G.R. No. 13052 - People vs Alabot

Case Summary (G.R. No. 13052)

Factual Background: The Events Surrounding the Killing

The Court found that, sometime previous to September 14, 1915, probably a day or two before that date, a party of about eight armed Moros went to a place near a lake in the Province of Lanao to procure subsistence by begging or stealing. The participants included the defendants Alabot, Kao, and Makarimpong, and prosecution witnesses Kalaku and Kuruao; the apparent organizer and chief was Rumaub. After obtaining palay, the party started back. On the way home, they passed the house of Sultan Sarip, which Rumaub, Alabot, and Uru entered. Thereafter, the party proceeded until they reached a cotta, where Rumaub ordered them to rest.

Early the next morning, September 14, 1915, while the party lay in wait, Rumaub fired a shot at an American passing in the roadway a few meters away, which caused confusion among some members. The witnesses Kalaku and Kuruao ran away. During their flight, Rumaub shouted, asking why they ran instead of shooting, and either because of this or out of curiosity, they looked back and saw Alabot slashing the American with his cris. The Court noted that Alabot, upon hearing the shot, did not flee; he instead jumped and ran to where he was later seen slashing the American.

Afterward, Rumaub, Alabot, and the other members caught up with Kalaku and Kuruao, and they proceeded to the house of Adam, the father of the latter two. At Adam’s house, both Rumaub and Alabot related their respective roles in the killing. Alabot told Adam that he had slashed the American who was shot by Rumaub and had taken the victim’s revolver and money. At that time, Alabot was in possession of those items. Rumaub later took the revolver from Alabot, gave it to Adam as dowry for his daughter, and divided the money among the members of the party.

Medical Findings and Identity of the Victim

On or about the same day, the dead body of an American named Charles H. Mills was brought to the hospital in Dansalan, where Dr. E. W. Ames, the provincial health officer, examined it with the assistance of Nicasio Torres. The body showed two bullet wounds in the abdomen (entrance and exit), a neck wound that almost severed the head, and additional wounds in various parts of the body caused by blows with a cutting instrument.

The defense argued that the proof failed to establish beyond doubt that the American shot and slashed was Charles H. Mills. The Court rejected this contention. It reasoned that Charles H. Mills had a bullet through his abdomen, and the American killed by Rumaub and Alabot had first been shot by Rumaub; likewise, Charles H. Mills had wounds from a cutting instrument, while the American killed by Alabot was slashed by him. It also found that Mills died on or about September 14, 1915, the same date when the killing by the Moros took place, and that no dispute on identity was seriously raised at trial.

Challenge to Jurisdiction and Proof of Lugar Within Lanao

The defense next asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it allegedly did not appear that the barrio of Tuluan was within the Province of Lanao. The information alleged that the crime was committed in or near Tuluan, Province of Lanao. At trial, the Court found that the crime was in fact committed in that barrio, but no witness testified directly that it lay within Lanao. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that a leading question presupposing the barrio’s location in Lanao was asked without objection: “Sabe Usted si se ha matado a algun americano en el sitio de Tuluan de la provincia de Lanao?” The answer was in the affirmative and identified Rumaub as the killer. The Court held this exchange sufficient to show that Tuluan was in Lanao.

The Court further invoked Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that courts may take judicial notice that a particular municipality or barrio is within the jurisdiction for which the court has competence. The Court cited Marzon vs. Udtujan, U. S. vs. Chua Mo, and U. S. vs. Lim Soon as support.

Separate Discharge of Other Accused to Serve as Witnesses

Another contention involved the trial court’s handling of separate cases against Adam, Kalaku, and Kuruao, which the defense claimed were dismissed so that they could testify for the prosecution and against Alabot. The Supreme Court held that the record did not affirmatively show that the three persons were charged with the same offense as Alabot. The Court also observed that, even assuming Act No. 2709 applied and that separate prosecution could invoke such a procedure on different informations, any possible error in discharging them did not affect the competency of their testimony. It relied on U. S. vs. Abanzado.

Procedural History: From Brigandage Charge to Amended Information for Robbery with Homicide

The last and most intricate issue concerned the allegedly defective arraignment process. The defense contended that Alabot was tried upon a complaint for which he was never arraigned and never pleaded. The Court examined the chronology.

