Title
Tolentino vs. Social Security Commission
Case
G.R. No. L-28870
Decision Date
Sep 6, 1985
Amado Tolentino, an SSS employee, challenged his dismissal for dishonesty and electioneering, arguing jurisdiction lay with the Civil Service Commission, not SSS or CIR. SC ruled in his favor, remanding the case to CSC and nullifying CIR's decision.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-28870)

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

Notable employment and disciplinary chronology: Tolentino’s various appointments and promotions (pre-1961 through 1965); formal charges filed May 23–24, 1966; preventive suspension effective July 6, 1966; investigating committee hearings July 12–September 7, 1966; SSC Resolution No. 1003 promulgated September 15, 1966 (dismissing Tolentino).
Litigation chronology: Tolentino filed a petition with the CFI on November 10, 1966; CFI dismissed for lack of jurisdiction June 5, 1967 (motion for reconsideration denied December 1, 1967); Prosecution Division of CIR filed ULP complaint May 7, 1968 (CIR decision finding unfair labor practice and ordering reinstatement rendered March 5, 1974; CIR en banc denied reconsideration August 13, 1974). The Supreme Court consolidated the related appeals and issued the subject decision in the Regular course of review.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework

Statutory framework relied upon in the decision: Social Security Act (R.A. No. 1161), as amended by R.A. No. 2658; Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and Civil Service Rules (including Section 33 of R.A. 2260 governing disciplinary jurisdiction); Republic Act No. 6040 (amending R.A. 2260, enacted August 4, 1969). Jurisdictional source for the CIR: Commonwealth Act No. 103 (establishing the CIR). Constitutional provision referenced in the decision: Article XII(B), Section 1(1) of the 1973 Constitution (declaring the civil service to embrace every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled corporations).

Factual Background

Tolentino had a long tenure with the SSS and held progressively higher positions culminating in designation as Technical Assistant (Executive Assistant) with a corresponding salary increase. In May 1966 the SSS Administrator filed charges of dishonesty and electioneering against Tolentino. After Tolentino’s answers were deemed unsatisfactory, he was placed on preventive suspension and an investigating committee conducted hearings from July 12 to September 7, 1966. The SSC, through Resolution No. 1003 dated September 15, 1966, affirmed the Administrator’s finding of dishonesty and imposed dismissal from the service.

Procedural Posture Before Trial and Industrial Courts

Tolentino sought relief from the CFI via a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction contesting the jurisdiction of the SSC to decide administrative disciplinary charges against civil service employees, arguing that exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction lay with the Commissioner of Civil Service under R.A. 2260. The CFI dismissed Tolentino’s petition for lack of jurisdiction to issue the requested writs against the SSC, reasoning that the SSC in its quasi-judicial capacity was of the same rank as the CFI. Tolentino then participated in a CIR unfair labor practice proceeding initiated by the CIR’s Prosecution Division on behalf of the SSS Employees’ Labor Union and himself; the CIR later found the SSS and Administrator guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered reinstatement with back wages.

Central Legal Issue

Whether, at the time of the disciplinary proceedings (1966–1968) and at the time the CIR unfair labor practice case was filed (May 7, 1968), the Social Security Commission, the SSS Administrator, or the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction to investigate, adjudicate, and impose disciplinary sanctions (including removal) upon SSS employees; and whether subsequent statutory changes (notably R.A. 6040) or constitutional provisions affected the jurisdictional analysis.

Governing Principles on Jurisdiction

The Court reiterated settled jurisdictional principles: jurisdiction is conferred by statute in effect when an action commences; it is not created by consent, acquiescence, or unilateral assumption. Once vested, jurisdiction persists until final termination of the case. The Court thus examined the statutes and rules that governed disciplinary jurisdiction at the time the contested actions were initiated and decided (mid-1960s).

Analysis under the Civil Service Act (R.A. 2260) and Pre–R.A. 6040 Law

Under R.A. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), Section 33 (as then worded) vested exclusive authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on civil service personnel in the Commissioner of Civil Service. Department heads or agency heads had recommendatory roles and limited original jurisdiction only as later provided by amendment. The Civil Service Rules and Section 27 reinforced that administrative disciplinary records were to be forwarded to the Civil Service Commissioner for decision. The Court, following Mendoza v. Social Security Commission, concluded that, at the time of Tolentino’s charges and the SSC’s Resolution No. 1003 (1966), the SSC and its Administrator lacked authority to impose final disciplinary sanctions falling within the purview reserved to the Civil Service Commissioner.

Effect of Civil Service Circulars and Exempt Service Claims

The SSC had sought to evade Civil Service jurisdiction by invoking Civil Service memorandum circulars (January 1964) classifying certain GOCC employees as part of the exempt service when they were covered by collective bargaining agreements. The Court found serious doubts as to the validity of those circulars, noting that the statutory definition of the exempt service (Section 6, R.A. 2260, and interpretive Civil Service Rules) limited the exempt class and did not permit administrative expansion by circular. Thus, those circulars could not properly deprive civil service employees of the protections and disciplinary mechanisms established by law.

Temporal Effect of R.A. 6040 and Non‑Retroactivity

The Legislature subsequently enacted R.A. 6040 (August 4, 1969), which broadened the exempt service to include employees of GOCCs primarily performing proprietary functions who were covered by collective bargaining agreements, and added provisos to Section 33 granting original disciplinary jurisdiction to heads of departments and agencies, with limited appealability. The Court held that R.A. 6040 could not be applied retroactively to validate SSC disciplinary action taken in 1966–1968 because the statute became effective after the events and litigation were already pending and because R.A. 6040 expressly preserved preexisting rights and privileges under the prior Civil Service law. Consequently, the pre‑R.A. 6040 legal regime (exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service) governed Tolentino’s case.

Constitutional Consistency of R.A. 6040

Separately, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of R.A. 6040 under the 1973 Constitution’s provision that the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including GOCCs. The Court found that insofar as R.A. 6040 insulated GOCCs with collective bargaining agreements from the reach of the Civil Service Commission, that legislative change conflicted with the constitutional mandate and was therefore void to the extent of the inconsistency.

Disposition — CFI Appeal (G.R. No. L‑28870)

The Supreme Court affirmed that Resolution No. 1003 and the SSC’

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms