Title
Valera vs. Tuason, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. L-1276
Decision Date
Apr 30, 1948
A forcible entry case transferred due to judicial disqualification; jurisdiction of La Paz justice upheld by Supreme Court, reversing lower courts' annulment of decision.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-1276)

Case Background and Procedural History

Judge Federico Paredes, presiding over the Justice of the Peace Court in Lagayan, disqualified himself due to a relationship with one party. He transferred the case to the Justice of the Peace of La Paz, the nearest municipality. Despite objections from the defense counsel, the Justice of the Peace of La Paz proceeded to trial, ruled for the plaintiff, and returned the case records to Lagayan. Subsequently, a new Justice of the Peace for Lagayan, Mariano B. Tuason, assumed office and declared the previous judgment null and void due to jurisdictional issues, ordering a retrial before himself.

Jurisdictional Conflict and Legal Issue

The newly appointed Justice of the Peace of Lagayan contended that only the district judge could designate another justice of the peace to hear a case upon disqualification, citing section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code. The designation made following a circular by the Secretary of Justice (January 17, 1940), which allowed direct transfer to the nearest justice of peace without notifying the district judge, was thus challenged as illegal.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

  • Section 73, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended): Requires the regular justice of the peace who is disqualified to notify the auxiliary justice who shall try the case unless also disqualified, in which case the cause transfers to the nearest justice of the peace not disqualified.
  • Section 211, Revised Administrative Code: Authorizes the judge of the district to designate the nearest justice of the peace when no auxiliary justice is available to perform duties due to disqualification, absence, or disability of the regular justice.

Analysis of Statutory Construction

The Court emphasized the well-established principle that laws relating to the same subject must be harmonized whenever possible. Implied repeal requires actual inconsistency or irreconcilability; mere relation to the same subject is insufficient. In this case, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code are not inherently conflicting but address distinct circumstances.

Section 73 governs disqualifications expressly enumerated in that Code (section 8), while section 211 applies to other forms of disability or disqualification. The Court noted the presumption against repeal applies strongly, especially where a special law exists alongside a general law. The Code of Civil Procedure provision is considered specific and thus would prevail over the general rule in the Revised Administrative Code in the event of conflict.

Historical and Legislative Context

The statutory history indicates that the two provisions were developed independently and intended to operate concurrently. The Administrative Code expressly repealed certain related earlier acts but did not repeal section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure or related amendments. This absence of express repeal strongly supports the continued applicability of section 73.

The Court rejected the opinion that the Rules of Court abrog

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