Title
Vassar Industries, Inc. vs. Vassar Industries Employees Union
Case
G.R. No. 76883
Decision Date
Sep 7, 1989
Vassar and Union disputed crediting a P1.25 wage increase against a P2.00 COLA under Wage Order No. 1. SC ruled the increase creditable, invalidated restrictive implementing rules, and dismissed Union's claim despite quitclaims.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 76883)

Collective Bargaining Agreement and the 3rd-Year Wage Increase

The CBA expressly required, among other obligations, that Vassar grant a general wage increase of P15.00 a month for each employee covered by the agreement, and that Vassar and the Union renegotiate on salary increase on the second and third year of the agreement. In 1980, when the third year arrived, the parties renegotiated on wage increases but failed to agree. The matter was submitted for compulsory arbitration, initially to Labor Arbiter V. G. Son. On March 6, 1981, Labor Arbiter Son succeeded in obtaining an accord, later embodied in an order, fixing the salary increase for the third year. Specifically, the order provided that the salary increase for the third year of the current CBA, covering October 1, 1980 to September 30, 1981, would be P1.25 per day, effective October 1, 1980.

Issuance of Wage Order No. 1 and the National Wages Council Implementing Rules

On March 26, 1981, Wage Order No. 1 was promulgated by former President Marcos under the stand-by legislative authority. The Wage Order increased the mandatory emergency cost-of-living allowance of non-agricultural workers to P2.00 per day, while permitting employers to credit certain wage increases against compliance requirements. The relevant provision stated that “[a]ll increases in wages granted unilaterally or by CBA shall be credited as compliance with this Wage Order provided such increases were granted between January 1, 1981 and March 22, 1981.”

On April 10, 1981, the National Wages Council promulgated implementing rules. One rule addressed “creditable benefits,” providing that increases in wages and allowances granted unilaterally or by CBA could be credited if granted between January 1, 1981 and the date of effectivity of the Order. It also specified that, for purposes of the increase, the rule would treat the increase as general increases given to all workers, excluding certain types of increases, including anniversary increases under Collective Bargaining Agreements.

Vassar’s Implementation and the Union’s Complaint

When Wage Order No. 1 took effect, Vassar implemented it by paying its workers only P0.75 per day beginning March 22, 1981. Vassar maintained that the earlier P1.25 per day salary increase it had granted pursuant to the March 6, 1981 amicable agreement and embodied in the arbitration order was creditable as compliance with the Wage Order. Under its theory, it only needed to add P0.75 per day to reach the required P2.00 per day emergency cost-of-living allowance.

The Union disagreed. It filed a complaint to compel Vassar to pay (1) the additional emergency cost-of-living allowance prescribed by Wage Order No. 1 in the amount of P2.00 per day, and (2) the P1.25 per day salary increase stipulated in the amicable agreement of March 6, 1981, which it argued was not creditable compliance with the Wage Order. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. AB-IV-10-528-81.

Proceedings Before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Union. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC decision was promulgated on June 9, 1986. It was assented to by the Chairman and six (6) members, with three (3) commissioners dissenting.

The Petition for Certiorari and the Supplemental Pleading

Vassar filed the petition for certiorari on January 6, 1987, seeking nullification of the majority NLRC decision. It alleged grave abuse of discretion because the ruling was allegedly inconsistent with Wage Order No. 1 and with Supreme Court precedents, including Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr. (117 SCRA 938), National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera (114 SCRA 354), and Brokenshire Memorial Hospital v. NLRC (143 SCRA 364).

Fifteen days later, on January 21, 1987, Vassar filed a “Verified Supplemental Petition.” It asserted that its Sta. Rosa, Laguna factory had closed its operations and that only thirty-one (31) members of the Union remained employed with its Makati office, which was still operating. It further alleged that the Union members formerly employed at the Sta. Rosa factory had already been terminated and were paid their claims, after which they executed individual deeds of quitclaim and release, except for some who had resigned.

Positions of the Solicitor General and the Private Respondents

In the Solicitor General’s Comment dated January 20, 1987, it was opined that the P1.25 per day increase granted by Vassar on March 6, 1981 was “an anniversary increase” and should not be credited as compliance with Wage Order No. 1, because it was allegedly an integral part of an existing CBA that bound both the complainant and the respondent.

The private respondents, in their own Comment dated October 28, 1987, advanced the same theory. They also argued that the precedents cited by Vassar were inapplicable, and that the execution of quitclaims and releases by individual members, assuming it occurred, did not bar their claim to the balance of the cost-of-living allowances in accordance with Wage Order No. 1.

Core Legal Question: Whether Implementing Rules Could Narrow Creditable Wage Increases

The Court framed the controversy around whether Wage Order No. 1, being promulgated by the President under stand-by legislative authority, made no distinction as to the nature of wage increases—whether unilateral or by CBA, and whether such increases were anniversary or otherwise—when it provided that all increases granted between January 1, 1981 and March 22, 1981 could be credited. The implementing rules, however, had introduced a distinction by declaring that anniversary increases under CBA were not creditable.

The central issue thus became whether an implementing rule issued pursuant to legislative authority could restrict or modify the scope of the law it was designed to implement. More particularly, the Court asked whether Wage Order No. 1 could be modified by implementing rules that treated CBA anniversary wage increases as not creditable toward compliance.

Application of Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Secretary Drilon

The Court treated the issue as already resolved. It cited Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. (COACO) v. Secretary Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 82849, promulgated on August 2, 1989. In that case, the Court en banc held that an implementing rule could not add to or subtract from the provisions of the law it sought to implement. The Court reasoned that the law at issue did not prohibit crediting of anniversary wage increases under CBAs, and therefore implementing rules could not impose a prohibition not contemplated by the law. The Court also emphasized that administrative regulations must harmonize with the statute and serve only to carry the statute into effect; the regulation could not expand the law. It further stated that an administrative agency could not amend an act of Congress.

The Court in the present case recognized that the COACO ruling was consistent with the rationale of the precedents invoked by Vassar, including Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, and Brokenshire Memorial Hospital v. NLRC, which conveyed the principle that a “double burden” on employers should not be imposed except by clear provision of law. Although those cases involved an additional thirteenth month pay under Presidential Decree No. 851, whereas the present case involved emergency cost-of-living allowances, the common message was treated as the prohibition against imposing payment burdens beyond what the law clearly required.

Ruling and Disposition

Applying the controlling doctrine of Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Secretary Drilon, the Court granted the petition and nullified the NLRC decision. It set aside the June 9, 1986 NLRC majority ruling. The Court dismissed the Union’s complaint that commenced the proceedings below in NLRC Case No. AB-IV-1

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