Case Summary (G.R. No. L-2831)
Factual Background
After the proclamation of Ribo as provincial governor, Torres instituted an election protest. Summons was served on Ribo on December 12, 1947. On December 15, 1947, Ribo filed a motion to dismiss the protest. The trial court denied that motion and issued an order giving him five days from receipt of the order within which to file his answer. Ribo received a copy of the order on January 6, 1948. On January 7, 1948, he moved for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to dismiss. The trial court granted reconsideration and dismissed the protest.
Torres appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the dismissal on May 21, 1943 as stated in the decision, and Torres’ protest was thereby revived. Ribo received a copy of the Supreme Court decision on May 24, 1948. Pending the entry of final judgment in the Supreme Court, Ribo filed his answer and counterprotest on May 29, 1948.
Trial Court Proceedings on Timeliness
Torres moved to dismiss and to strike out Ribo’s answer and counterprotest on the ground that they were filed out of time. The trial court sustained Torres’ theory and granted the motion. It held, in essence, that Ribo should have filed his responsive pleadings within the period computed from December 12, 1947, the date summons was served, as required by Section 176.
Ribo appealed from that order.
The Parties’ Contentions
Torres relied on the statutory five-day requirement under Section 176 of the Revised Election Code, which provides that the protestee shall answer the protest within five days after being summoned and, if the protestee desires to impugn votes in other precincts, he must file a counterprotest within the same period. Torres asserted that the five-day period began on December 12, 1947 and expired on December 17, 1947, making Ribo’s answer and counterprotest filed on May 29, 1948 clearly late.
Ribo maintained, in substance, that the time to answer should have been suspended because he had acted promptly by filing a motion to dismiss, and later a motion for reconsideration, and because the Supreme Court’s reversal was not yet final and executory when he filed his answer and counterprotest.
Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Majority
The Court focused on the operation of Section 176 and the procedural realities of election protest litigation. The majority recognized that Section 176 generally fixes a five-day period for the protestee to answer after being summoned and allows the counterprotest to be filed within the same period. However, it held that a trial court may give the protestee an opportunity to answer where the protest is pending resolution of a motion to dismiss.
The majority considered the order denying the motion to dismiss and giving five days within which to answer as valid, because it reasoned that the protestee could not be expected to answer while his motion to dismiss was under judicial consideration. It emphasized that what the law inferentially prohibits is the filing of an answer after the commencement of the hearing of the protest, not the filing of an answer after a denial order has been issued and before the hearing begins.
The majority therefore treated the start of the five-day period as January 6, 1948, the day the protestee received the order denying his motion to dismiss and granting him five days to answer. It further held that the period was suspended on January 7, 1948, when Ribo filed a motion for reconsideration, until the motion was finally decided. Since the motion for reconsideration was granted and the protest dismissed, the majority held that the suspension continued in effect until the dismissal was finally resolved on appeal.
As to the Supreme Court decision reversing the dismissal, the majority held that the decision was not final and executory immediately upon receipt, because the losing party still had the fifteen-day period within which it could file a motion for reconsideration. It noted that Ribo did not file a motion for reconsideration. Instead, pending the entry of final judgment, Ribo filed his answer and counterprotest on May 29, 1948. The majority reasoned that Ribo’s filing on May 29 constituted acquiescence in or acceptance of the decision, making it final by virtue of compliance.
On this computation, the Court concluded that only one day had passed between January 6, 1948 and the filing of the motion for reconsideration on January 7, 1948, and that the responsive pleadings filed on May 29, 1948 were therefore filed within the five-day period still available after the suspensions.
The majority articulated a controlling rule: a bona fide motion to dismiss an election protest suspends the period within which the protestee should file his answer until the motion is finally decided, because if the motion to dismiss prospered, there would be no need for the protestee to answer.
Disposition
The Court reversed the trial court’s order that had struck out the answer and counterprotest. It remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, and it assessed costs against the appellee.
Separate Opinions and Doctrinal Takeaways
Justice Feria stated that he concurred in the result.
Justice Perfecto dissented. He anchored his view directly on the literal command of Section 176(b) and (c), quoting that the protestee shall answer within five days after being summoned, and that the counterprotest must be filed within the same period. Applying those provisions strictly, he reasoned that be
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-2831)
- The case arose from an appeal by Bernardo Torres against an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that declared Mamerto S. Ribo’s counterprotest filed out of time and ordered it stricken from the record.
- The Court addressed whether the protestee’s answer and counterprotest were time-barred under Section 176 of the Revised Election Code, in light of the protestee’s motions attacking the protest.
- The Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, with costs against the protestee.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Bernardo Torres acted as protestant in an election protest filed against Mamerto S. Ribo.
- Mamerto S. Ribo acted as protestee, and he was described as the protestee-appellant in the appeal from the trial court’s adverse order regarding the timeliness of his counterprotest.
- The trial court ruled that the counterprotest was filed out of time and struck it from the record, after granting the protestant’s motion to dismiss and strike out.
- The protestant appealed to the Supreme Court from that order, seeking reversal of the trial court’s ruling on timeliness.
Key Electoral Background
- Torres and Ribo were candidates for provincial governor of Leyte in the general elections held on November 11, 1947.
- Ribo was proclaimed elected, and Torres filed an election protest challenging the result.
Service and Early Court Actions
- Summons was served upon the protestee on December 12, 1947.
- On December 15, 1947, the protestee filed a motion to dismiss the protest.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, in the same proceeding, gave the protestee five days from the receipt of the order to file his answer.
- The protestee received a copy of the order denying the motion on January 6, 1948.
- On January 7, 1948, the protestee filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying dismissal.
- The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the protest.
Supreme Court Reversal and Subsequent Filings
- The protestant appealed the trial court’s dismissal.
- On May 21, 1943 (as written in the source text), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal.
- The protestee received a copy of the Supreme Court decision on May 24.
- Pending entry of final judgment, the protestee filed his answer and counterprotest on May 29, 1948.
- The protestant then filed a motion to dismiss and to strike out the protestee’s answer and counterprotest, asserting they were filed out of time.
- The trial court granted the motion, prompting the present appeal.
Statutory Framework: Section 176
- Section 176 of the Revised Election Code required that the protestee answer the protest within five days after being summoned, or if there was no summons, from the date of appearance, and in all cases before the commencement of the hearing of the protest.
- Section 176 also required that a counterprotest to impugn votes in other precincts be filed within the same five-day period fixed for the answer.
- The dissent emphasized the literal statutory deadline implied by summons served on December 12, 1947, which would make the latest filing December 17, 1947.
Issue on Timeliness
- The central issue was whether the protestee’s m