G.R. No. L-55152 - Valisno vs. Plan

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-55152)

Factual Background: The Competing Claims to the Same Parcels

On August 21, 1964, petitioners spouses acquired by purchase two parcels of land from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco—identified in the record by metes-and-bounds descriptions. Petitioners thereafter declared the parcels for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession in the concept of owners, including by installing a caretaker, Fermin Lozano.

On August 12, 1968, Vicencio Q. Cayaba—asserting ownership based on a deed of sale executed on June 30, 1967 in his favor and that of Bienvenido G. Noriega by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano—ousted Fermin Lozano and took possession. Cayaba later erected a six-door apartment on the land.

On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against Cayaba for recovery of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895. The case was resolved in favor of petitioners, which led to a finding of ownership in their favor in that proceeding.

Appellate Reversal in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R

Cayaba appealed to the then Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, and the appellate court promulgated a decision on January 19, 1978. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The appellate court reasoned, first, that the land described in petitioners’ complaint and sketch was completely different from the land shown in Cayaba’s subdivision plan, and that petitioners’ identification evidence was unreliable because it was characterized as self-serving. It also invoked Article 434 of the New Civil Code on the requirement that, in an action to recover property, the property must be identified and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title.

Second, the appellate court emphasized that Cayaba was the actual possessor by virtue of his purchase from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, and that possession with just title relieved him from the need to justify the basis of possession under the cited provisions of the Civil Code.

Third, it found Cayaba’s evidence superior on the point of identification, including a vicinity plan that showed the land’s position with respect to known boundaries and landmarks, while petitioners’ evidence, including tax declaration description, was treated as an unreliable estimation of area and boundaries. Petitioners’ further petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied.

Land Registration Application and Petitioners’ Opposition

After the final appellate reversal, Cayaba filed an application for registration on September 25, 1979 in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, seeking registration of the same lands in his name. The application relied on the deed of sale and the appellate decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.

Petitioners filed an opposition on April 26, 1980. Cayaba then moved for dismissal of the opposition on the basis that it was barred by prior judgment, namely, the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite petitioners’ opposition to the motion, the trial court issued its first assailed order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition for res judicata. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the second assailed order dated September 19, 1980.

Issues Raised in the Petition

Petitioners came to the Supreme Court, challenging the dismissal as irregular in land registration procedure and contending that res judicata could not be set up at that stage. They argued that the trial court erred in holding that the requisites of res judicata existed, in assuming that a motion to dismiss was proper in land registration proceedings, and in allegedly depriving them of their day in court. They further maintained that Cayaba was trying to secure title to land belonging to petitioners and that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.

Procedural Posture Before the Supreme Court and the Motion to Amend

The Supreme Court gave due course on April 1, 1981 and required the parties to submit briefs. Petitioners complied on August 26, 1981, while Cayaba failed to file his brief within the period that expired on October 9, 1981. The case was thus considered submitted for decision without Cayaba’s brief.

On July 8, 1985, the Court received a copy of a motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., seeking inclusion as co-applicant in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204. The Court noted that the situation—dismissal of an opposition on a motion to dismiss in a land registration case—was “unique and peculiar,” though it was not treated as highly irregular.

Dismissal by Motion to Dismiss in Land Registration Proceedings

The Court explained that the Land Registration Act [Act 496] did not provide a pleading akin to a motion to dismiss. However, it held that Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allowed the application of its provisions in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. The Court relied on Duran v. Oliva to sustain dismissal on a motion to dismiss when it was indubitably shown that the court lacked jurisdiction over the res because the lands sought to be registered had previously been registered in the names of oppositors.

The Court reasoned that the opposition in registration proceedings functioned in substance like an answer with a counterclaim. It drew an analogy to ordinary civil procedure, where a counterclaim would become, in effect, a claim that the original plaintiff could either answer or move to dismiss. The Court acknowledged that the irregularity complained of stemmed primarily from the infrequent use of motions to dismiss in land registration cases, not from the lack of authority to entertain such a motion. It also stated that the trial court’s dismissal did not depend on a highly anomalous procedural device but on the availability of procedural rules in a suppletory manner.

Re-evaluation of Abellera v. Farol and the Availability of Res Judicata

Petitioners heavily relied on Abellera v. Farol, which had ruled that in a cadastral case res judicata could be used to defeat a claimant’s rights but could not be set up in a motion to dismiss. The Court treated Abellera as requiring re-evaluation. It recounted that Abellera had ruled that prior judgment could not be invoked in a motion to dismiss. The Court further described Justice Paras’s dissent in Abellera, where it was argued that Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 did not expressly prohibit entertaining a motion for dismissal on grounds such as res judicata or prescription, and that prompt disposal was a principal purpose of the rules.

The Court cited other decisions supporting the rule that a final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining ownership of land is res judicata in a registration case when the parties and property are the same, referencing Menor v. Quintana, and the cases cited therein, including Versoza v. Nicolas and Santiago v. Santos.

