G.R. No. 146874 - Republic vs. Jacob

Case Summary (G.R. No. 146874)

Election Protest and Trial Court Ruling

Dissatisfied with the proclamation, respondent Esteban Mayo filed a timely written protest with the Court of First Instance of Batangas. After the proper proceedings and the taking of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision on August 10, 1938, ruling that the protestee and herein petitioner Pablo L. Torres should be declared mayor-elect of Lipa. It adjudicated that Torres obtained 4,377 votes, or a plurality of thirty-one (31) votes, over Mayo, to whom it awarded 4,346 votes.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

From that judgment, Mayo appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 4034. On August 1, 1939, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It declared Mayo mayor-elect with a plurality of two (2) votes, based on totals of 4,368 votes for Mayo and 4,366 votes for Torres. The Court of Appeals thereby sustained the view that certain ballots—previously adjudicated differently by the trial court—should be treated in a manner that altered the final count.

Petition for Certiorari and the Assignments of Error

On August 26, 1939, Torres filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision, alleging that the adjudication of certain ballots in favor of Mayo and the rejection of ballots for Torres were contrary to law and to the election rules previously established by the Court. After the denial of his motion, Torres filed the present petition to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. The Supreme Court then examined the ballots whose admission or rejection by the Court of Appeals was challenged through assignments of error.

Ballots Claimed by the Petitioner: Torres’ Preferred Admissions

With respect to ballot Exhibit T-162, Torres asserted that it should be admitted because it contained a vote for him that the Court of Appeals rejected on the ground that “G. jorres” appeared on the mayoral space. The Supreme Court ruled that the letter “G” could stand for the Tagalog salutation “Guinoo”, equivalent to “Sr.” in Spanish, and held that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the ballot.

As to ballot Exhibit M-133, which Mayo claimed for himself and which the Court of Appeals admitted by treating “Concordio Robles” as a scattered vote, the Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals. It held that under section 464 of the Election Law, as amended by Acts Nos. 3210 and 3387, where a name not belonging to any candidate appears written, the ballot is not annulled but is treated as a scattering vote, consistent with Salak vs. Espinosa, Aviado vs. Talens, Namocatcat vs. Adag, and Cailles vs. Gomez, among others.

Regarding ballot Exhibit T-217, Torres claimed and the Court of Appeals rejected it on the belief that it was signed or countermarked by the voter named “P. Rongkillo,” allegedly appearing after the voter wrote below the last space for councilors. The Supreme Court held the ballot admissible because “P. Rongkillo” was the name of a candidate for councilor, not the voter’s identifying mark. It further emphasized that an excess candidate name written on a ballot does not void the ballot; it is considered a scattering vote. Accordingly, Exhibit T-217 was ordered admitted as a vote in favor of Torres.

For ballot Exhibit M-12, Mayo claimed it as his vote and the Court of Appeals admitted it because the words “Gone. Res” were written by a person other than the voter. The Supreme Court held the admission proper. For ballot Exhibit M-134, also claimed by Mayo, the Court of Appeals admitted the ballot because it did not believe “Bo Kopino Sayao” constituted signs or marks and considered them idem sonans with “Rufino Sayas.” The Supreme Court upheld that admission.

On ballot Exhibit T-180, the Court of Appeals had rejected it as marked with the word “cab” written after the mayoral vote for Loreto Macuha. The Supreme Court held that “cab” was not, by itself, a prohibited sign or mark. It explained that Loreto Macuha was not a candidate for councilor; thus, the writing of Macuha’s name on the relevant space could serve to mark the ballot without requiring the addition of “cab.” It also considered that “cab” could be an abbreviation of “cabeza,” an customary address in the barrios. Consequently, Loreto Macuha could be treated as a scattering vote, and the ballot was ordered admitted.

As to ballot Exhibit M-16, Mayo claimed it valid and admitted by the Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court declined to consider the matter because the petitioner’s challenge involved a question of fact not properly reviewable in the certiorari posture described in the decision.

The Supreme Court also addressed ballots Exhibits M-160 and M-99, which the Court of Appeals admitted. It sustained admission for Mayo, not by reason of any specific interpretive rule about intended votes for Moises Kalaw, but because the assemblyman Hon. Maximo Kalaw was well-known in Batangas and the unschooled elector might have intended to vote for him as councilor. The Supreme Court treated the resulting votes as scattering ones, and it found the admission for Mayo proper.

