Case Summary (G.R. No. 188078)
Key Dates
Relevant chronology: change in work schedule effective July 5, 1972; night-shift employees’ demand of November 6, 1972; work schedule promulgated to take effect November 26, 1972; suspension for absence occurring November 26, 1972; Arbitrator’s decision ordering reinstatement (May 4, 1973); NLRC dismissal of company’s appeal (June 8, 1973); Secretary of Labor’s modification awarding separation pay (February 7, 1975); Secretary’s denial of reconsideration (July 24, 1975). Decision under review rendered in 1992.
Applicable Law
Primary constitutional framework for the decision: the 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable by reference due to the decision’s date). The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties is central to the contractual rights and management prerogatives at issue. Administrative and labor adjudicatory processes (Arbitrator, NLRC, Secretary of Labor) and prior jurisprudence cited by the court are also applied.
Facts Found by the Secretary of Labor
The Secretary’s findings — adopted in the Court’s recounting — are undisputed. The company operated three shifts; a change in schedule was imposed that altered the third-shift workweek from Monday–Saturday (or Monday–Friday for some) to Sunday–Thursday effective November 26, 1972. The three complainants, dissenting from the new schedule, did not report for work on Sunday, November 26, 1972 (a nonworking day under the preexisting CBA), and were suspended for 14 days. Subsequent disciplinary processes culminated in dismissal after the Secretary of Labor approved the company’s application for clearance to terminate.
Procedural History
The Arbitrator ordered reinstatement with backwages (May 4, 1973). The NLRC dismissed the company’s appeal as tardy (June 8, 1973). The company’s motion for reconsideration, treated as an appeal, was brought before the Secretary of Labor, who modified the Arbitrator’s order to award separation pay instead of reinstatement. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the Secretary was denied, prompting the present petition for review.
Central Issue
Whether the complainants’ refusal to comply with the new working schedule amounted to insubordination justifying their dismissal, given the terms of the existing CBA and the employees’ claimed protection under the CBA provision fixing the agreement’s duration.
Court’s Analysis on the CBA and Management Prerogative
The Court examined the CBA provisions. Although the CBA fixed its effective period (September 1, 1971 to August 31, 1974) and provided that negotiations could not be initiated before July 1, 1974, the same CBA expressly reserved management prerogatives in Section 2, Article II. That clause granted the company exclusive rights including scheduling hours, shifts, and work schedules, directing operations, transferring employees between shifts, and making rules for conduct and safety. The Court held that management retained the authority to change work schedules when exigencies of service require, so long as the exercise of that prerogative is in good faith and not intended to defeat rights under special laws or valid agreements. The Court relied on prior jurisprudence to reinforce that management prerogatives must be protected alongside employee welfare.
Application to the Facts: Was Dismissal Justified?
The Court concluded there was no unfair labor practice and no gross or habitual neglect or serious misconduct that would amount to willful disobedience warranting dismissal. The employees’ refusal to follow the new schedule did not, in the Court’s view, constitute insubordination of the degree necessary to support dismissal. The Arbitrator’s finding that reinstatement was appropriate was not seriously questioned on its merits.
Constitutional Claim and Retroactivity
Petitioner argued a violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure (citing Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution in the decision’s discussion). The Court observed that the incidents occurred in 1972 and reasoned that the 1973 Constitution’s guarantees could not be applied retroactively to disturb vested rights. The Court emphasized the general principle that fundamental law provisions are given prospective effect unless a contrary legislative intent is clear, thereby rejecting any retroactive application of constitutional guarantees to the 1972
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 188078)
Court and Citation
- Supreme Court of the Philippines, Third Division.
- Reported at 290 Phil. 31.
- G.R. No. L-41314.
- Decision promulgated November 13, 1992.
Parties
- Petitioner: Union Carbide Labor Union (NLU).
- Respondents: Union Carbide Philippines, Inc.; the Honorable Secretary of Labor (then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople).
Relief Sought / Nature of the Case
- Petition for review of the Secretary of Labor’s decision dated February 7, 1975 which set aside the Arbitrator’s reinstatement-with-backwages order and instead awarded separation pay.
- Petition also challenges the Secretary’s resolution dated July 24, 1975 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Procedural History
- Arbitrator rendered decision on May 4, 1973 ordering reinstatement with backwages of the complainants.
- On June 8, 1973, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed respondent company’s appeal as filed out of time.
- Respondent company filed a motion for reconsideration treated as an appeal before the Secretary of Labor.
- Secretary of Labor (Blas Ople) modified the Arbitrator’s decision by awarding separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages (decision dated February 7, 1975).
- Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by resolution dated July 24, 1975.
- Petitioner filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court, resulting in the Supreme Court’s decision on November 13, 1992 affirming the appealed decision.
Undisputed Facts as Found by the Secretary of Labor
- Complainants: Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar were dismissed after an application for clearance to terminate them was approved by the Secretary of Labor on December 19, 1972.
- Secretary’s finding noted that respondent company’s application for clearance alleged “willful violation of Company regulations, gross insubordination and refusal to submit to a Company investigation.”
- Background sequence leading to dismissal (as recited in the Arbitrator’s decision):
- Company operated on three shifts: morning, afternoon, night.
- Night (third) shift workers normally worked Monday to Saturday, with the last working day being Friday (forty hours a week or Monday to Friday).
- Sometime in July 1972, there was a change in the working schedule from Monday–Friday (as in the CBA) to Sunday–Thursday, effective July 5, 1972.
- Third shift employees were required to start the new work schedule Sunday–Thursday.
- On November 6, 1972, night shift employees filed a demand to maintain the old schedule (Monday–Friday) via a letter to the Committee on Labor Relations (UCLU).
- The demand was referred to the Labor Management Relation Committee and discussed from November 15 to November 24, 1972.
- It was agreed that all night shift operating personnel were allowed to start work Monday and on Saturday, except maintenance and preparation crews whose schedule remained Sunday–Thursday.
- The revised work schedule between management and the alleged officers of the Union (Varias group) was approved and disseminated to take effect November 26, 1972 (Exh. "2" Respondent).
- In manifestation of dissent to the new work schedule, Duro, Torio, and Javillonar did not report for work on November 26, 1972 (a Sunday), which they asserted was not a working day under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Exh. "A" Complainant).
- Their absence caused their suspension for fourteen (14) days.
Issue Presented
- Whether the complainants could be validly dismissed from their employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the new work schedule imposed by the employer.
Petitioner’s Contentions (as stated in the record)
- The change in the company’s working schedule violated the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
- Because complainants’ refusal to comply with the re-scheduled working hours was based on a provision of the CBA, they could not be validly dismissed for insubordination.
- The dismissal violated Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution guaranteeing the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work.
Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions Quoted in the Decision
- Article XIX (Duration):
- “This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in full force and effect without change until August 31, 1974. Unless the parties hereto agree otherwise, negotiation for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a new agreement may not be initiated before July 1,