Case Summary (G.R. No. 12287)
Petitioner and Respondent Positions
Petitioner attacked section 14 on eleven grounds (including that it adds qualifications to Supreme Court membership, authorizes appointment without constitutional procedures, effects removal except by impeachment, creates two Supreme Courts, impairs rulemaking power, constitutes a bill of attainder, denies equal protection, and is ex post facto). The Solicitor General opposed the motion, arguing Congress had authority to enact section 14; the provision merely supplements disqualification rules and contemplates temporary designees who need not meet full constitutional appointment qualifications or Commission on Appointments confirmation.
Procedural Posture
The motion to declare section 14 unconstitutional was considered along with a reproduced opposition filed in People v. Sison (G.R. No. L-398) at the Court’s direction. The Court limited the scope of issues it would decide for purposes of the resolution but proceeded to address the central constitutional conflicts raised by section 14.
Statutory Provision at Issue (Section 14, People’s Court Act)
Section 14: (1) disqualifies any Supreme Court Justice who held office under the Philippine Executive Commission or the so-called Philippine Republic from sitting and voting in People’s Court treason cases where the accused held similar positions; and (2) authorizes the President to designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges (without certain disqualifications) to sit temporarily as Justices to form a quorum or until judgment is reached.
Applicable Constitutional Provisions (1935 Commonwealth Constitution)
The Court’s analysis centered on Article VIII (Judicial Department): section 1 (vests judicial power in one Supreme Court and inferior courts), section 4 (composition of Supreme Court — Chief Justice + ten Associate Justices; may sit in banc or in two divisions unless otherwise provided by law), section 5 (appointments by President with consent of the Commission on Appointments), section 6 (qualifications for appointment to the Supreme Court), section 9 (tenure during good behavior until age 70 or incapacity), and section 13 (rules of court). Article XVI, section 2 (continuity of preexisting laws until amended by Congress) and Article IX (impeachment as removal procedure) were also invoked.
Core Legal Questions Presented
(a) May Congress add to pre-existing grounds of disqualification for Supreme Court Justices by statute (section 14)? (b) May persons act as Supreme Court Justices by presidential “designation” without appointment and Commission on Appointments confirmation? (c) Can the President constitutionally designate lower-court judges to sit temporarily as Supreme Court Justices under section 14?
Majority’s Analytical Framework: Constitution Supremacy and Repugnancy Test
The majority applied the principle that legislative acts repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law. Their test compared the operation of the constitutional scheme without section 14 to its operation with section 14 in effect, asking whether section 14 prohibited or impaired duties and powers the Constitution assigns to Supreme Court justices.
Analysis — Congress’ Power to Add Disqualifications (Majority)
The majority concluded that section 14, insofar as it adds a new ground disqualifying constitutional members of the Supreme Court from sitting in specified treason cases, is repugnant to the Constitution. Before section 14, constitutional members had the power and duty to sit in such cases. Section 14’s statutory prohibition prevented those constitutional duties from being performed by constitutionally composed Court; therefore it conflicted with the framing of Article VIII. The majority held that Congress cannot, by statute, impose disqualifications that effectively prevent constitutionally appointed justices from exercising their judicial functions in cases within the Court’s jurisdiction, because such a statute would impair judicial independence and the constitutional allocation of judicial power.
Analysis — Appointment Requirement and “Designation” Versus Constitutional Appointment (Majority)
The majority held that no person not appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (the constitutional method) may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court. The “designation” authorized by section 14 does not satisfy the constitutional appointment-and-confirmation requirement. Designated lower-court judges lack the constitutional vetting and may lack the constitutionally required qualifications (five years’ citizenship, minimum age, ten years’ practice or judgeship). Consequently, designation cannot constitutionally convert a lower-court judge into a Supreme Court Justice, even temporarily.