For ballot Exhibit T-143, Torres claimed its rejection was erroneous because the Court of Appeals found it violated ballot secrecy by being written by two different hands using two different pencils. The Supreme Court held otherwise. It found, from the ballot’s general appearance and the formation of the letters, that it had been written by only one hand, so it was ordered admitted.

The Supreme Court further treated the challenged ballots Exhibits M-3, J-6, and M-117, in which the name “S. Mayo” or “I. Mayo” appeared, sustaining their admission. It accepted the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that electors with some knowledge of English might confuse letters in pronunciation and writing, such that “S” may be rendered or understood as “ES,” and “I” as “E,” particularly when the goal is to write the candidate’s name Esteban. The Supreme Court also noted that a similar issue had been resolved in Moya vs. Del Fierro (promulgated November 18, 1939), and it treated those ballots as valid.

On Exhibits M-100 and M-126, where the mayoral space carried “Estiban” and the vice-mayoral space carried either “Mayo” or “Maio,” the Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals’ admissions because they reflected the elector’s intention to vote for Mayo for mayor, and the defects were not considered marks that would invalidate the ballot.

The Court upheld the admission of Exhibit M-122, where the elector began writing “Estiban Mayo” on the line reserved for mayor but finished below the same line and toward the vice-mayor space. It agreed that the elector’s intention to vote for Esteban Mayo for mayor was manifest, and it found admission proper.

The Court also sustained admission of Exhibit M-6 bearing “ESTEBAN Mayo” with “ESTEBAN” in print, Exhibit M-40 where the councilor names “F. INFANTE,” “F. LANTIN,” and “Jose LANTIN” appeared with “Jose” supplied, and Exhibit M-46 where mayoral, vice-mayoral, and councilor names appeared in capital letters (“ESTEBAN MAYO,” “P. TAPIA,” and “T. MAKALA”). It held that print and capital letters were not marks.

Finally, the Supreme Court sustained admissions of Exhibits M-140, M-72, and M-51. For Exhibit M-140, it ruled the ballot was good despite an “X” after “Silverio Conejo” being placed by another person after the commissioners revised the ballot without the voter’s knowledge or consent, because it did not invalidate the vote as presented. For Exhibit M-72, it found “E. Miyo” idem sonans with Mayo and not a contradictory mark. For Exhibit M-51, it held “Mayon” idem sonans with “Mayo”, and the additional writing “istiban Maio” for councilor did not negate the mayoral vote.

The Supreme Court rejected Torres’ effort to have ballots Exhibits T-189 to T-199 (inclusive) considered. It held that the Court of Appeals had rejected them based on factual findings, including that they were found in the red box for spoiled ballots in precinct No. 23 and that they were in excess of the ballots used, as reflected by the election returns. Since the question involved factual appreciation, the Supreme Court would not consider it in this certiorari proceeding.

Ballots Claimed by the Respondent: Mayo’s Preferred Rejections

Turning to the ballots that Mayo alleged were erroneously admitted for Torres, the Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals’ rulings for the challenged Torres ballots.

For ballot Exhibit T-2, the Court of Appeals had admitted it because what appeared as “Atty. P. Torres (Pres. at present)” was not treated as a distinguishing mark but as a prefix or title. The Supreme Court affirmed the admission, citing Cailles vs. Gomez and Valenzuela vs. Carlos.

For ballot Exhibit T-181, the Court of Appeals had admitted it because it did not believe “Agosti Bugao” written on the vice-mayor space was a distinguishing mark, but possibly the name of a non-candidate, in which event it could be treated as a scattering vote. The Supreme Court sustained the admission.

The Supreme Court also upheld the Court of Appeals’ admissions of a series of ballots based on the application of idem sonans rules to the petitioner’s surname and name, finding the mayoral writings sufficient as Torres’ name despite variations. It affirmed the validity of the ballots listed as Exhibits T-120, T-86, T-92, T-136, T-151, T-228, T-140, T-130, T-161, T-175, T-178, T-186, T-207, T-215, T-219, T-176, T-115, and T-118, and T-96, where the Court of Appeals had treated the mayoral writings as idem sonans with Pablo L. Torres and admitted them as votes.

The Supreme Court then addressed Mayo’s rejected ballot claims. It held that Exhibit M-61 was properly rejected because the Court of Appeals found the mayoral words “e Maoe” or similar variants did not constitute idem sonans with Esteban Mayo, and it also found it difficult to determine the intention of the preparer.

