G.R. No. L-24308 - Vencilao vs. Camarenta

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-24308)

Procedural History and Material Events

On February 11, 1961, Vencilao filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer before the justice of the peace at Maribojoc. The complaint was later superseded by an amended complaint dated March 9, 1961. In the amended complaint, Vencilao alleged that as one of the heirs of Vicenta Obenza, he had been in lawful and peaceful possession of the house and five parcels of land since Vicenta Obenza’s death on January 24, 1960. He further alleged that on or about September 16, 1960, the defendants entered the premises by force, strategy, and stealth, harvested coconut trees and banana plants, and unlawfully deprived him of possession, while the defendants remained in illegal possession up to the filing of the action.

The amended complaint sought an order for the defendants to vacate and restore possession to Vencilao, to pay P75.00 per month as compensation for use and occupation from September 16, 1960 until possession would be restored, and to pay P100 as attorney’s fees and the costs.

On February 25, 1961, the defendants filed an answer denying the material allegations and asserting a counterclaim for P250.00. Vencilao filed his answer to the counterclaim on March 8, 1961.

After trial, on June 14, 1961, the justice of the peace rendered judgment ordering the defendants (a) to vacate and restore possession of the five parcels and the house; (b) to pay P75.00 monthly as compensation for use and occupation from September 16, 1960 until possession was restored; (c) to pay P100 as attorney’s fees; and (d) to pay the costs.

On June 26, 1961, the defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. After the appeal was docketed, they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was not prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest, alleging that Vencilao was only a co-owner. On July 21, 1961, the Court of First Instance denied the motion, invoking Article 487 of the new Civil Code, and ruled that any co-owner may bring an action in ejectment.

On August 11, 1961, the defendants filed their answer in the Court of First Instance, reiterating their denials. They also raised the defense that they were mere tenants of Albina Obenza, whom they alleged had acquired the properties by donation from the deceased Anastacio Doylabo and Vicenta Obenza on November 9, 1945. They further sought P500.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses, and P1,500.00 in moral damages as counterclaim due to alleged malicious filing.

On March 19, 1962, Vencilao moved for execution of the justice of the peace judgment on the ground that the defendants had not made the required deposits of P75.00 per month as specified in the judgment. On March 30, 1962, the Court of First Instance granted the motion and issued a writ of execution requiring the defendants to vacate and deliver possession to Vencilao, while also denying the defendants’ request for an extension of time to deliver the properties.

On May 23, 1962, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss, asserting that during the proceedings before the justice of the peace, the evidence would show that the question of title was necessarily involved, and that possession could not be resolved without adjudicating title. Vencilao opposed the motion on May 29, 1962, and the defendants filed their reply on May 30, 1962. Hearings on the motion to dismiss were held on May 11 and May 24, 1962.

On June 1, 1962, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case. It reasoned that it had no appellate jurisdiction because the justice of the peace allegedly had no original jurisdiction, since it was necessary to determine ownership before possession could be decided. In the same order, the Court of First Instance also ruled that the complaint should have been filed in the name of all the heirs of Vicenta Obenza, notwithstanding its earlier ruling that any co-owner may sue. It further declared the writ of execution issued on March 30, 1962 void and ordered the return of the premises to the defendants. Vencilao appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal to the Supreme Court on the basis that it involved questions of law.

Issues Raised on Appeal

Vencilao contended that the Court of First Instance erred in: (1) holding that the justice of the peace had no original jurisdiction; (2) dismissing the complaint without a trial on the merits after the defendants raised the question of ownership in a motion to dismiss; and (3) holding that in a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, all co-owners must be made parties plaintiff.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Nature of the Action and Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court held that the action filed before the justice of the peace was one for forcible entry and detainer as shown by the allegations of the amended complaint. The complaint alleged prior lawful and peaceful possession by Vencilao, a forcible entry by the defendants on or about September 16, 1960, and unlawful detention thereafter, and it prayed for restoration of possession together with damages arising from illegal detention. The Court emphasized that under earlier jurisprudence, particularly Mediran v. Villanueva (37 Phil. 752), jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and if the complaint shows prior possession and deprivation by a trespasser within one year, the action lies with the justice of the peace for the sole purpose of restoring possession, regardless of any claims of ownership, so long as the prayer is limited to such relief.

