Title
People vs. Udarbe
Case
G.R. No. 9945
Decision Date
Nov 12, 1914
Municipal president leased municipal fishpond during term, violating conflict-of-interest law; upheld conviction, six months’ imprisonment imposed.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 9945)

Facts Found by the Trial Court

The trial court made the following specific factual findings, which the appellate court accepted: Udarbe was municipal president from October 28, 1912; while presiding the municipal council adopted Regulation No. 7 (Dec. 9, 1912) providing that current leaseholders of fishpond sections could continue by paying the fixed rental, subject to others bidding if preferential rights were waived; on December 16, 1912, Udarbe presided at the auction and his participation in the bidding for section No. 102 was recorded, with that section adjudicated to him as highest bidder for P2 per year; he paid the municipal treasurer P2 on January 10, 1913; he continued in the lease of section No. 102 through December 1913; on December 20, 1913 he transferred the lease to his nephew, Miguel Udarbe.

Defendant’s Position and Evidentiary Contentions

Udarbe contended that he already held the lease of section No. 102 before his appointment as municipal president and therefore merely continued an existing private right; he also asserted he did not participate in the December 16, 1912 bidding. The defense relied further on two Attorney-General opinions (1902 and 1909) to argue that the statute should not be construed to criminalize the conduct alleged. The trial court found the defendant’s assertion of a preexisting lease not sufficiently proven; instead the documentary minute of December 16, 1912 showed he was awarded the lease while presiding.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether a municipal officer who, by reason of his office, participates in municipal deliberations and actions, may become directly or indirectly interested in a contract or business of the municipality — here, the leasing of municipal property — without violating section 28 of the Municipal Code (as amended by Act No. 663), and whether the facts proved constituted a penal offense under that provision.

Statutory Text, Purpose, and Analogous Penal Provision

Section 28 of the Municipal Code, as amended, proscribes that no municipal officer “shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract work, or cockpits, or any other permitted games and amusements, or business of the municipality, or in the purchase of any real estate or any other property belonging to the corporation,” with violation punishable by imprisonment not less than six months nor more than two years. The statute’s purpose is to prevent conflicts of interest, the subordination of municipal interests to private interests of officers, and the risk of fraud or favoritism in transactions where municipal officers influence the terms, award, or administration of municipal contracts or leases. Article 397 of the Penal Code was cited as an analogous provision penalizing a public officer who becomes interested in any contract or operation in which he must intervene by reason of his office; the court treated this as harmonizing with the policy behind section 28.

Court’s Analysis of Evidence and Application of Law

The court emphasized documentary proof: Minute No. 54 (Dec. 16, 1912) established that Udarbe presided over the auction and was adjudicated section No. 102 as highest bidder. The court rejected the defense claim that he held the lease prior to his appointment because the Minute Book did not substantiate that assertion. Even if he had held the lease prior to appointment, the court reasoned that continuing to enjoy or renew such a lease while presiding over council resolutions (notably the Dec. 9, 1912 regulation granting preferential rights to incumbent leaseholders) created the same conflict the statute seeks to prevent. The court found Udarbe’s active participation in adopting a rule that advantaged incumbent leaseholders, and then bidding and obtaining the lease while presiding, demonstrated precisely the kind of conflict of interest and possibility of unfair advantage that section 28 forbids. The court also noted his subsequent transfer of the lease to a nephew, and his prior excuse from deliberation on Resolution No. 202 (Dec. 15, 1913) as evidence he understood the delicate nature of the matter — an understanding that made his earlier conduct more culpable.

Treatment of Attorney‑General Opinions and Precedent

The defense relied on two Attorney‑Genera

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.