Nature of the Alleged Libel and Its Source
The alleged libel upon the private prosecutor was contained in the letter. The evidence established that the letter was written by the defendant in the course of illicit correspondence with the private prosecutor’s wife. The record also showed the manner by which the communication reached the private prosecutor: the defendant sent the letter to the wife, she read it, and it was ultimately discovered by the husband in the wife’s possession. The defendant’s counsel did not dispute that the letter’s language was defamatory in substance; counsel instead advanced an argument grounded on the letter’s alleged character as “private, confidential, and secret,” contending that this would rebut the presumption of malice otherwise attached to publication.
Governing Libel Statute and Presumption of Malice
The Court applied the “new libel law” under which the prosecution was brought. It held that the statute attaches the presumption of malice to an injurious publication “if no justifiable motive for making it is shown”. It quoted Act of the United States Philippine Commission, No. 277, sec. 3. The Court did not attempt an exhaustive statement of what motives might qualify as justifiable under the act. It confined itself to the case at bar and reasoned that the defendant’s letter amounted to a solicitation to commit adultery. For that reason, the Court held that it would be a contradiction to treat such publication as made with “justifiable motives.” It added that there was nothing in the record to rebut the presumption of malice that arises from the mere fact of publication.
Publication and the Statutory Test of “Parting with Custody”
The Court next addressed the defendant’s contention that it was not shown that he parted with the custody of the letter “under such circumstances that as a natural and logical consequence it might be read by a third person.” The Court relied on Section 5 of the Libel Act, which provided that “to sustain a charge of publishing a libel, it is enough that the accused knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the libel under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any other person than himself.” On the evidence described in the decision, the Court found that the statutory conditions were fully satisfied. The defendant sent the letter to the private prosecutor’s wife, she read it, and it was ultimately discovered by the private prosecutor in her possession.
Review of Assignments of Error
The appellant raised errors relating to the conduct of the trial court, particularly claims about the defendant’s right to testify and the admissibility of the wife’s testimony. The Court examined the record and rejected these claims. It held that the statement of counsel that the court below did not permit the defendant to testify in his own behalf was not true in point of fact. It likewise held that the
...continue reading
- The case arose from a prosecution for libel brought under the “new libel law” applicable to the Philippines.
- The United States acted as the complainant and appellee, while Jaime Ubinana stood as defendant and appellant.
- The matter reached the appellate court on an appeal from the judgment of the court below.
- The Court issued an affirmance, with instructions for execution of the judgment.
Alleged Libel by Letter
- The alleged libel was contained in a letter.
- The evidence showed that the letter was written by the defendant in the course of an illicit correspondence.
- The correspondence involved the private prosecutor’s wife.
- The defendant sent the letter to the private prosecutor’s wife.
- The wife read the letter.
- The private prosecutor later discovered the letter in the wife’s possession.
Malice Presumption Under New Libel Law
- The defense did not claim that the letter’s language was not defamatory.
- Instead, the defense invoked the letter’s described character as “private, confidential, and secret”.
- The Court treated that argument as insufficient to defeat the presumption of malice.
- Under Act of the United States Philippine Commission, No. 277, sec. 3, the law attached a presumption of malice to an injurious publication.
- The presumption applied “if no justifiable motive for making it is shown.”
- The Court explained that the inquiry into justifiable motives need not be exhaustively addressed for the present case.
- It held that the letter, being a solicitation to commit adultery, could not logically be characterized as published with justifiable motives.
- The Court concluded that nothing in the case rebutted the presumption of malice.
- The Court further held that the presumption arose from the mere fact of publication.
“Private” Character Not a Defense
- The Court rejected the idea that the private, confidential, and secret character of the letter alone could rebut malice.
- It reasoned that confidentiality did not negat