It also upheld the rejection of Exhibit M-58, where the words “istiban

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 146874)

In the December 14, 1937 general elections, Pablo L. Torres and Esteban Mayo ran for mayor of the municipality of Lipa, Province of Batangas.
After the canvass by the municipal board of canvassers, the board proclaimed Torres mayor-elect on the basis of 4,352 votes, compared with 4,845 votes for Mayo, and the proclaimed plurality was seven (7) votes in favor of Torres.
Mayo filed a timely election protest with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, challenging the result and praying for the proper adjudication of votes.
The trial court ruled on August 10, 1938, adjudicating 4,377 votes to Torres and 4,346 votes to Mayo, and proclaimed Torres mayor-elect with a plurality of thirty-one (31) votes.
Mayo appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 4034.
On August 1, 1939, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and proclaimed Mayo mayor-elect with a plurality of two (2) votes, based on 4,368 votes for Mayo and 4,366 votes for Torres.
On August 26, 1939, Torres sought reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, alleging that the adjudication of certain ballots was contrary to law and to the rules on election matters announced by the Court.
Upon denial of reconsideration, Torres came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, challenging the appellate court’s rulings on the admission or rejection of specific ballots.

Key Election Controversy

The core controversy centered on whether the Court of Appeals properly admitted or rejected identified election ballots for the offices of mayor, vice-mayor, and councilors, including issues involving distinguishing marks, secrecy of suffrage, and treatment of scattering votes.
The Supreme Court treated numerous assignments of error as requiring examination of the ballots whose admission or rejection was directly questioned.
The Court repeatedly applied election rules on idem sonans, scattering votes, and distinguishing conduct affecting the vote’s validity.

Ballots: Errors and Corrections

The Supreme Court ruled that Exhibit T-162 had to be admitted for Torres, because the letter “G” written on the mayor space could stand for the Tagalog salutation “Guinoo,” equivalent to “Sr.” in Spanish, and thus did not invalidate the ballot under the cited doctrines.
The Supreme Court held that Exhibit M-133, admitted by the Court of Appeals as a scattered vote, was correctly admitted, because the name “Concordio Robles” written on the councilor space belonged to neither the name nor surname of any candidate and therefore the ballot was governed by the rule on scattering votes under section 464 of the Election Law, as amended by Acts Nos. 3210 and 3387.
The Supreme Court ruled that Exhibit T-217 should be admitted for Torres, because the Court of Appeals erred in treating “P. Rongkillo” as a voter’s identifying feature when the name was actually the name of a councilor candidate, so it did not violate the secrecy of suffrage.
The Court held that inclusion in a ballot of the name of a candidate in excess of the number of offices fixed by law did not void the ballot and instead required treating the excess as a scattering vote.
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ admission of Exhibit M-12, stating that the words “Gone. Res” on the councilor space were properly considered valid, even if written by a person other than the voter, as the Court accepted the appellate court’s view of validity.
The Supreme Court sustained the admission of Exhibit M-134, because the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the words “Bo Kopino Sayao” were properly treated as idem sonans with “Rufino Sayas,” a councilor candidate.
The Supreme Court ordered admission of Exhibit T-180, rejecting the Court of Appeals’ view that the ballot was marked by the word “cab.”
The Court reasoned that the additional word did not, by itself, establish a forbidden mark, and it also found plausible that “cab” could have been an abbreviation of “cabeza,” a form of address, while the key point remained that “Loreto Macuha” was treated as a scattering vote since Macuha was not a mayor candidate.
The Supreme Court refused to consider Exhibit M-16 as argued by the respondent, because the question involved was deemed one of fact, outside the scope of the Court’s review in the proceeding presented.
The Court admitted Exhibits M-160 and M-99, treating the writings “maximo kalao” and “macemo kalao,” respectively, as not constituting prohibited marks and as showing at most the elector’s intention in a way that the ballots could be treated as scattering votes.
The Court emphasized the factual premise relied upon by the Court of Appeals, namely that Maximo Kalaw, as an assemblyman, was well known in Batangas, and that the unschooled elector might have intended to vote for Maximo Kalaw for councilor rather than reveal identity.
The Supreme Court directed admission of Exhibit T-143, which the Court of Appeals had rejected for purported violation of the secrecy of suffrage based on the finding of different hands and pencils.
The Supreme Court held that Exhibit T-143 should be admitted because its overall look, including the formatio