Title
Tulfo vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 161032
Decision Date
Sep 16, 2008
A libel case against journalists and publishers for defamatory articles accusing a public official of corruption; malice and liability affirmed, with penalties modified.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 152833)

Petitioner(s)

Erwin Tulfo (author) and, in a consolidated petition, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay (editorial and publishing officers of Remate).

Respondent(s)

People of the Philippines (prosecution) and Atty. Carlos T. So (private complainant).

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

  • Publications: May 11, May 12, May 19, and June 25, 1999.
  • Informations filed: September 8, 1999 (four consolidated criminal informations in RTC Pasay, Branch 112).
  • RTC conviction: Decision dated November 17, 2000 (guilty of four counts of libel; prison term imposed; awards of actual, moral and exemplary damages).
  • CA affirmed: Decision June 17, 2003; motions for reconsideration denied.
  • Consolidated Rule 45 petitions to the Supreme Court; final disposition affirmed with modifications (penalty substituted with fines; actual and exemplary damages deleted; award of moral damages affirmed).

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

1987 Constitution (freedom of the press and expression must be balanced with responsibility). Relevant statutory and codal provisions applied: Revised Penal Code (Article 353 — libel; Article 354 — qualified privileged communications and presumption of malice in law; Article 355 — penalties; Article 360 — persons responsible for publication); Civil Code provisions on damages (Articles 2199, 2219, 2220, 2230). Jurisprudential standards applied include the “actual malice / reckless disregard” test (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan; Flor v. People) and decisions cited in the record (Borjal; Jurado; others referenced by the courts).

Facts Established at Trial

  • Four Remate “Direct Hit” columns accused “Atty. Ding So” of extortion, corruption, smuggling, and acquiring illegal wealth. The articles contained highly pejorative expressions and allegations.
  • Pre-trial admissions by the defendants included: Remate’s general circulation status; authorship of the column; and that the complainant was not assigned at South Harbor on the publication dates.
  • Prosecution witnesses (co-workers and records officer) testified that there was only one Atty. Carlos T. So known as “Ding” in the Bureau of Customs and that the published articles referred to him. A certification from the Customs records office corroborated uniqueness of that name in the agency.
  • Tulfo admitted he did not personally know Atty. So prior to publication, did not verify the allegations beyond relying on an unnamed source at Customs, and that he wrote and continued to write about the matter (including a follow-up article reacting to the libel suit).

Trial Court Findings

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of libel as defined in Article 353, applying the presumption of malice under Article 354. The court concluded the articles were libelous per se and were published with reckless disregard. The RTC imposed imprisonment under the applicable penal provisions and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages (with specific sums).

Appellate Court Disposition

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC conviction and the factual findings. Motions for reconsideration were denied, and the matter reached the Supreme Court via consolidated petitions for review.

Supreme Court’s Core Holdings

  • Petitioners’ challenges were dismissed and the CA decision was affirmed with modifications. The Supreme Court held that the freedom of the press must be exercised responsibly and that the penal law and jurisprudence permit liability where a journalist publishes defamatory allegations without bona fide effort to verify factual bases.
  • The Court distinguished Borjal (a civil libel context, finding inadequate identification and treating the writings as fair comment) on multiple grounds: Borjal was a civil action, dealt with fair comment, involved a private citizen, and lacked sufficient identification; whereas this case involved a public official and unsubstantiated allegations.
  • The Court applied the presumption of malice under Article 354 (malice in law) because defendants did not properly raise or develop a qualified privileged communication defense at trial; in any event, the published columns failed the tests for qualified privilege and fair comment because they were not fair and true reports, lacked good faith fact verification, and included abusive epithets and unsubstantiated allegations.

Standards on Qualified Privilege and “Fair Comment”

  • The Court reiterated that qualifiedly privileged communications protect fair comment on matters of public interest but do not shield publications that are false allegations of fact or comments based on false suppositions when the journalist has not exercised reasonable care.
  • Borjal’s expansion of qualified privilege does not automatically immunize all public-figure criticisms; the privilege presumes good faith, reasonable care and verifiable factual foundation. The Supreme Court emphasized that mere reliance on a single unnamed source, without further investigation, does not meet the standard of “good faith and reasonable care.”

Malice / Reckless Disregard Analysis

  • The Court applied the “reckless disregard” standard (actual malice), as articulated in New York Times/Flor jurisprudence, insofar as Tulfo contended that malice in fact (rather than the statutory presumption of malice) should have been required. The Court found that Tulfo published with reckless disregard for the truth: he did not verify, relied on an unnamed source, persisted in attacking the complainant after a libel action was filed, and made gratuitously insulting statements. The publication after issuance of a libel complaint was treated as evidence reinforcing malice.

Identification Issue

  • Arguments that the articles referred to some other “Atty. Ding So” at South Harbor were rejected. Testimony, the Customs certification (showing only one Atty. Carlos T. So in the Bureau), and Tulfo’s own subsequent article referring to the libel suit by “Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs” established the complainant’s identity as the person targeted.

Liability of Editors and Publisher under Article 360

  • The Court held that editors and the publisher (Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, Pichay) are criminally liable under Article 360 irrespective of claimed lack of direct participation in writing or editing. Article 360 expressly renders authors, editors, and business managers responsible to the same extent as if they were the author. The Court cited established doctrine that proprietors, managers and editors are prima facie responsible for content appearing in their publications and cannot avoid liability merely by asserting lack of knowledge or participation when they hold managerial control or authority.

Mitigation of Penalties and Damages

  • Recognizing mitigating considerations (first conviction for libel; public interest in press freedom and its hazards), the Supreme Court modified the penalties: imprisonment was converted to fines (PhP 6,000 per count) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, following precedents that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment for libel under equitable considerations.
  • The RTC’s awards of actual damages (P800,000) and exemplary damages (P500,000) were deleted for lack of proof (no pecuniary loss shown; no aggravating circumstances to justify exemplary damages). The Court affirmed moral damages (P1,000,000), jointly and severally against the defendants, reasoning that libelous publications cause menta

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