The record showed that on October 20, 1916, Alabot was charged in the justice of the peace court of Dansalan in the Province of Lanao with brigandage. He was arraigned there, pleaded not guilty, and waived a preliminary investigation. The case was transmitted to the Court of First Instance. On March 13, 1917, a criminal prosecution was instituted charging a crime denominated “robbery with homicide,” though the body of the information more properly described brigandage. On March 14, 1917, an amended information was filed charging the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The Court held the amended information defective because it failed to allege that the criminal act was done with intent to gain, expressed as “con animo de lucro.” On March 15, 1917, the accused was arraigned on the amended information and pleaded not guilty. After the defense pleaded and the first prosecution witness testified, the defense moved to dismiss for insufficiency of the information due to that omission. The trial judge then stated he would allow the prosecution to amend by inserting the words “con animo de lucro,” which the prosecution did. The defense objected.

Whether the Information Without “con animo de lucro” Could Support Conviction

In resolving whether permitting the amendment was reversible error, the Supreme Court first considered whether conviction was possible even before inserting the missing intent-to-gain allegation. The Court emphasized that intent to gain is undoubtedly an essential element in robbery, consistent with the definition in Article 502 of the Penal Code. It explained that intent to gain refers to an actor’s internal mental purpose. It usually is inferred from external circumstances surrounding the act, and in robbery these circumstances typically reveal such intent with sufficient reliability.

The Court referred to subsection 3 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58, which required that the acts or omissions be stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily in the exact statutory words, so long as they enable the accused to know the charge and the court to pronounce judgment according to law. It also invoked section 7 of General Orders No. 58, under which an erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed immaterial when the offense is described with sufficient certainty to identify the act. It further cited section 8 and the forms under General Orders No. 58, concluding that the essential objective of an information is to identify the act charged with adequate certainty.

The Court relied on earlier rulings, including United States vs. San Pedro, to hold that reversal is not warranted where all other facts establishing robbery exist even if the information fails to specifically allege intent con animo de lucro. It quoted the principle that, once robbery’s other elements were established, intent of gain may be presumed. It further adopted the reasoning from Spanish authority cited in the opinion: possession of another’s property against the will of the owner, where force or violence is used, implies intent to gain as the natural motive, and it must be overcome by contrary facts.

Effect of the Amended Information and Character of the Amendment

The Court then examined the language of the amended information as actually submitted. It quoted the information charging that, on or about September 14, 1915, in or near Tuluan, Province of Lanao, Alabot (a) Paguinaguina, forming a band with several Moros including Adam, Rumaub, Uru, Kalapi, Kalaku, Kuruao, Kao, and Makarimpong, with treachery, evident premeditation, in an uninhabited place, and armed with guns and krises, did unlawfully, by means of violence, obtain specified articles—namely a revolver with munitions, a watch worth P3, and P36 in cash belonging to Charles H. Mills whom the band killed by shooting, with several wounds inflicted by Alabot with his kris, and with a view to securing the articles mentioned.

The Court held that, following United States vs. San Pedro, this information already charged the essential ingredients of robbery even without the express phrase “y con animo de lucro.” It reasoned that only one reasonable inference could be drawn from the allegations: the accused’s intention was to gain. It emphasized that the seizure was alleged to be unlawful, against the will of the owner, by violence, which implies the purpose of gain. It highlighted the closing language of the complaint, “con el fin de apoderarse de los efectos mencionados,” as reinforcing that appropriating the victim’s personal effects necessarily involved depriving the owner of property for the consequent benefit of the accused and the band.

Accordingly, the Court found that if conviction could properly have been sustained on the information as it stood, the accused suffered no prejudice from the later insertion of the words “con animo de lucro.” The Court also treated the amendment as nonpr

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 13052)

The case reached the Supreme Court on review of a Court of First Instance judgment convicting Alabot (alias) Paguinaguina of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to death.
The Court reviewed multiple defense contentions relating to identity of the victim, court jurisdiction, rulings on separate witness cases, and the validity of the informations and arraignment.
The Court ultimately affirmed the death sentence, directing execution in accordance with law, subject to possible effects of executive clemency.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The plaintiff and appellee was the United States, acting through a fiscal in the institution and amendments of the information.
The defendant and appellant was Alabot (alias) Paguinaguina, who was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Lanao after the matter had been transmitted from the justice of the peace court.
The Court of First Instance tried the accused on a complex charge denominated “robbery with homicide,” after a prior charge for brigandage in the justice of the peace court.
The Supreme Court addressed the appellant’s assignments of error and sustained the conviction and sentence.

