Title
Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez
Case
G.R. No. L-23002
Decision Date
Jul 31, 1967
Concepcion Felix sought to nullify 1934 property transfers, alleging duress and simulation. The Supreme Court ruled against her, citing lack of evidence, illicit purpose, and laches, barring recovery after 28 years of inaction.
widow
properties
transfer
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-23002)

Factual Background

Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez had been previously married and had one living child, Concepcion Calderon. She contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez, a widower with four children, surnamed Rodriguez. Prior to the second marriage, the widow was the registered owner of two fishponds in barrio Babangad, municipality of Bulacan, covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 605 and 807 and totaling 557,711 square meters. On January 24, 1934, a deed of sale purportedly conveyed the properties from the widow to her daughter for P2,500.00; on January 27, 1934, the daughter executed a deed transferring the property to her mother and stepfather for P3,000.00. Both notarial instruments were registered on January 29, 1934, and Torrens Certificates of Title Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names of the spouses Domingo Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.
Domingo Rodriguez died intestate on March 6, 1953. On March 16, 1953, his widow, children and grandchildren executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate treating the fishponds as conjugal property and partitioning one-half among heirs, with resulting cancellation and reissuance of titles in the names of the heirs. On March 23, 1953, the heirs executed a power of attorney in favor of the widow to manage their shares. Subsequent transactions included a deed of partition on July 2, 1954 (resulting in TCT Nos. T-12910 and T-12911, later TCT No. 16660), a lifetime usufruct granted to the widow on October 12, 1954, and a lease agreement dated December 15, 1961, by which the widow purportedly leased the fishpond covered by TCT No. 16660 for five years beginning August 16, 1962, for an annual rent of P7,161.37. A demand for P3,000.00 for unpaid earnings was sent to the widow on May 16, 1962.

Procedural History

On May 28, 1962, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez filed suit to declare null and void the January 24 and January 27, 1934 conveyances, to annul the extrajudicial settlement, to cancel TCT No. 16660 and reinstate title in her name, and to recover P56,976.58 in alleged income delivered to the defendants from 1953 to 1961; alternatively, she claimed a surviving spouse’s share of one-fifth if the property was adjudged conjugal. Defendants answered denying material allegations and pleaded lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel, and laches; they filed a counterclaim for P3,000.00 and for attorney’s fees and expenses. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the defendants on October 5, 1963. Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez appealed to this Court.

Issues Presented

The principal issues were whether the January 24 and January 27, 1934 conveyances were null and void on grounds of duress, simulation, or lack of consideration; whether the extrajudicial settlement of March 16, 1953 was void; whether the widow could recover P56,976.58 paid to defendants; and whether, alternatively, she was entitled to one-fifth of the properties as surviving spouse.

Parties' Contentions

The plaintiff-appellant asserted that her deceased husband exercised force and pressure to procure the conveyances, that the transfers were simulated and without consideration and therefore inexistent, and that she had acted under the false belief that the properties had become conjugal when she later participated in the extrajudicial settlement and other instruments. As alternative relief she sought recognition of her statutory share as surviving widow. The defendants-appellees denied the allegations, maintained the voluntary character and validity of the transactions, pleaded prescription, estoppel and laches, and sought payment on their counterclaim.

Trial Court Findings

The trial court found the evidence of duress unconvincing, disbelieved the testimony of plaintiff’s daughter (Concepcion C. Martelino), and accepted testimony contradicting the charge of violence. The court held that the parties’ consents to the 1934 documents were voluntary. It ruled that plaintiff, having participated in subsequent transactions, could not now plead lack of consideration; that a contract without consideration was voidable rather than inexistent, citing Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); and that ratification and confirmation by the plaintiff occurred when she joined in the extrajudicial settlement. The court also concluded that plaintiff’s alternative remedy for rescission of the extrajudicial settlement was barred by the four-year prescriptive period.

Supreme Court's Ruling and Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The Court held that duress was not established and, even if it had existed, the action was barred by the four-year period under Article 1301 of the Civil Code of 1889 because the suit was brought twenty-eight years after the alleged intimidation and nine years after the death of the alleged wrongdoer. The Court also found that the alleged simulation was not shown because the parties intended the transactions to have real legal effect. The Court further ruled that the conveyances were supported by causa within the meaning of Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889, since the deeds recited definite monetary prices and the promise to pay constituted consideration even if payment was not contemporaneous. The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court analyzed duress as a mere vice of consent and applied the prescription rule that actions based on vitiated consent must be brought within four years after the vice ceased, citing Article 1301 of the Civil Code of 1889 and authorities such as Prevost vs. Gratz and Sinco vs. Longa. The Court emphasized skepticism toward allegations of duress made after the death of the alleged perpetrator. On simulation, the Court explained the distinction between a simulated transaction and a transaction in fraudem legis; it adopted the doctrinal exposition of Ferrara that a simulated contract produces only an appearance and is not really intended to produce legal effects, whereas a fraudulent device seeks a real result to evade a legal prohibition. The Court held that the 1934 sales were real and intended to effect the conversion of paraphernal property into conjugal property, not mere sham acts. The Court rejected the applicability of Vazquez vs. Porta on the facts.
Concerning causa, the Court applied Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 and cited Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz for the principle that consideration need not be paid at the time of the promise; the obligation to pay constituted valid causa. The Court nevertheless found the transactions tainted by an illicit p

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