Analysis — Constitutionality of Presidential Designation of Lower-Court Judges (Majority)
The majority further held that permitting lower-court judges to sit temporarily as Supreme Court Justices by presidential designation creates a constitutional problem because it risks changing the Court’s composition and substituting non-constitutional members in place of those the Constitution prescribes. Even if temporary, such substitution is not authorized by the constitutional provisions governing the composition and appointment of the Supreme Court. The majority rejected the notion that the “unless otherwise provided by law” clause in Article VIII, section 4, authorized alteration of the constitutional composition or mode of appointment; that clause was read as limited to the Court’s manner of sitting (in banc or in two divisions), not to membership qualifications or appointment procedures.
Separation of Powers, Judicial Independence, and “Two Supreme Courts” (Majority)
The majority emphasized that section 14 threatens judicial independence and could result in a de facto “packing” or creation of a second Supreme Court composed partly of designated lower-court judges. Disqualifying constitutional justices and replacing them with designees could change the Court’s character and impair its appellate jurisdiction over capital or life-imprisonment cases, thereby undermining the constitutional scheme of separation of powers and stability of judicial tenure. The majority found such effects intolerable and repugnant to the Constitution.
Holding and Relief
The Court declared section 14 of the People’s Court Act unconstitutional in the respects specified in the opinion and ordered that the case be proceeded with henceforward in harmony with that resolution. Specifically: (a) section 14 is unconstitutional insofar as it disqualifies constitutional members of the Supreme Court and authorizes presidential designation of lower-court judges to sit as temporary Supreme Court Justices in the manner provided; and (b) the proceedings in the case were to proceed consistent with the resolution.
Concurring Opinions (Moran C.J., Perfecto, Briones, et al.)
Chief Justice Moran (concurring) and Justices Perfecto and Briones concurred in the result. Moran emphasized unfairness and the destructive practical effects of section 14 on the Court’s composition and integrity. Perfecto concurred strongly, reiterating the multiple constitutional defects of section 14 (including that it effectively amends the Constitution, violates separation of powers, imperils judicial independence, and permits unconstitutional temporary compositions), and developed an extended exposition of principles protecting constitutional tenure, appointment procedures, immovability, and the danger
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 12287)
Procedural posture and relief sought
- Motion filed by counsel for the defense dated August 28, 1947, assailing constitutionality of section 14 of the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682).
- Motion raises multiple constitutional grounds attacking section 14; Solicitor General opposed the motion and submitted a memorandum reproduced by reference from People v. Sison (G.R. No. L-398).
- The Supreme Court announced that it would not decide every question raised but would set forth considerations deemed sufficient for the present resolution.
- The resolution was prepared prior to acting on the Solicitor General’s motion to dismiss dated February 17, 1948, and promulgated before the Court acted further on that motion.
- The ultimate disposition pronounced: (a) section 14 of the People’s Court Act is unconstitutional in the respects specified in the resolution; and (b) that the case be thereafter dealt with in pursuance and harmony with the resolution.
Parties and roles
- Petitioner: Jorge B. Vargas.
- Respondents named: Emilio Rilloraza, Jose Bernabe, Manuel Escudero, Judges of the People’s Court, and the Solicitor General of the Philippines.
- Counsel for petitioner moved against constitutionality of section 14; Solicitor General opposed and submitted multiple propositions defending section 14.
- Several members of the Supreme Court filed separate concurring and dissenting opinions (Moran, C.J.; Perfecto, J.; Briones, J.; Feria, J.; and others joined or concurred as noted).
Text and operative provisions of section 14 (People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act No. 682)
- Section 14, quoted in full in the resolution, contains two paragraphs:
- First paragraph: Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section 13 wherein the accused held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
- Second paragraph: If, on account of such disqualification (or by grounds in Rule 126, or illness, absence, temporary disability) the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment is reached.
Issues presented (as framed by parties and the Court)
- Whether Congress had power to add to pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court by enacting section 14.
- Whether a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (i.e., whether the "designation" in section 14 satisfies constitutional appointment/confirmation requirements).
- Whether a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President under section 14, can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justices" of the Supreme Court by virtue of that designation.
Petitioner’s asserted grounds attacking constitutionality of section 14
- Section 14 provides qualifications for members of the Supreme Court other than those in section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Section 14 authorizes appointment of Supreme Court members who do not possess qualifications of section 6, Article VIII.
