Title
Ty-Delgado vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Case
G.R. No. 219603
Decision Date
Jan 26, 2016
Pichay, convicted of libel (a crime involving moral turpitude), filed for candidacy before his disqualification period lapsed. SC ruled his COC void ab initio, disqualifying him; Ty-Delgado declared rightful winner.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 219603)

Key Dates

Promulgation of Tulfo v. People (conviction): 16 September 2008; decision became final and executory: 1 June 2009. Payment of fines and moral damages by Pichay: 17 February 2011. Filing of certificate of candidacy (COC) by Pichay for 2013 elections: 9 October 2012. Petition for disqualification filed by Ty-Delgado before COMELEC: 18 February 2013. Proclamation of Pichay as winner: 16 May 2013. Quo warranto filed with HRET: 31 May 2013. HRET Decision dismissing quo warranto: 18 March 2015; HRET Resolution denying reconsideration: 3 August 2015. Supreme Court decision reversing HRET: 26 January 2016.

Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Because the decision date is 2016, the 1987 Constitution is the governing constitution. Relevant statutory provisions cited: Section 12 (Disqualifications), Section 74 (Contents of certificate of candidacy), and Section 78 (Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus Election Code; Articles 353 (definition of libel) and 360 (responsibility of publisher) of the Revised Penal Code. HRET’s constitutional role as the “sole judge” of contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of House members is recognized, subject to Supreme Court review for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel in Tulfo v. People, and sentenced to fines and moral damages. He paid the fines and moral damages on 17 February 2011. He filed his COC on 9 October 2012 and was proclaimed the winning candidate after the May 2013 elections. Ty-Delgado pursued a petition for disqualification before COMELEC and later filed an ad cautelam quo warranto with the HRET after Pichay’s proclamation, alleging that the libel conviction involved moral turpitude and that the five-year disqualification period under Section 12 had not expired at the time he filed his COC.

HRET’s Ruling

The HRET asserted jurisdiction over quo warranto but concluded that the circumstances of Pichay’s conviction—specifically his role as president of the publishing company rather than as direct author—did not demonstrate that his conviction involved moral turpitude. The HRET therefore dismissed the quo warranto and declared Pichay eligible to serve.

Legal Standard on Disqualification and Moral Turpitude

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code disqualifies persons sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude unless plenarily pardoned or after five years from service of sentence. The Court adopted the provided definition of moral turpitude as acts contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals — acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties. The Court reiterated the general rule that crimes mala in se typically involve moral turpitude, and cited precedents treating various crimes (e.g., libel) as involving moral turpitude.

Nature of Libel and the Element of Malice

Libel is defined by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as the public and malicious imputation of a discreditable act or condition. The elements of libel include allegation of a discreditable act or condition, publication, identification of the person defamed, and existence of malice. Malice is central to libel; it denotes ill will, bad faith, or an intention to injure and may be established by showing publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.

Application of Law to Pichay’s Conviction

The Supreme Court recognized that in Tulfo v. People the Court found that Pichay and others published four defamatory articles with reckless disregard of their falsity, establishing actual malice. The subsequent publication of another libelous article after the filing of the complaint was viewed as additional evidence of malice. Given that malice was established and libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, the Court concluded Pichay’s conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Publisher Liability and the Effect of Reduced Penalty

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code makes authors, editors, and business managers equally responsible for defamations contained in publications. The Court held that the statute does not distinguish degrees of participation among those responsible for publication; therefore, Pichay’s liability as president/publisher is coextensive with the authors’. The imposition of a fine (instead of imprisonment) because of first-offender status does not negate the classification of a crime as involving moral turpitude, as established by prior precedent.

Computation of the Five-Year Disqualification Period

Under Section 12, the five-year disqualification period runs from the service of sentence. The Court applied prior holdings (e.g., Teves) treating payment of the fine as service of sentence. Since Pichay paid the fines on 17 February 2011, the five-year disqualification would run until 16 February 2016, meaning he remained disqualified at the time he filed his COC in October 2012 and at the May 2013 elections.

False Material Representation in the Certificate of Candidacy

Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code require a candidate to state under oath that he is eligible, and provide for denial of due course or cancellation of a COC when material representations are false. The Court applied prior precedent (Jalosjos) holding that a candidate barred by final judgment who still swears to eligibility in the COC makes a false material representation

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