Application of Res Judicata: Elements and Identity of Matters

The Court then addressed the doctrine itself. It held that res judicata operates when: (a) the former judgment is final; (b) it was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it is a judgment on the merits; and (d) between the first and second actions there is identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action, citing Carandang v. Venturanza.

It found that CA-G.R. No. 60142-R satisfied these requirements. It was final, rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and it decided the matter on the merits. The Court also held that the identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action existed between the registration case and the earlier civil action for recovery of property.

On parties, it rejected petitioners’ contention that adding co-owner Bienvenido Noriega, Sr. to the registration application changed the parties in a way that defeats res judicata. The Court explained that one right of a co-owner is to defend the interests of the co-ownership, and that Cayaba’s defense of ownership was effectively in behalf of the co-ownership, demonstrated by Cayaba’s reliance on the deed of sale executed in his and Noriega’s favor. Thus, there was no genuine change in the real party in interest for res judicata purposes.

On subject matter, the Court stated that there was no question the parcels sought to be recovered in the first action were the same parcels sought to be registered.

On cause of action, the Court noted that although the earlier case was captioned as one for recovery of possession, the allegations and prayer required resolution of ownership, and it was characterized as in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case was for registration of title, and the Court emphasized that registration is based on ownership. In both proceedings, the plaintiff or applicant sought exclusion of others from ownership. It recognized a difference in form—exclusion of particular persons in the first case versus exclusion of the world in the registration case—but held that the cause of action remained the same. It also cited

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-55152)

Petitioners Flordeliza L. Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno sought certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondent judge Andres B. Plan of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and respondent Vicencio Cayaba.
The challenged acts were two orders in Land Registration Case No. Branch II-N-204: the order dated July 2, 1980 dismissing petitioners’ opposition on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Court resolved the petition by dismissing it and affirming the dismissal of petitioners’ opposition.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners were spouses who had previously filed a civil action for recovery of possession of two parcels of land, which had been decided against them on appeal.
Respondent Cayaba sought registration of the same parcels of land in his name in a land registration proceeding.
Respondent judge ruled in the land registration case that petitioners’ opposition was barred by res judicata.
After the petition was filed, the Court gave it due course and required briefs; respondent Cayaba failed to file a brief, so the case was decided without it.

Land Transactions and Possession History

Petitioners spouses purchased the subject parcels on August 21, 1964 from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, and they declared the lands for taxation purposes.
Petitioners exercised possession in the concept of owners by installing caretaker Fermin Lozano and having his house built on the property.
On August 12, 1968, respondent Cayaba claimed ownership based on a June 30, 1967 deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido G. Noriega’s favor by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, and he ousted Fermin Lozano from possession.
After the ouster, Cayaba erected a six-door apartment on the land and let it to transients and residents.

Earlier Civil Case for Possession

On January 22, 1970, petitioners filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela for recovery of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them owners.
On appeal in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978.
The Court of Appeals found, among others, that the land described in petitioners’ complaint was different from the land occupied by Cayaba, and it refused to credit the opponents’ sketch for being self-serving.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the idea that Cayaba was the actual possessor under his purchase, and it preferred Cayaba’s evidence showing the land’s position through a vicinity plan with known boundaries and landmarks.
The decision was ultimately left undisturbed because petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari was denied due course.

The Land Registration Proceeding

On September 25, 1979, Cayaba filed an application for registration of title over the subject lands in his name, anchoring his entitlement on the deed of sale and the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application.
Cayaba then moved for dismissal of the opposition on the ground that the opposition was barred by prior judgment, referring to CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
Respondent judge issued the order dated July 2, 1980 dismissing the opposition on res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners argued that the dismissal of their opposition was irregular in land registration proceedings.
Petitioners relied on Abellera vs. Farol and contended that res judicata could not be set up in a land registration case.
Petitioners argued that the requisites for res judicata did not exist and that, even if a motion to dismiss were proper, res judicata could not be raised in that manner.
Petitioners asserted that the dismissal deprived them of their day in court and that record indications showed Cayaba was trying to secure title to what was actually petitioners’ land.
Petitioners further claimed grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

Motion to Dismiss in Registration Cases

The Court observed that the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not expressly provide for a pleading equivalent to a motion to dismiss.
The Court held that Rule 132 of the Rules of Court permits suppletory application of the rules in land registration proceedings when practicable and convenient.
The Court relied on Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, which sustained dismissal of a registration application upon a motion to dismiss filed by oppositors, where the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the res because the lands sought were previously registered in the oppositors’ names.
The Court reasoned that the irregularity alleged by petitioners lay in the infrequent use of motions to dismiss in registration cases, not in the unauthorized character of the remedy.
The Court evaluated Abellera vs. Farol and held that its ruling required re-evaluation, leading the Court to abandon the Abellera limitation.

Re-evaluation of Abellera vs. Farol

Petitioners’ reliance on Abellera vs. Farol rested on the statemen