G.R. No. 14476 - People vs. Baluyot

Case Summary (G.R. No. 14476)

Factual Summary

Baluyot, a defeated political candidate for governor in 1916 and then a captain in the National Guard, came to Balanga on August 3, 1918, carrying a revolver. He waited in the recorder’s office and twice entered Governor Lerma’s office for an interview. The first brief interview was interrupted at the governor’s request so another caller (Antonino Aranjuez) could speak with the governor. After Aranjuez’s conference ended, Baluyot reentered the governor’s office. Witnesses in the recorder’s office heard Baluyot call the governor (some heard words about the governor’s revolver) and almost immediately a shot. Within seconds another shot was fired as the governor fled, and later, after the governor took refuge in a closet and called for help, a fatal shot through the closet door struck the governor in the head. The governor died a few hours later. Baluyot threw down his revolver, indicated to approaching constabulary where they should come, and surrendered without resistance.

Procedural History

An information for murder was filed in the justice of the peace court on August 3, 1918; the case was transmitted to the Court of First Instance where Baluyot was arraigned and tried. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, ordered to indemnify heirs, and assessed costs. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. After consideration, a majority affirmed the conviction but, because one Justice dissented regarding the propriety of the death penalty, the penalty was reduced under Act No. 2726 from death to cadena perpetua with accessory penalties under article 54 of the Penal Code.

Issues Presented on Appeal

Whether the killing was murder (and, if so, whether qualifying circumstances such as alevosia/treachery and known premeditation were established).
Whether alleged trial errors deprived the accused of a fair trial (denial of continuance, alleged bias of trial judge for attending funeral, refusal to allow withdrawal of not-guilty plea to file a demurrer, refusal to compel production of fiscal investigative statements, and failure to record consultation with assessors).

Court’s Findings on Primary Facts and Sequence of Events

The Court accepted the trial court’s findings on the sequence: Baluyot waited in the recorder’s office, entered the governor’s office twice, spoke to the governor (including remarks heard by some witnesses about a revolver), and fired the first shot within seconds of reentry. The first shot struck the governor’s upper-right shoulder region, the second shot struck similarly while the governor fled, and the third shot was fired through the closet door while the governor was hiding and calling for help; this third wound was fatal. The Court found the attack continuous from the first shot through the fatal shot. The Court emphasized evidence that Baluyot knew, or confirmed, that the governor was unarmed in the office when the attack began (including the removal of a revolver from the governor’s office earlier and testimony indicating the governor did not have his revolver at hand), and that the assault was executed in a manner calculated to ensure success without risk to the assailant.

Legal Qualification: Alevosia (Treachery) and Premeditation — Majority Analysis

Alevosia: The majority held that the killing was murder qualified by alevosia. The Court reasoned that Baluyot gained access to the governor’s office under a pretext of a friendly interview, reentered when conditions were favorable, and used methods (shooting an unarmed and hemmed-in official, and ultimately firing through the closet door at a helpless victim) that tended directly and specially to insure execution of the crime without risk to himself. The Court regarded the entire assault as deliberately planned in the way it was executed and concluded treachery was present, particularly at the final lethal act.
Premeditation: The trial court found evident premeditation. The majority noted several indicia pointing to a formed determination (previous threatening remarks attributed to Baluyot, his trip to Balanga, his demeanor and lack of repentance after the act). The Supreme Court observed that known premeditation need not include planning of all details but requires formation of the determination to kill with some time to reflect. Although the majority recognized evidence supporting premeditation, they ultimately refrained from making an explicit express finding on premeditation because it was unnecessary for disposition; nevertheless they accepted the murder qualification principally on the alevosia finding.

Aggravating and Extenuating Circumstances

The Court identified aggravating circumstances: (1) commission of the crime against a person engaged in public authority performing duties (province governor), and (2) existence of at least one qualifying circumstance (alevosia). The trial court also found evident premeditation as an additional aggravating circumstance. The accused’s plea for extenuating circumstances (passion/obfuscation, or lack of intent to commit so great a wrong) was rejected on the factual record: the Court found Baluyot’s self-serving account of provocation and accident to be contradicted by other evidence, including admissions and circumstances showing deliberation.

