G.R. No. 4504 - People vs Cuna

Case Summary (G.R. No. 4504)

Facts and Procedural Posture

The provincial fiscal charged the defendant with violating section 5 of Act No. 1461 by selling a small quantity of opium to a Filipino woman who was not authorized to possess or vend opium. The defendant demurred to the information on the ground that Act No. 1461 had been repealed by Act No. 1761 while the case was pending and that the repealing statute contained no exception preserving prosecution of pending offenses; therefore, the defendant asserted, there was no law in force by which he could be punished and the court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the information. The Government appealed.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the general repealing clause in Act No. 1761, which expressly repealed Act No. 1461 effective October 17, 1907, deprived the courts of jurisdiction after that date to try, convict, and sentence persons for violations of Act No. 1461 committed prior to the effective date of the repeal.

Trial Court's Reasoning Cited

The trial court relied on English and American common-law authority holding that repeal of a penal statute operates as a remission of penalties for offenses committed before repeal, and releases persons from prosecution therefor unless the repealing statute expressly authorizes prosecution. The court cited cases such as U.S. v. Tynen, Mongeon v. People, and State v. Wilder in support of dismissal.

Competing Doctrines: Anglo‑American Common Law

The opinion recounts the Anglo‑American common-law doctrine: under general common-law principles, repeal of a penal statute is treated as remission of penalties and a bar to subsequent prosecution unless the repealing statute contains an express saving clause. The Court cites U.S. v. Reisinger for this articulation of the common-law rule.

Spanish/Philippine Doctrinal Framework

The Court explains that English and American common law are not binding here except insofar as they rest on principles applicable locally and not in conflict with existing law. It therefore examines Spanish doctrinal authorities and the local codes in force. It highlights article 1 of the Philippine Penal Code (crimes are voluntary acts or omissions penalized by law), article 21 (no crime punished by a penalty not prescribed prior to commission), and article 22 (penal laws have retroactive effect insofar as they favor persons convicted). It also invokes article 3 of the preliminary title of the Spanish Civil Code (laws are not retroactive unless so provided).

Interpretation under Spanish Penal Doctrine and Codes

Drawing on Spanish authorities and commentary (including Pacheco and Spanish Supreme Court precedents cited in the opinion), the Court explains the Spanish construction: when a new penal law repeals a prior penal law by a general repealing clause, that repeal does not automatically relieve offenders of penalties already incurred under the old law unless the new law is more favorable (diminishes or abolishes the penalty). Penal provisions are to be applied to offenses committed before repeal according to the law in force at the time of commission unless the new law expressly affords a more favorable rule; in that latter case the more favorable rule applies. Thus, general repealing clauses do not, by their own force, strip courts of jurisdiction over pending prosecutions.

Application to Acts of the Philippine Commission

The Court addresses the argument that Penal Code articles apply only to the Code and not to special Acts of the Commission. It reasons that article 22 prescribes a general rule of application for penal laws and, even if article 22 were deemed inapplicable to special Acts, article 3 of the Civil Code would still prevent retroactive effect of laws unless expressly provided. Consequently, the principles supporting application of the Spanish doctrine extend to Acts of the Commission where no express retroactivity or remission is declared.

Analysis of Legislative Intent and Jurisdictional Consequences

The Court rejects the trial court’s assumption that repeal necessarily removes court jurisdiction or implies remission of penalties. It finds that to hold otherwise would require an arbitrary implication that the legislature intended to pardon certain offenders merely because repeal occurred w

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 4504)

Facts of the Case

On June 30, 1907, the defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco) allegedly sold a small quantity of opium for ten cents Philippine currency to Apolinaria Gumpal in the municipality of Echague, Province of Isabela.
The provincial fiscal filed an information charging the defendant with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 on August 12, 1907, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela.
Act No. 1761 was enacted on October 10, 1907, and went into effect on October 17, 1907; section 33 of Act No. 1761 expressly repealed Act No. 1461.
The alleged offense was therefore committed while Act No. 1461 was in force; prosecution was pending when Act No. 1761 took effect.

Procedural History

After the information was filed, the defendant demurred to the information on grounds that:
- The information alleged a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 occurring on June 30, 1907.
- Act No. 1461 was repealed by Act No. 1761 during the pendency of the case.
- Because the repealing law did not contain exceptions touching pending cases, there was no law in force penalizing the alleged offense and the court had no jurisdiction.
The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the information, declaring costs de oficio.
The Government appealed from the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information.
The sole question presented on appeal: Whether section 33 of Act No. 1761, which expressly repealed Act No. 1461, should be construed to deprive the courts of jurisdiction after the effective date of the repealing Act to try, convict, and sentence persons guilty of violations of Act No. 1461 committed prior to that date.

Trial Court Ruling and Reasoning

The trial court found Act No. 1461 was in force at the time of the alleged offense but was superseded by Act No. 1761 effective October 17, 1907.
The trial court observed that section 33 of Act No. 1761 repealed Act No. 1461 without excepting pending cases or prescribing disposition of such cases.
Citing authorities (U. S. v. Tynen, Mongeon v. People, State v. Wilder), the trial court applied the common-law doctrine that repeal of a penal statute operates as a remission of penalties and releases prosecution for prior violations unless the repealing statute authorizes continuation.
On that basis, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case for want of a law in force by which the defendant could be punished.

Legal Question Presented

Whether, under the law applicable in the Philippine Islands, the repeal by Act No. 1761 of Act No. 1461 deprived the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons who violated Act No. 1461 prior to the repealing Act’s effective date, when the repealing Act contains no express exception for pending cases.

Statutory and Doctrinal Provisions Invoked

Act No. 1461 (the “Opium Law”) — offense alleged to have been committed under section 5 (text of section not quoted in source).
Act No. 1761 — enacted October 10, 1907; effective October 17, 1907; section 33 expressly repealed Act No. 1461.
Penal Code (Philippine Islands):
- Article 1 — defines crimes and misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by law.
- Article 21 — provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
- Article 22 — provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, even if final judgment has been pronounced and sentence executed.
Spanish Civil Code (preliminary title):
- Article 3 — provides that laws in general shall not have retroactive effect unless expressly provided otherwise.
Spanish authorities and jurisprudence (Pacheco; supreme court of Spain decisions) interpreting analogous provisions of Spanish penal codes and the effect of general repealing clauses.

Competing Doctrines and Authorities Cited

English and American common-law doctrine:
- The common-law rule holds that repeal of a penal statute operates as a remission of penalties for violations committed before repeal and releases prosecution thereafter unless expressly authorized by the repealing statute.
- Cited U.S. Supreme Court authority: U. S. v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. Rep., 398, stating the common-law principle.
- Trial court cited cases (U. S. v. Tynen; Mongeon v. Peo