The Court acknowledged that evidence at trial in the justice of the peace court tended to establish ownership. However, it treated that evidence as merely incidental to the parties’ proof of possession. The justice of the peace, in the Supreme Court’s view, correctly disregarded questions of ownership and confined itself to determining who had prior actual possession and whether the defendants disturbed such possession. The Supreme Court quoted the inferior court’s explicit statement that it was not the justice of the peace’s job to determine who were the owners of the lands and house, nor to pass upon the validity of exhibits such as alleged wills and deeds of donation, because the task was limited to determining prior physical possession before September 16, 1960 and whether the defendants entered and harvested as alleged.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the justice of the peace had proper jurisdiction from the outset, and that because the appeal to the Court of First Instance was properly taken, the Court of First Instance necessarily had jurisdiction to decide the case on appeal. It further held that the defendants could not defeat appellate jurisdiction by raising the issue of ownership for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court stressed that the defendants did not raise any question of ownership in their answer before the justice of the peace, and thus the lower court erred in dismissing the case on the supposed lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Co-Ownership and the Real-Party-in-Interest Requirement in Ejectment Cases

The Supreme Court also addressed the procedural contention that the complaint should have been filed by all co-heirs as plaintiffs. The Court held that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any co-owner may bring the action. It noted that the Court of First Instance had already ruled on this point when it initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper naming of the real parties in interest. The Supreme Court found no valid reason for the Court of First Instance to later reverse itself and require that all heirs be impleaded.

The Court further explained that in a forcible entry and detainer action, the principal issue is prior physical possession. Since the complaint alleged that Vencilao was in actual possession of

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-24308)

The case arose from an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 1, 1962 in Civil Case No. 1434, which dismissed the case on appeal from the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc, Bohol.
The Court of Appeals originally received the appeal but certified it to the Supreme Court because the appeal involved questions of law.
The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal, held that the inferior court had proper appellate jurisdiction, and remanded the case for trial as an appeal from the justice of the peace court.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Leopoldo Vencillao was the plaintiff-appellant, initially the plaintiff in a forcible entry and detainer case filed in the justice of the peace court.
Cleto Camarenta, et al. were the defendants-appellees, initially the defendants in the same action.
The justice of the peace court decided the case on June 14, 1961 and ordered the defendants to vacate and restore possession, pay monthly compensation for use and occupation, pay attorney’s fees, and pay costs.
The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 26, 1961.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the case on June 1, 1962 for lack of appellate jurisdiction, after later proceedings and a motion to dismiss.
Vencillao appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal to the Supreme Court for resolution of pure questions of law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal and the corollary orders were erroneous and remanded the matter for appellate adjudication on the merits of the possession issue.

Key Factual Allegations

Vencillao alleged that he was one of the heirs of Vicenta Obenza and that he had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a house and five parcels of land at Punta Cruz, Maribojoc, Bohol since January 24, 1960, the date of Obenza’s death.
Vencillao alleged that on or about September 16, 1960, the defendants entered by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully took possession, harvested and gathered fruits from coconut trees and banana plants on the premises, and illegally deprived him of possession.
Vencillao alleged that since September 16, 1960, the defendants remained in illegal possession and were still in possession when the complaint was filed.
The prayer sought restoration of possession to Vencillao, compensation for illegal deprivation at P75.00 a month, attorney’s fees in the amount of P100.00, and costs.
The defendants denied the material allegations and counterclaimed for P250.00 in the justice of the peace proceedings.
The defendants later asserted in the Court of First Instance that they were mere tenants of Albina Obenza, claiming authority to enter based on a donation allegedly acquired from the deceased Anastacio Doylabo and Vicenta Obenza on November 9, 1945.
The defendants also counterclaimed for P500.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses and for P1,500.00 as moral damages due to what they characterized as malicious filing of the complaint.

Proceedings in the Justice Court

On February 11, 1961, Vencillao filed the original complaint for forcible entry and detainer before the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc.
The complaint was later superseded by an amended complaint dated March 9, 1961.
The defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint on February 25, 1961.
Vencillao filed his answer to the counterclaim on March 8, 1961.
After trial, the justice of the peace court rendered judgment on June 14, 1961 ordering: (a) defendants to vacate and restore possession of the five parcels and house; (b) payment of P75.00 monthly as compensation for use and occupation from September 16, 1960 until restoration; (c) payment of P100.00 attorney’s fees; and (d) payment of costs.
The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance on June 26, 1961.

Motions and Interlocutory Events

After docketing the appeal, the defendants moved to dismiss based on the alleged defect that the action was not prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest, because Vencillao allegedly was only a co-owner of the properties.
The Court of First Instance denied the motion on July 21, 1961, reasoning that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any co-owner could bring an action in ejectment.
In the Court of First Instance, the defendants filed an answer reiterating their denials and asserting a tenancy-defense anchored on authority allegedly granted by the owner, Albina Obenza.
On March 19, 1962, Vencillao moved for execution of the justice court judgment, alleging non-compliance with deposits required at P75.00 a month as provided in the judgment.
On March 30, 1962, the Court of First Instance granted execution, issued a writ requiring defendants to vacate and deliver possession, and denied defendants’ motion dated March 28, 1962 for extension of time.
On May 23, 1962, defendants filed a subsequent motion to dismiss, arguing that in the justice court proceedings the evidence showed that title was necessarily involved and that possession could not be determined without adjudicating ownership.
Hearings on the motion to dismiss were conducted on May 11 and May 24, 1962.
On June 1, 1962, the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal, declared the earlier writ void, and ordered the return of the premises to the defendants.

Issues Framed for Review

The Court of First Instance held th