- Section 14 removes members of the Supreme Court by procedure other than impeachment, contrary to Article IX.
- Section 14 deprives the Commission on Appointments of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject Supreme Court appointments.
- Section 14 creates two Supreme Courts.
- Section 14 impairs the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII.
- Section 14 is a bill of attainder, punishing by disqualification members who served during the Japanese occupation.
- Section 14 denies equal protection of the laws.
- Section 14 is ex post facto legislation.
- Section 14 amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV.
- Section 14 destroys the independence of the Judiciary and permits "packing" of the Supreme Court by Congress or the President.
Solicitor General’s opposing propositions (as presented and incorporated by reference)
- Congress has power to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
- Section 14 does not and is not intended to provide an additional qualification for Supreme Court members, nor to amend section 6, Article VIII.
- Qualifications in section 6, Article VIII apply to permanent "appointees" not to temporary "designees".
- Section 5, Article VIII is not applicable to temporary designations under section 14.
- Section 14 does not remove but merely disqualifies members from sitting and voting in the particular class of cases mentioned.
- Section 14 does not create an additional "Special Supreme Court."
- Section 14 does not impair the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of Court.
- Section 14 is not a bill of attainder.
- Section 14 is not an ex post facto law.
- Section 14 does not deny equal protection either to the affected Justices or to treason indictees.
- Section 14 does not amend any constitutional provision.
- Section 14 does not destroy judicial independence or curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Constitutional provisions, statutory background and rule-making context cited by the Court
- Article VIII, section 4: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices and may sit either in banc or in two divisions unless otherwise provided by law.
- Article VIII, section 5: Members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
- Article VIII, section 6: No person may be appointed member of the Supreme Court unless five years a citizen, at least 40 years of age, and for ten years a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
- Article VIII, section 9: Members hold office during good behavior until age 70 or incapacity.
- Article VIII, section 13: Then existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are repealed as statutes and declared rules of court, subject to Supreme Court modification and Congress power to repeal, alter or supplement.
- Article XVI, section 2: All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until Commonwealth inauguration and thereafter remain operative unless inconsistent, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by Congress.
- Code of Civil Procedure (former) sections 8 and 608 provided grounds for disqualification of judges prior to the Constitution.
- Rule 126 of the Rules of Court treats disqualification of judicial officers and was derived from the abovecited Code provisions.
- Section 149 of the Revised Administrative Code contains qualifications for Judges of First Instance.
- Historical executive actions and statutes: Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259 amended provisions on the Supreme Court composition; Executive Orders No. 40 and No. 86 restored number of Justices to eleven post-liberation.
- United States congressional act of February 6, 1905 authorized the Governor-General to designate Judges of the Court of First Instance to sit temporarily as Supreme Court judges in cases of temporary disability or vacancies — referred to in the resolution as a historical antecedent, with divided view among members of the Court whether still in force.
Legal background on disqualification law as recited by the Court
- Prior Code provisions on judge disqualification (sections 8 and 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure) were continued either as rules of court under Article VIII, section 13 or as statutes under Article XVI, section 2; either way, grounds for disqualification existing at Constitution adoption remained operative.
- Rule 126 of the Rules of Court embodies the disqualification grounds derived from the old Code.
- The Constitution did not leave the disqualification subject-matter inoperative; it continued the prior grounds either as Rule of Court or as law, and consequently the prior provisions governing disqualification of judicial officers (including justices) continue to be recognized.
Court’s analytical approach (three angles)
- (a) Whether Congress had power to add to pre-existing grounds of disqualification of an Associate Justice by enacting section 14.
- (b) Whether a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (i.e., the validity of “designation”).
- (c) Whether, by the method of “designation” in section 14, a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large, or Cadastral Judge can constitutionally “sit temporarily as Justice” of the Supreme Court.
Majority reasoning — overview and principal holdings
- The Court applied the cardinal principle that no legislative act repugnant to the Constitution can become law (citing In r