Title
Travel Wide Associated Sales , Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 77356
Decision Date
Jul 15, 1991
Travel Wide and TWA sued for failing to deliver travel package services; Supreme Court ruled agents can be liable, remanded for trial.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 77356)

Factual Background

In March 1975, Decision Systems Corporation and its president Manuel A. Alcuaz, Jr. filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila alleging that Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc. had failed to honor obligations under the Travel Pass 73 U.S.A. package, consisting of a TWA ticket and prepaid hotel accommodations, for which the plaintiffs had paid in Manila.

Pleadings and Pretrial Events

On May 16, 1975, Trans World Airlines, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to amend, which they did on June 27, 1975. On July 7 and July 11, 1975, respectively, TWA and Travel Wide filed new motions to dismiss the amended complaint, which were denied on July 11, 1975, the court finding the allegations sufficiently particular. A joint answer was filed on September 5, 1975, asserting as a special defense that the defendants were not the real parties-in-interest because they acted only as agents of a disclosed principal.

Preliminary Hearing, Dismissal and Intermediate Appellate Court Action

At pre-trial on October 27, 1975, the special defense was reiterated and the defendants obtained a Joint Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special Defense. Despite plaintiffs' opposition that the defense was waived for not being raised in the motions to dismiss, the trial court held a preliminary hearing and, by order dated September 13, 1976, dismissed the complaint, finding that Travel Wide was merely the general agent of TWA and that TWA itself was agent for a disclosed principal, Tour Services, Inc., so that neither defendant was a real party-in-interest.

Intermediate Appellate Court Reversal and Further Proceedings

The trial court’s dismissal was appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which on June 30, 1983, reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The record shows that separate motions for reconsideration filed by the appellees were resolved only on January 27, 1987. The petitioners then filed the present petition to this Court seeking reversal of the appellate court and reinstatement of the trial court’s dismissal.

Issues Presented

The principal legal questions were whether the defendants waived the defense that they were not real parties-in-interest by failing to include it in their motions to dismiss under the omnibus motion rule; whether the trial court erred in conducting a preliminary hearing and receiving evidence on the asserted special defense; and whether the petitioners were, as a matter of law, mere agents of a disclosed principal and thus not liable on the complaint.

Parties' Contentions

The petitioners argued that the defense of not being a real party-in-interest is not among the grounds enumerated for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Section 1, and therefore could not properly be raised in a motion to dismiss but only as a special defense in the answer. The respondents contended that the defense related to the adequacy of the complaint to state a cause of action and therefore was cognizable under the omnibus motion rule in Rule 15, Section 8, and Rule 9, Section 2, and could be raised by motion or at later stages.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ setting aside of the trial court’s dismissal, although the Court rejected the appellate court’s reasoning that the appellees had waived the defense by not including it in their motions to dismiss. The Court held that the dismissal should not have been granted because the petitioners were real parties-in-interest as defendants and therefore the ground relied upon by the trial court was unsustainable.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court examined the omnibus motion rule in Rule 15, Section 8, and the provision in Rule 9, Section 2, which deems defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer as waived, but expressly excepts lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action. The Court explained that the concept of a real party-in-interest is that of the party entitled to the avails of the suit and that Rule 3, Section 2 requires actions to be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. The Court concluded that the question whether the suit was brought against the real party-in-interest may be presented as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and therefore is one of the exceptions to waiver under Rule 9, Section 2. The Court further cautioned that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action ordinarily tests the sufficiency of the allegations on the face of the complaint and does not permit reception of extraneous evidence; reliance on Rule 16, Section 5 to conduct a preliminary hearing with evidence was inconsistent with the doctrine in

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