Title
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Fice
Case
G.R. No. 115455
Decision Date
Oct 30, 1995
Multiple petitioners challenged R.A. No. 7716's constitutionality, alleging violations of revenue bill origination, due process, equal protection, and press freedom. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling the Senate's amendments, presidential certification, and legislative process were valid.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 115455)

Procedural Posture and Governing Constitution

The Court considered ten motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners after the petitions challenging R.A. No. 7716 were dismissed. The Court applied the 1987 Constitution as the governing charter for its analysis (issues principally arising under Article VI provisions on origination and readings of revenue bills, and Article II/III guarantees implicated by other claims).

Overview of Relief Sought and Disposition on Reconsideration

Petitioners challenged R.A. No. 7716 on multiple grounds (constitutionality of legislative process, presidential certification, conference committee conduct, title/one-subject rule, press and religious freedom, equal protection/due process/contract impairment, taxation policy for cooperatives). The Court denied the motions for reconsideration, lifted the temporary restraining order previously issued, and reaffirmed the validity of the legislative enactment under the Constitution as interpreted in the opinion.

I. Senate’s Power to Propose Amendments to Revenue Bills — Core Holding

The Court held that under the 1987 Constitution the Senate’s power to "propose or concur with amendments" to revenue bills passed by the House is plenary and may be exercised by enacting a Senate version or substitute bill (here S. No. 1630) that amends the House measure (H. No. 11197). The constitutional requirement that revenue bills "originate exclusively in the House" does not preclude the Senate from substantially revising or substituting text so long as the process follows constitutional and legislative rules.

I. Legislative Practice and Precedent Supporting Senate Substitution

The Court cited legislative practice in the Eighth and Ninth Congresses showing prior instances where Senate versions were enacted in consolidation with House bills and became enrolled laws (examples: R.A. Nos. 7369, 7549, 7642, 7643, 7646, 7649, 7656, 7660, 7717). The Court emphasized that amendment by substitution is a matter of form and that no substantial constitutional right is impaired by the Senate enacting a substitute bill "taking into consideration" the House bill.

I. Historical Rationale for Full Senate Amending Power

Reviewing the constitutional drafting history, the Court explained why the Philippine provision differs textually from the U.S. counterpart (addition of "exclusively" and omission of "as on other Bills"). The recorded history shows an unsuccessful attempt to limit the Senate’s powers; the framers ultimately preserved a full Senate amending authority analogous in effect to the U.S. practice. Consequently, the Senate may, after the House transmits a revenue bill, pass a comprehensive substitute as its amendment.

II. Characterization of S. No. 1630 as an Amendment of H. No. 11197

The Court concluded that S. No. 1630 was properly characterized as an amendment (by substitution) of the House bill rather than an independent, separate bill. Comparative provisions demonstrate that many Senate provisions were intended as amendments to the House text; without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have legitimately enacted S. No. 1630. As a substitute measure, it constituted a valid Senate amendment for constitutional purposes.

II. Precedential and Legislative Practice on Conference of Non‑Identical Versions

The Court noted precedents and congressional practice indicating that a conference committee may reconcile differing House and Senate bills even where neither identical bill was passed by both houses; past congressional practice (including debates and rulings) supports the propriety of conference proceedings on such paired measures.

III. Presidential Certification and the Exception to Three Readings/Four‑Day Distribution

The Court upheld the President’s certification as applicable to the particular version of the revenue bill being considered at the time (S. No. 1630 in the Senate). The constitutional exception allowing the President to certify the "necessity of immediate enactment" permits the dispensation of the three‑reading and three‑day printed-distribution rules when the President certifies an emergency. The Court found the Senate’s action—voting second and third readings on the same day in response to certification—within the scope of the constitutional exception and supported by the circumstances (concern over an urgent fiscal situation).

III. Historical and Textual Basis for the Certification Exception

The Court traced the historical evolution of the three‑reading/printed copies requirement and its exception, showing that the exception is both textually explicit in the 1987 Constitution and historically rooted in the 1935 and 1973 precedents. The purposes of the three‑reading rule (notice to members and public) were substantially satisfied by the Senate’s prior consideration and debate; the final-day distribution requirement was the limited aspect waived by certification.

IV. Power and Procedure of Conference Committees; Executive Sessions

The Court rejected challenges to the conference committee’s use of executive (closed) sessions. It explained that Philippine practice and rules do not require open conference‑committee hearings, and the controlling concern—public right to know—was satisfied by the conference committee’s published report and the attached enrolled bill showing changes. The Court recognized that conference committees possess broad authority (including introducing germane new provisions) so long as their reports are later approved by both houses.

IV. Limits and Legislative Rulemaking

While noting critiques of conference‑committee secrecy from comparative studies, the Court emphasized that each House has power to determine its rules (Art. VI, Section 16(3) of the Constitution) and that reform of conference procedures must be undertaken by Congress itself. Judicial review will not substitute for legislative self‑governance absent a clear constitutional violation.

V. Title and One‑Subject Requirement — Franchise Amendment and Notice to Affected Parties

The Court found that the title of R.A. No. 7716 sufficiently described the law’s subject (restructuring the VAT, widening its base, and amending relevant provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code). The withdrawal of particular exemptions (including franchises such as P.D. No. 1590 concerning PAL) was within the law’s scope and sufficiently germane to the title. The Court rejected the contention that each affected special law must be named in the title, relying on the principle that details necessary to accomplish the legislated objective need not be recited verbatim in the title.

V. Precedent on Title Sufficiency

The Court relied on prior reasoning (citing Philippine Judges Association v. Prado and authorities) that titles need only reasonably describe the general subject and that provisions germane to the subject may be included without explicit enumerated reference in the title.

VI. Press Freedom and Religious Liberty Claims

The Court held that (1) withdrawal of a previously granted tax exemption from the press does not amount to an unconstitutional targeting of the press where the tax is neutral and nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect; and (2) the Value‑Added Tax is a general revenue tax, not a license tax or prior restraint, and so does not per se infringe First/Article III freedoms. The Court distinguished the challenged law from cases invalidating discriminatory or targeted taxes that operatively functioned as censorship or suppression.

VI. Specifics on Press and Religious Organization Claims

The Court rejected the Philippine Press Institute’s claim that even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms is per se unconstitutional; it explained that precedent against license taxes imposing prior restraints (Murdock, Grosjean, American Bible Society) does not forbid neutral revenue taxes like the VAT. The Court also addressed the Philippine Bible Society’s concern (that VAT on bible sales would impair religious dissemination), treating such burdens as incidental and noting administrative fees (e.g., P1,000 registration fee) are regulatory/administrative rather than constitutionally proscribed taxation of religious exercise—liability questions to be resolved in concrete assessment proceedings.

VII. Due Process, Equal Protection, Contract Clause, and Taxation Rule Challenges

The Court rejected broad and abstract constitutional attacks that R.A. No. 7716 impairs contracts or denies equal protection or violates th

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