Trial Procedure and Alleged Errors — Court’s Rulings

Denial of continuance: The Court found no prejudice. The record showed Baluyot was represented by competent counsel throughout; Vicente Sotto arrived and took charge; no affidavit detailing lack of preparation was filed; and no specific witness was shown to have been unavailable due to the schedule. Court discretion in denying continuance was not abused.
Alleged judge bias for attending governor’s funeral: The Court found no proof of actual bias and noted statutory grounds of disqualification are exhaustive; mere attendance at public obsequies did not establish disqualification.
Denial of motion to withdraw plea to file demurrer: The trial court acted within discretion and reasonably regarded the motion as dilatory; no abuse of discretion was shown.
Refusal to compel production of fiscal investigative written statements: The Court upheld the trial court. The statements were administrative-departmental declarations taken by the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code (an investigation, not a sworn preliminary hearing under the committing magistrate’s procedures). They were part of the fiscal’s file and not automatically producible on mere request; moreover, the defense had the witnesses before the court and cross-examined them, and no predicate was laid to justify compulsory production for impeachment. The Court explained the proper method to impeach by prior inconsistent statements (laying a predicate on cross-examination) and noted the court could order production if a proper showing by affidavit were made.
Assessors not recorded as consulted: The Court treated the omission as immaterial. Assessors are advisory; the judge has the responsibility for decision. In the absence of record evidence to the contrary, the court presumed proper consultation, and subsequent certifications by the assessors indicated concurrence.

Sentencing and Final Disposition by the Majority

The majority concluded that murder, qualified by alevosia and with the aggravating circumstance of being committed against a public authority, was established. The trial court had imposed death. Because one Justice dissented concerning the propriety of the death penalty, and under the statutory requirements (Act No. 2726), the penalty imposed was reduced to cadena perpetua with accessory penalties as provided by article 54 of the Penal Code. The judgment as thus modified was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Dissent Summary (Justice Araullo): Homicide, Not Murder — Core Arguments

Justice Araullo dissented from the majority’s classification of the offense as murder with alevosia and would have found only homicide. Core points in the dissent:

Burden of proof: Qualifying circumstances (alevosia, premeditation) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt like the homicide itself; mere presumptions or inferences are insufficient.
Conflicting witness timings: The three witnesses in the recorder’s office gave inconsistent accounts of the timing between Baluyot’s reentry and the first shot (estimates ranging from about 2 seconds to 9–11 seconds). Because these timing discrepancies make it uncertain whether Baluyot had time to draw and deliberately fire upon discovering the governor unarmed, the dissent argued the inference that Baluyot awaited the governor’s defenselessness and then treacherously shot is not conclusively established.
Revolver possession and awareness: The dissent observed evidence that the revolver seen earlier belonged to the jail warden, not the governor, and questioned whether Baluyot actually knew the governor was unarmed. The dissent stressed Baluyot’s own statements about the exchange and the surrounding conversation, noting the governor and accused had an antagonistic verbal exchange that could have precipitated sudden violence rather than a treacherous ambush.
Nature of the assault and continuity: Justice Araullo emphasized that alevosia must be present throughout the assault constituting the crime; if treachery was absent at the outset, finding treachery solely at a later instant of a continuous attack is improper. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence and earlier decisions (including United States v. Balagtas and Jaime and Spanish precedents), the dissent argued that treachery which onl

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 14476)

Procedural Posture

Appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan convicting Jose I. Baluyot of murder (committed August 3, 1918), sentencing him to death, ordering indemnity to heirs P1,000, and assessor of costs.
Case reported at 40 Phil. 385; G.R. No. 14476; decision promulgated November 6, 1919.
On appeal, majority affirms conviction but reduces penalty from death to cadena perpetua under Act No. 2726 because one Justice dissented as to imposition of death; accessory penalties under article 54 imposed.
Judgment rendered by Chief Justice Arellano; concurrence by Justices Torres, Johnson, and Avancena; Justice Malcolm did not take part; Justice Moir voted with majority but was absent at promulgation and name not signed; opinion signed C.S. Arellano.
Separate dissenting opinion by Justice Araullo, who would have classified the crime as homicide and prescribed a different penalty.

Statement of Facts — Background, Motive, and Circumstances Prior to the Killing

Baluyot and Conrado Lerma were political competitors in the June 6, 1916 general election; Lerma was elected governor of Bataan, Baluyot came third.
A personal rancor developed in Baluyot toward Lerma; Baluyot became convinced Lerma was persecuting him.
In 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted for estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila relating to a loan from the Philippine National Bank; the prosecution was tried and was pending decision in early August 1918.
Baluyot had been commissioned captain in the National Guard; he had been asked to resign, and was temporarily relieved from duty pending investigation; Baluyot attributed these misfortunes and other minor ones to “machinations” of Governor Lerma.
On August 2, 1918, Baluyot left Manila and went to Orion, Bataan, carrying a revolver. The following day the record states (in text) that he shipped his wife’s piano from Orion to Manila early that day and at 8 a.m. went to Balanga, arriving about 9 a.m. at the recorder’s office where he inquired for Governor Lerma and waited.

