Title
UEM Mara Philippines Corp. vs. Ng Wee
Case
G.R. No. 206563
Decision Date
Oct 14, 2020
A dispute over investment losses led to a writ of preliminary attachment against UEM MARA's income. The Supreme Court ruled the writ ceased after UEM MARA was absolved in the main case, finding no liability for Ng Wee's losses.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 206563)

Relevant Dates and Procedural Posture

  • Writ of preliminary attachment issued by RTC: November 6–7, 2000 (notice of garnishment served on PRA on November 7, 2000).
  • Trial court orders on motions to discharge and counter-bond: various orders between 2010–2011 (including May 20, 2010 and May 26, 2011).
  • CA reinstated the writ: August 29, 2012 Decision and March 27, 2013 Resolution (CA-G.R. SP No. 120695).
  • Supreme Court resolution on certiorari: October 14, 2020 (G.R. No. 206563), reversing the CA and deeming the writ lifted after final disposition of the main case.

Applicable Law and Precedents Cited

  • Rule 57, Revised Rules of Court (preliminary attachment).
  • Jurisprudence on the nature and effect of attachment: Lorenzo Shipping v. Villarin; Adlawan v. Judge Tomol; Yu v. Miranda.
  • The Supreme Court’s 2017 and 2018 decisions in Virata et al. v. Ng Wee (disposed Civil Case No. 00-99006 with finality and absolved UEM MARA of liability).

Summary of Factual Allegations in the Complaint

Ng Wee alleged that he was induced by officers of Westmont Bank and Wincorp to place investments which were subsequently loaned to Power Merge Corporation (beneficially owned by Virata). Ng Wee claimed the loans were part of a fraudulent scheme: Power Merge lacked capacity and obligation to repay; Wincorp allegedly agreed to side arrangements rendering Power Merge non-liable; and the credit facilities (including the Power Merge Credit Line Facility) originated from fraudulent transactions involving Hottick Line Credit Facility. The damages sought totaled P210,595,991.62.

Issuance and Scope of the writ of preliminary attachment

On November 6, 2000, the RTC granted the application for a writ of attachment. The sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment dated November 7, 2000, on, among others, the PRA, seeking to garnish “the proportionate share of [UEM MARA] in the Project Income of the Tollway Project which are collected by the Public Estates Authority and/or any of its subsidiaries, affiliates, agents and/or entities or persons acting on its behalf.”

PRA’s Responses and PRA’s Position on Garnishable Income

By letter dated November 13, 2000, the PRA informed the sheriff that as of November 7, 2000 there was no income allocable to UEM MARA because the Joint Venture Project Committee had not approved distribution of net revenue; thus, no income could be garnished. PRA also referred the notices to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and maintained that the contract for the Tollway Project was with UEM-MARA, not UEM Development Phils., Inc., and that Virata was not a party to the Toll Operation Agreement.

Procedural Challenges by UEM MARA and Virata

UEM MARA and Virata filed motions to dismiss (and motions to discharge the writ), arguing lack of real party in interest and failure to state a cause of action; these motions were denied by the trial court (Omnibus Order of October 23, 2001; Order of October 14, 2002). They pursued certiorari relief to the Supreme Court and had petitions denied in 2003–2004.

Discovery, Audited Financial Statements, and Subpoena Issues

Ng Wee produced UEM MARA’s audited financial statements for 2000 and 2001 reflecting UEM MARA’s share in toll fees (P171,535,275.00 and P166,192,476.00 respectively). Ng Wee sought issuance (and re-issuance) of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to the PRA’s General Manager (for documents and testimony regarding the November 7, 2000 garnishment and subsequent distributions). PRA reiterated its 2000 stance that no net revenue had been approved for distribution as of that date. The trial court granted Ng Wee’s motion for re-issuance of the subpoena (Order dated February 2, 2011), over UEM MARA and Virata’s objections that the subpoena was unnecessary and oppressive given PRA’s prior statements.

Trial Court Orders on Counter-bond and on Lifting Attachment

  • May 20, 2010: RTC granted Virata’s urgent motion to discharge attachment conditionally (subject to a counter-bond) but initially only as to the Forbes Park property (TCT No. 133645).
  • June 29, 2010: RTC held abeyance on reconsideration and set hearing to determine property value.
  • May 26, 2011: RTC modified counter-bond amount for Virata’s Forbes Park property from P60,000,000.00 to P174,100,000.00, and lifted and set aside the writ of attachment on UEM MARA’s project income. The May 26, 2011 order provided that upon posting the counter-bond of P174,100,000.00, the writ over the Forbes Park property would also be lifted.

Court of Appeals’ Ruling Reinstating the Attachment

The CA (August 29, 2012 Decision and March 27, 2013 Resolution) annulled the RTC’s May 26, 2011 order insofar as it discharged the writ of attachment on UEM MARA’s project income and restored the preliminary attachment. The CA reasoned that the RTC had gravely misapprehended the facts by giving full credence to PRA’s claim of nonexistence of distributable income without testing that claim against Ng Wee’s audited financial statements which reflected UEM MARA’s project income. The CA held the RTC should have conducted a hearing to resolve the factual conflict before lifting the attachment.

Grounds of UEM MARA’s Petition to the Supreme Court

UEM MARA contended that the CA erred by: (1) finding grave abuse of discretion by the RTC for alleged factual misapprehension; (2) failing to consider that the lifting of the preliminary attachment was justified despite the absence of counter-bond; and (3) granting certiorari over mere errors of judgment.

Supreme Court’s Legal Framework on Preliminary Attachment

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled nature of preliminary attachment as a provisional, ancillary remedy under Rule 57 designed to preserve property for satisfaction of any judgment—preventing disposal of assets and subjecting property to a creditor’s claim during pendency of the main action (citing Lorenzo Shipping; Adlawan; Yu). The Court emphasized that an attachment is incident to and dependent upon the main suit, and that the attachment ceases to exist upon final adjudication of that principal action.

Final Disposition of the Main Case and Its Effect on the Attachment

Civil

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