Title
Valdez-Tallorin vs. Heirs of Tarona
Case
G.R. No. 177429
Decision Date
Nov 24, 2009
A dispute over land ownership arose when heirs sought cancellation of a tax declaration, alleging fraud. SC ruled non-joinder of indispensable parties voided prior decisions, remanding for proper inclusion.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 177429)

Factual Background

On February 9, 1998, the Taronas filed an action in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan against petitioner Tallorin for the cancellation of her tax declaration and two other women’s tax declarations covering a parcel of land in Morong, Bataan. In their complaint, the Taronas alleged that in 1981 the Assessor’s Office of Morong cancelled Tax Declaration 463, issued in the name of their father, Juanito, which covered 6,186 square meters of land. The cancellation, they claimed, was allegedly premised on an affidavit purportedly executed by Juanito in favor of Tallorin and the two other women, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez.

The Taronas further alleged that the affidavit used by the Assessor’s Office was unsigned, though it was notarized, and that it had been missing from the Assessor’s Office records. They asserted that, because the old affidavit could not be found, the cancellation of Juanito’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new declaration, Tax Declaration 6164, in the names of Tallorin and the other two women were likewise illegal. The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and order the issuance of a new tax declaration in the names of Juanito’s heirs.

Early RTC Proceedings and the Default Issue

The Taronas filed a motion to declare petitioner Tallorin in default on March 6, 1998, alleging failure to answer within the prescribed period. Before the RTC could act on this motion, Tallorin filed a belated answer. In her answer, she invoked several defenses and asserted, among others, that she actually held a copy of the affidavit allegedly executed by Juanito. She claimed that Juanito was merely an agricultural tenant of the land covered by Tax Declaration 463. She alleged that Juanito surrendered and waived his tenancy rights to her and to the other two women in exchange for P29,240.00, and she also raised affirmative defenses of non-compliance with conciliation proceedings and prescription.

On March 12, 1998, the RTC set Tallorin’s affirmative defenses for hearing. The Taronas sought reconsideration, contending that the trial court should have instead declared Tallorin in default based on their earlier motion. On June 2, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that it had already received Tallorin’s answer before a default order could be issued, and also that the Taronas failed to show proof of Tallorin’s notification of the motion to be heard.

After a judge inhibited himself upon the Taronas’ motion, the case was re-raffled, and the new judge upheld the predecessor’s orders. The Taronas then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA, which succeeded in annulling the RTC’s March 12 and June 2, 1998 orders. The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting Tallorin’s late answer in the absence of a motion to admit it, and it held that the RTC should have heard the motion to declare Tallorin in default.

Remand and RTC Judgment

Upon remand, the RTC heard the Taronas’ motion to declare Tallorin in default. The RTC granted the motion and directed the Taronas to present evidence ex parte. On January 30, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment: (a) it annulled the tax declaration in the names of Tallorin, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez, and Dolores Valdez; (b) it reinstated Tax Declaration 463 in the name of Juanito; and (c) it ordered the issuance of a new tax declaration in the names of Juanito’s heirs. The RTC also ruled that Juanito’s affidavit authorizing the transfer had no binding force because he did not sign it.

Petitioner appealed to the CA, assigning errors that the land covered by the tax declaration was titled in Tallorin’s name and those of her co-owners; that Juanito’s affidavit dealt only with surrender of tenancy rights and could not justify cancelling Tax Declaration 463; that while Juanito did not sign the affidavit, he thumbmarked and acknowledged it before a notary; and that the RTC erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as indispensable parties.

CA Decision

On May 22, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. It rejected petitioner’s arguments. It reasoned that petitioner did not assign as error the RTC’s order declaring her in default and that she took no part in the trial; hence her claims were treated as conjectures not supported by evidence in the record. The CA, however, did not directly address petitioner’s contention regarding the failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as indispensable party-defendants, even though the RTC judgment had annulled tax declarations issued in their names.

Issues Presented

In the petition, petitioner raised three questions: first, whether the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas’ complaint for not impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez; second, whether the CA erred in failing to rule that the complaint was barred by prescription; and third, whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that Juanito’s affidavit had no legal effect because it was unsigned, despite the alleged presentation of evidence showing Juanito’s thumbmark during the hearing on Tallorin’s motion to declare her in default.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court treated the first question—indispensable party joinder—as dispositive. It emphasized that the rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties, citing Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. Indispensable parties were described as those with such an interest in the controversy that any final decree would necessarily affect their rights, such that the court cannot proceed without their presence. The Court underscored that joinder of indispensable parties is a requirement of due process because judgments do not bind strangers to the suit.

It also addressed responsibility for joinder. It held that the obligation to implead indispensable parties rests with the plaintiff. In the case, the Taronas sought annulment of the tax declarations in the names of Tallorin and the two co-named women, namely Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, and they also attacked as void the affidavit in which Juanito allegedly renounced his tenancy rights in favor of those three persons. Any decision granting the reliefs demanded would necessarily affect the rights of Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez over the property covered by the cancelled tax declaration. The Court reasoned that tax declarations are significant because they function as primary evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim ownership of real property, and the cancellation of a tax declaration adversely affects the interest of the persons in whose names it is issued.

To support the evidentiary and notice function of tax declarations, the Court cited Uriarte v. People, which held that while not conclusive, a tax declaration is telling evidence of possession that may ripen into ownership, and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, explaining that a person does not pay taxes for a property over which he has no claim, and that tax payments indicate intent to pursue eventual titling while putting others on notice. The Court further observed that the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164, which belonged not only to Tallorin but also to Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, without giving these absent persons an opportunity to be heard because they were never impleaded. The Supreme Court held that the RTC and the CA therefore had no authority to annul that tax declaration without first ensuring that all interested parties were impleaded.

At the same time, the Court clarified that the action could not be dismissed outright solely due to non-joinder. Invoking Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, it held that non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Under Sec. 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal on the ground of non-j

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