Key Factual Allegations

The evidence established that, sometime before September 14, 1915 (probably a day or two earlier), a party of about eight armed Moros went to an area near a laje in the Province of Lanao to procure subsistence by begging or stealing.
The defendants Alabot, Kao, and Makarimpong, together with prosecution witnesses Kalaku and Kuruao, belonged to the party, and the organizer and apparent chief was Rumaub.
After obtaining palay, the group returned and passed the house of the Sultan Sarip, where Rumaub, Alabot, and Uru entered.
The group continued until reaching a cotta, where Rumaub told them to rest.
In the early morning of September 14, 1915, while the party was lying in wait in the cotta, Rumaub fired a shot at an American passing in the roadway a few meters away.
The shot created confusion within the party, and Kalaku and Kuruao ran away after Rumaub fired and shouted, which prompted others to look back.
Upon looking back, they saw that Alabot was slashing the American with his cris.
After hearing the shot, Alabot did not flee but instead ran to the spot where he was seen slashing the American.
Later, Rumaub, Alabot, and the other members caught up with Kalaku and Kuruao and brought them to the house of Adam, the father of the latter two.
At Adam’s house, Rumaub and Alabot each related their participation, and Alabot told Adam that he had slashed the American who had been shot by Rumaub and had taken the victim’s revolver and money.
At the same time, Alabot was initially in possession of the revolver and money, but Rumaub took these and gave the revolver to Adam as dowry for his daughter and divided the cash among the party members.
On or about the same day, the dead body of the American Charles H. Mills was brought to the hospital at Dansalan, examined by Dr. E. W. Ames with the assistance of Nicasio Torres.
The body showed two bullet wounds in the abdomen (entry and exit), a wound on the neck almost severing the head, and multiple wounds inflicted by a cutting instrument.
The Court treated the killing as the same occurrence described in the testimonies, and the death occurred on or about September 14, 1915.

Identity of Deceased Victim

The defense argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the American attacked and cut by the party was indeed Charles H. Mills.
The Court noted an internal consistency between the medical findings for Charles H. Mills and the division of acts attributed in the narrative: Rumaub shot the American in the manner reflected by the bullet wounds, and Alabot slashed him in the manner reflected by the cutting instrument wounds.
The Court emphasized that Charles H. Mills had two bullet wounds consistent with a bullet passing through the abdomen, and also had multiple cutting-instrument wounds, while the narrative attributed bullet injury to Rumaub and slashing injury to Alabot.
The Court further relied on the absence of any contest on identity at trial, because both parties assumed during questioning that the slain American was Charles H. Mills.
In view of these circumstances, the Court held that there was no doubt as to the identity of the person slain.

Jurisdiction Over Place of Crime

The defense contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it did not appear that the barrio of Tuluan was in the Province of Lanao.
The information charged the crime was committed in or near the barrio of Tuluan, Province of Lanao.
The Court acknowledged that no witness had testified directly that Tuluan was in Lanao.
The Court found that a leading question premised on that fact had been asked without objection, and the witness answered affirmatively, thereby establishing the territorial link.
The Court held that the exchange was sufficient to show that Tuluan was within Lanao.
The Court additionally invoked Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure to support that courts may take judicial notice that a municipality or barrio falls within their jurisdiction.
The Court cited prior decisions—Marzon vs. Udtujan, U. S. vs. Chua Mo, and U. S. vs. Lim Soon—as authority for judicial notice of such territorial facts.

Separate Cases as Witness Matter

Another defense contention attacked the dismissal of separate cases against Adam, Kalaku, and Kuruao so that they could testify against Alabot.
The Court found that the record did not affirmatively show that the three individuals had been charged with the same offense as the appellant.
Even assuming that Act No. 2709 applied to separate prosecutions by different informations, the Court held that any possible error in discharging them as witnesses did not affect the competency of their testimony.
The Court cited U. S. vs. Abanzado in support of this rule.

Arraignment and Effect of Informations

The defense argued that the accused was tried on a complaint to which he was never arraigned and to which he never pleaded.
The Court reviewed the procedural history starting with a charge of brigandage in the justice of the peace court of Dansalan in Lanao on October 20, 1916.
The Court found that, on the brigandage charge, the accused was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and waived preliminary investigation.
After transmission to the Court of First Instance, the prosecution initiated on March 13, 1917 a criminal prosecution charging a crime denominated as “robbery