial and testified that he knew her and her husband as early as 1958 and that the two were compadres. Bernabe testified that appellant’s husband, Maj. Ventura, had been a member of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee chaired by Commander Calinawan, and that Bernabe had been giving Calinawan money totaling P2,000.00 through Maj. Ventura, even while admitting that he did not know and had not met Calinawan. The acquittal decision further noted the seeming inconsistencies that “puzzled the Court,” including why Bernabe gave money to a man whom he allegedly did not know, and why Bernabe claimed to verify with Calinawan about whether Calinawan had received the money when the denial by Calinawan had occurred regarding earlier transactions.

For appellant’s part, she vigorously denied going to Bernabe’s house and giving the letter. She also denied having received the check. She argued that Bernabe’s prosecution was motivated by misunderstandings between Bernabe and her husband. The criminal court emphasized that the prosecution did not rebut this explanation. On these premises, the criminal court declared appellant NOT GUILTY and acquitted her, with costs de oficio.

Initiation of the Civil Action for Damages

Subsequent to the acquittal, appellant, assisted by her husband, filed the civil case for damages against Bernabe. The complaint prayed for moral damages, exemplary and/or corrective damages, actual damages for attorney’s fees, reimbursement of premium paid on appellant’s bail bond for 4 years in connection with the criminal case, attorney’s fees in the civil case, and costs. The pleading alleged that Bernabe formulated and pursued the criminal charge before the fiscal’s office with malicious intent and/or malice aforethought and without justifiable cause, allegedly to “wreck vengeance,” smear appellant’s honor, reputation, and prestige, and expose the family to public ridicule and contempt. It alleged that these acts led to the filing of a criminal case docketed as No. 9003 for Estafa thru Falsification of Private Document, and that appellant suffered the claimed damages “by reason of defendant’s malicious and unjustifiable filing of the criminal action.” The copy of the criminal complaint was attached as Annex A.

Motion to Dismiss and Order of the Court of First Instance

Bernabe moved to dismiss on the theory that the complaint did not state a cause of action. He invoked Supreme Court rulings requiring, for an action for damages due to malicious prosecution, a specific declaration by the acquitting court that the accusation was false and malicious or an order directing prosecution of the complainant for false prosecution. He relied on earlier cases cited in the motion: Gonzales Quiros v. Palanca Tan Guinlay, 5 Phil. 675; Herrera v. Escoto, 56 Phil. 804; Eclarin v. Municipality of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 368; and U. S. v. Barrera, 4 Phil. 461. He also relied on Grattage v. Standard Fuel Co., 20 Phil. 460, which stated that where the judgment of acquittal or dismissal did not expressly certify the denunciation or accusation to be false or libelous, the civil action could not prosper.

Over appellant’s vigorous objection, the Court of First Instance granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the complaint states no cause of action. It reasoned that its conclusion was buttressed by Grattage, and that, because the acquittal decision did not expressly declare that the denunciation was false and libelous nor order that prosecution be commenced against the complaining witness, there was no basis for the claim of civil liability.

Appellants’ Assigned Errors and the Court’s Approach

On appeal, appellant assigned three errors, but its brief focused on the trial court’s reliance on older decisions applying Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1887 and its perceived requirement of a prior finding that the accusation was false. Appellant argued that Article 326 had not been carried into the Revised Penal Code and therefore should not control.

The Court recognized that the argument about the obsolescence of the old Penal Code provision was well taken. Still, it emphasized what it viewed as the more serious error committed by the trial court: the dismissal of a complaint that, in the Court’s view, sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 and related provisions of the Civil Code.

Invoking its discretion under Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, the Court considered the plain error on its own initiative and reversed the dismissal.

The Revised Penal Code Issue: No Offense of “Accusacion o Denuncia Falsa” and the Limited Scope of Article 363

The Court addressed the asserted irrelevance of the old Article 326 and the trial court’s reliance on cases applying it. It cited People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236, which held that Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code did not appear in the Revised Penal Code, which contained no offense denominated “acusacion o denuncia falsa” or its equivalent. It then examined whether the Revised Penal Code provided an offense that covered acts analogous to malicious prosecution.

The Court noted that the closest relevant provision was Article 363 on incriminatory machination, which punishes acts that directly incriminate an innocent person, with punishment. However, it held that Article 363 does not contemplate malicious prosecution in the sense of instigating a criminal charge in court. It relied on People v. Rivera for the distinction between the gravamen under Article 326 (false prosecutions based on imputation) and under Article 363 (acts tending directly to cause a false prosecution), and it reasoned that the term “asechanza,” as used in the title preceding Article 363, suggests actions such as planting evidence.

The Court further reasoned that appellants had not alleged that Bernabe had planted evidence. It described the complaint as alleging, at most, that Bernabe filed the criminal complaint without justifiable cause and with malicious intent, and that he testified falsely as a witness for the prosecution. The Court held that these allegations did not constitute incriminatory machination under Article 363, especially because Article 363 expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing it. For purposes of the civil action, it held that the absence of a specific Revised Penal Code offense denominated “malicious prosecution” did not preclude civil relief.

Civil Liability Under the Civil Code: Article 2219 and Related Provisions

The Court held that Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which includes malicious prosecution among instances for recovery of moral damages, sufficed as the basis for relief if the elements of malicious prosecution were properly alleged and could be proved. It also adverted to related Civil Code provisions, particularly Article 21 (liability for willfully causing loss or injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy) and Article 2176 (torts or quasi-delict).

The Court ruled that the essential requirement for the aggrieved party to prove liability was not dependent on a prior criminal-court certification under the obsolete Spanish Penal Code doctrine invoked by the trial court. It clarified that the complainant in a malicious prosecution case must prove that the person was falsely charged with knowledge of the falsity, that the defendant acted with malice, and that damages were suffered.

Elements of Malicious Prosecution and the Role of Probable Cause and Malice

The Court discussed the elements of malicious prosecution as requiring malice and want of probable cause, along with the defendant’s role as prosecutor or instigator of the prosecution that ended in acquittal. It drew this from Martinez v. United Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-24017, August 31, 1970. It also discussed that malice alone was insufficient if probable cause existed, but that both malice and want of probable cause must concur.

The Court then distinguished the case before it from Martinez. In Martinez, the acquittal decision’s recitals negated imputation of malice because the issue that resulted in legal acquittal differed from the fiscal’s view and did not clearly show malice on the part of the defendant. In appellant’s case, the Court ruled it could not say that the acquittal decision clearly suggested Bernabe had good reasons to accuse appellant. On the contrary, the acquittal decision’s observations that appellant’s testimony was more credible and that Bernabe filed the case because of misunderstandings with her husband, which was “not even rebutted,” tended to support the plausibility of appellant’s allegation that the charge was not founded on legitimate grounds. The Court also stressed that whether actual or legal malice existed was a matter of proof, but the issue before it on appeal was limited to whether the civ

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