Events of August 3, 1918 — The Encounter and Killings

Baluyot waited in the recorder’s office (an anteroom to the governor’s office). Around 11 a.m. the governor arrived; Baluyot and Lerma greeted each other by shaking hands.
Lerma invited Baluyot into his office. Another caller, Antonino Aranjuez, was present; after a short initial conference the governor requested Baluyot withdraw briefly to confer with Aranjuez. Baluyot withdrew to the recorder’s office, told Aranjuez the governor wanted to speak with him, then reentered the governor’s office after Aranjuez’s conference ended.
Witnesses in the recorder’s office (Antonino Aranjuez, Pedro Gonzalez the recorder, and Gregorio de Guzman the provincial assessor) were positioned so as to hear parts of the conversation and to observe the events shortly thereafter.
Within seconds (disputed interval among witnesses but generally very short) after Baluyot reentered the governor’s office, shots were fired by Baluyot. The lower court found the first shot was fired within a few seconds after reentry and that the interval was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach Governor Lerma’s desk.

Testimony on Words Spoken Immediately Before the Shooting

Baluyot’s account: he said words about revolvers — “It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre.” Lerma allegedly replied “No sir; mine is 32.” Baluyot: “So is mine. Be prepared because one of us must die.” Baluyot testified his remark intended to admonish the governor to prepare for a mortal combat.
Witness accounts: Aranjuez heard Baluyot call out “governor”; Gregorio de Guzman understood Baluyot to be asking the governor for his revolver. Pedro Gonzalez did not report hearing those words but stated he heard a shot about two seconds after Baluyot entered the governor’s office.
The majority concludes Baluyot’s account of the conversational detail immediately prior to shooting is false and/or lacking verisimilitude given the very short interval before the first shot; the court infers Baluyot drew his revolver and fired almost immediately upon discovering Lerma unarmed.
The record also contains testimony that while Baluyot sat in the recorder’s office a guard (Paulo Venegas) entered, the recorder handed a revolver and cartridges to the guard, and the guard departed with that revolver; the court debates the implications of this fact on whether Lerma’s office commonly contained a revolver and whether Lerma would be unarmed.

Sequence and Ballistic Trajectory of the Three Shots (Per Testimony and Court Findings)

First shot: entered frontal region of right shoulder blade (described as frontal region of the right shoulder blade or below the upper right clavicle), passed through that part of the body, penetrated back of the chair, then lodged in the office wall after being spent; line of direction indicates somewhat downward trajectory, consistent with the governor reclining backward in chair at moment of impact.
Second shot: fired as Lerma fled toward the corridor, struck in region of right shoulder blade and passed through the body approximately one or two inches from first wound; witnesses dispute whether it entered from front or back depending on positions described; Aranjuez saw the second shot fired at the governor while the governor was fleeing and thought the governor’s face was turned in direction of his flight such that the second shot might have entered from behind; Dr. Bonifacio Mencias opined both of the first two wounds entered from the front.
Third shot: after Lerma took refuge in a closet at the end of the corridor and shut the door, calling loudly for help, Baluyot fired through the panel of the closet door. The bullet struck Lerma near and above the right temple, passed downward and out through the left eye, loosening the eyeball and penetrating the cerebrum; this wound was necessarily fatal though death occurred approximately two or three hours later without recovery of consciousness.
After the final shot, Baluyot opened the door and Lerma’s body shot forward then fell prone; Baluyot then went to a window, called Constabulary troops, threw his revolver (with three empty shells among cartridges) on the floor, and surrendered without resistance when Constabulary arrived.

Medical and Forensic Evidence

Dr. Bonifacio Mencias examined Lerma five minutes after the incident and testified to three perforating wounds: two in the right shoulder region (described as entering in front and exiting the right shoulder blade) and one in the head entering the right temple and exiting the left side; he described the first two wounds as not necessarily mortal and the third as mortal, having penetrated the cerebrum.
The physical evidence included the back of the governor’s chair pierced and a circular hole in the office wall consistent with the first shot lodging after being spent.

Defendant’s Post-Offense Conduct and Admissions

Baluyot surrendered to Constabulary without resistance after indicating their arrival and discarding his revolver.
He reportedly made admissions to others: to reporter Eusebio Reyes (La Vanguardia) on August 5 (that he had told the governor to defend himself, saying “I come to kill you,” and that he fired the first and second shot one after the other); to Lieutenant Angel Labayan (Constabulary commanding officer) on August 3 he reportedly said he asked the governor about the calibre of his revolver, the governor said he did not bring a revolver, and Baluyot then said “I will kill you now,” and fired when the governor called for help.
Baluyot’s own trial testimony included a narrative of provocation and struggle, later discredited by the majority as implausible.

Legal Issues Presented on Appeal

Whether the killing of Governor Conrado Lerma constituted murder by reason of alevosia (treachery) and/or evident premeditation, justifying imposition of the maximum penalty.
Whether extenuating circumstances existed (impulse producing passion and obfuscation; lack of intention to commit so great a wrong) as argued by the defendant.
Whether trial errors occurred: denial of continuance (last request by defendant’s attorney), trial judge’s impartiality/personal qualification due to attendance at Lerma’s funeral, denial of motion to withdraw plea and allow demurrer, refusal to comp