G.R. No. 137650 - Tumlos vs. Spouses Ferdez

Case Summary (G.R. No. 137650)

Factual Background and Procedural History

The spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, as plaintiffs, filed an ejectment action before the MTC of Valenzuela against Guillerma Tumlos and two others, alleging ownership of an apartment building, alleging they allowed the defendants to occupy the premises without rent since 1989, and demanded their eviction. Guillerma Tumlos answered, claiming she was a co-owner of the property, based on a Contract to Sell listing her as a co-vendee with Mario Fernandez. The MTC ruled against her. On appeal, the RTC initially affirmed the MTC’s ruling but later reconsidered and reversed, accepting that Tumlos and Mario Fernandez, despite not being legally married, cohabited and acquired the property as co-owners, barring her eviction. The CA reversed the RTC ruling, rejecting her claim of co-ownership for failure to prove actual contribution for the property acquisition and affirmed the ejectment order. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issue on Cohabitation and Property Ownership Under Family Code Article 148

Article 148 of the Family Code governs property relations between a man and a woman who are legally incapable of marrying each other but cohabit. It stipulates that co-ownership over property acquired during cohabitation arises only if there is proof of actual joint contribution in money, property, or industry toward the acquisition. Contributions such as care for the home or children, or moral support, are excluded from constituting contributions under Article 148 and thus do not establish co-ownership rights. Moreover, if one party is validly married to another, the share of the party cohabiting in bad faith accrues to the conjugal partnership with the lawful spouse. This provision contrasts with Article 144 of the Civil Code, applicable only to non-incapacitated cohabiting couples or those with void marriages, which presumes co-ownership differently.

Application of Article 148 to the Case: Petitioner’s Incapacity to Marry and Lack of Actual Contribution

Mario Fernandez was validly married to Lourdes Fernandez during the entire period of cohabitation with Guillerma Tumlos, thereby rendering the latter legally incapable to marry Mario and subjecting their property relations to Article 148 of the Family Code. Tumlos’ claim to co-ownership rested solely on her cohabitation and a Contract to Sell naming her as Mario’s spouse. She failed to provide any evidence of actual contribution—monetary or otherwise—toward purchasing the apartment building. The alleged administration of the property by collecting rentals does not equate to a contribution to acquisition under Article 148. Consequently, co-ownership is not established, and the property presumptively belongs to the conjugal partnership of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez.

Evidentiary Considerations: Admissibility of New Evidence on Appeal

The Court clarified that the RTC was correct in considering evidence presented during appeal that was not submitted before the MTC, because the defense of co-ownership was consistently maintained from the outset. Furthermore, procedural rules on raising issues during trial are grounded in considerations of fair play and prejudice avoidance. Since respondents did not object to this evidence at the RTC level, they waived any claim of unfair surprise. However, even this evidence failed to substantiate petitioner's co-ownership claim.

Ownership and Possession Issue: Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court

The Court confirmed that the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, including ejectment actions. While the question of ownership may be raised to resolve possession issues, such ownership determination is incidental and not final, preserving the possibility of separate proceedings to conclusively determine ownership. Therefore, the MTC’s assertion of jurisdiction and examination of ownership facets solely for possession purposes was proper.

Rejection of Alleged Rights Based on Support Obligations of Respondent Mario Fernandez

Petitioner argued that Mario Fernandez’s failure to repudiate the filiation of their two alleged children entitled her and the children to occupy the property on the basis of support rights, which include shelter. The Court rejected this contention, explaining that the ejectment action concerns possessory rights over the property, and any support obligations must arise from proper judicial or extrajudicial demand pursuant to Article 298 of the Civil Code and be proven in appropriate proceedings. The need for support cannot be presumed in this summary ejectment case, especially when unsupported by the necessary procedural and substantive requirements.

Procedural Challenges on Court of Appeals’ Rulings and Alleged Bias

Petitioner claimed procedural irregularities and bias on the part of the Court of Appeals, including acceptance of incomplete pleadings, untimely submissions, and lack of formal due course declaration. The Court of Appeals found these objections untimely as they were not raised before the appellate court and therefore barred by estoppel. The Supreme Court affi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 137650)

Procedural Posture and Overview

The case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) October 7, 1997 Order which had overturned the Municipal Trial Court’s (MTC) initial decision.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos seeks to be declared co-owner of an apartment building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and assails the denial of her motion for reconsideration by the CA.
The main legal issue centers on whether petitioner, who cohabited without marriage with Respondent Mario Fernandez, acquired co-ownership rights under Article 148 of the Family Code.
The ejectment suit arose from the Fernandez spouses' claim as absolute owners seeking possession and rental payments for the apartment building occupied by petitioner and others.

Factual Background

Respondents, Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, filed a complaint for ejectment against Guillerma Tumlos and other occupants alleging ownership of the apartment building.
They alleged tolerance in allowing occupation since 1989, with verbal agreements on rental payments which were not fulfilled.
Guillerma Tumlos answered claiming co-ownership based on a Contract to Sell indicating her as co-vendee with Mario Fernandez.
Evidence presented included marriage contracts, letters of demand, the Contract to Sell, and affidavits.
The MTC ruled in favor of respondents; the RTC initially reversed the MTC and ruled petitioner co-owner based on cohabitation without marriage and administrative facts.
The CA ultimately reversed the RTC, holding petitioner failed to prove actual contribution to acquisition and that Mario Fernandez was validly married to Lourdes, thus invalidating any co-ownership claim arising from the alleged concubinage or adulterous relationship.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether petitioner Guillerma Tumlos can be considered a co-owner of the property acquired during cohabitation without legal capacity to marry under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Whether petitioner’s claim of co-ownership based on cohabitation without marriage and having borne children to Mario Fernandez is sufficient to overcome the presumption of ownership by the lawful conjugal partnership.
Whether the rights of the minor children to support and shelter can bar the ejectment suit filed by respondents.
Ancillary questions concerning alleged bias of the Court of Appeals and the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court over the ejectment case.

Jurisprudential and Statutory Framework

Article 148 of the Family Code governs property relations between parties living in conjugal cohabitation who are legally incapacitated to marry (e.g., due to valid prior marriage).
Only properties acquired through actual joint contributions of money, property, or industry are subject to co-ownership in proportion to contributions under Article 148.
Contributions such as care, maintenance of household and moral support do not constitute actual contribution under Article 148.
Article 144 of the Civil Code