Case Summary (G.R. No. L-246)
Facts
- An information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Justice of the Peace Court of Vigan, alleging that on or about January 17, 1945, in Bantay, Ilocos Sur, Valdez wilfully and with treachery killed Juan Ponce with a bolo, dagger and other weapons.
- Valdez moved to dismiss in the Justice of the Peace Court on the ground that the fiscal lacked authority and the court lacked jurisdiction; the motion was denied on September 5, 1945. Since then Valdez has been detained.
- On September 13, 1945, the fiscal filed the information (reproduced) in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Valdez moved to quash on December 18, 1945; the motion was denied December 20, 1945. A petition for reconsideration filed December 29, 1945 was denied January 7, 1946.
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- Valdez filed a petition to the Supreme Court seeking: annulment of lower-court proceedings; declaration that the respondent judge lacked jurisdiction; an injunction to stop further proceedings; an order directing the provincial warden to discharge Valdez; other interim reliefs including assessment of costs.
Central Legal Issue
- Whether civil courts (specifically the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur) had jurisdiction to try Valdez for murder when Valdez claimed status as a member of a recognized guerrilla force that had been absorbed into the United States armed forces and later into the Philippine Army, thereby rendering him a person subject to military law and, according to Article 93 of the Articles of War, triable by court-martial.
Petitioner’s Contentions
- Valdez claimed (1) he was a regular member of recognized guerrillas subsequently incorporated into the U.S. and then the Philippine Army, making him subject to military law; (2) Article 93 of the Articles of War provides that murder committed in time of war by persons subject to military law shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, thereby conferring exclusive jurisdiction on military courts; (3) Ilocos Sur was overrun by the enemy at the time, making guerrilla hideouts effectively military reservations; and (4) even if he committed the killing, the victim might have been a spy whose execution would fall under military jus tice (citing Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution as to military exigencies).
Respondent / Factual Clarifications at Argument
- Counsel for petitioner conceded at oral argument that neither the United States Army nor the Philippine Army asserted any claim to try Valdez by court-martial; no military authority had demanded trial by military court nor asserted priority custody.
Governing Law Considered by the Court
- Article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408): “Any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct.”
- The Court treated Article 93 as substantially identical to Article 92 of the United States Articles of War and thus considered pertinent American and other precedents interpreting that provision.
Court’s Analysis — Concurrent Jurisdiction Principle
- The Court held that Article 93 does not deprive civil courts of concurrent jurisdiction to try murder committed by persons subject to military law even in time of war. The Court relied on analogous United States jurisprudence, including Cadwell v. Parker and other cited authorities, which establish that Articles of War do not give military courts exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses and that state (civil) courts retain jurisdiction unless military authorities exercise priority. The decision quotes and cites multiple cases (Cadwell v. Parker; United States v. Hirsch; Government v. McGregory; People v. Gardiner; People v. Denman) to support the proposition that military trial jurisdiction is not exclusive.
Court’s Analysis — Actual Hostilities and Timing
- The Court observed that when the information was filed, the Philippines had been liberated and actual hostilities had ceased. The Court rejected the contention that a formal treaty of peace had to be signed to negate the civil courts’ jurisdiction; it emphasized the factual cessation of hostilities as determinative. It relied on precedent (Ex parte Koester) establishing th
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-246)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Full citation as given: 76 Phil 356 EN BANC [ G.R. No. L-246. March 27, 1946 ].
- Case brought to the Supreme Court by petition of Silverio Valdez seeking multiple forms of relief, including:
- annulment of the proceedings of the lower court;
- declaration that the respondent judge was without jurisdiction;
- injunction commanding the respondent judge to desist from further proceedings in the cause;
- an order directing the provincial warden, Celestino Jimenez, to discharge the defendant from jail;
- a preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent judge from hearing the case on the merits pending proceedings in the petition;
- assessment of costs against the respondents;
- such other or further reliefs as may be just or equitable.
- The opinion in this Court was authored by Justice Jaranilla.
- Disposition at the Supreme Court: Petition dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
- Justices concurring: Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.
Undisputed Factual Background
- The petitioner, Silverio Valdez, was prosecuted for murder under an information filed by the provincial fiscal in the Justice of the Peace Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
- The information, in part, alleged that on or about January 17, 1945, in barrio San Julian, Bantay, Ilocos Sur, the defendant with intent to kill, with premeditation and treachery, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with cruelty, by augmenting the suffering of one Juan Ponce, killed the latter with bolo, dagger and other weapons and that the victim died instantly.
- Valdez moved for dismissal of that information in the Justice of the Peace court, alleging lack of authority on the part of the fiscal to file it and that the court acquired no jurisdiction; that motion was denied by the Justice of the Peace on September 5, 1945.
- Since the denial of that motion on September 5, 1945, the accused had been detained as a provincial prisoner in the provincial jail in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
- On September 13, 1945, the provincial fiscal reproduced the said information in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
- The defendant filed a motion to quash the information in the Court of First Instance on December 18, 1945; the motion was denied on December 20, 1945.
- A petition for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash was filed on December 29, 1945, and was denied on January 7, 1946.
- At oral argument in this Court, counsel for petitioner stated that neither the United States Army nor the Philippine Army was claiming precedence or priority in the trial of the petitioner, nor that either was demanding that he be tried by a court-martial; no such allegation appeared in the petition.
Main Legal Issue Presented
- Whether the civil courts (specifically the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur) had jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the murder case filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez, given his asserted status as:
- a member of a recognized guerrilla and thus a member of the United States armed forces in the Philippines (in North Luzon);
- subsequently absorbed into the Philippine Army;
- and therefore, by virtue of Article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), subject to trial by a general court-martial possessing jurisdiction over the crime charged and the person of the accused.
Petitioner’s Principal Contentions and Legal Assertions
- Petitioner contended that:
- He was a regular member of a recognized guerrilla organization, recognized by the United States Army.
- His unit was incorporated into the United States Army, and he was later incorporated into the Philippine Army, thus placing him "a person subject to military law" for purposes of Art. 93.
- Because the offense (murder) was committed in time of war, Article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) confers jurisdiction over such offense to a court-martial.
- The whole of Ilocos Sur, at the time imputed in the information, was overrun by the enemy, and any guerrilla hiding place in the province amounted to a military reservation for the safety of Philippine and American armed forces.
- Even granting, without admitting, that he committed the crime, if the supposed victim were a spy committing espionage amidst Philippine and American armed forces and the enemy in actual combat, the petitioner might be exempt from liability or might be justified in commission under "section 2 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines," provided the military procedure for administration of military justice had been followed in making executions of spies.
- Petitioner primarily relied on Article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) as the source of exclusive military jurisdiction over murder committed in time of war by persons subject to military law.
Text of the Military Provision Relied Upon
- The petition placed primary reliance on the text o