G.R. No. L-17113 - Suarez vs. Tengco

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-17113)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

The Sandiganbayan convicted both petitioners of violating Section 3(h) of RA 3019 and sentenced them to an indeterminate prison term plus confiscation and perpetual disqualification; it also ordered confiscation of their interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center. The Sandiganbayan simultaneously absolved them of the specific allegation that Mayor Teves caused issuance of the business permit on or about 4 February 1992. The petitioners sought review in the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan decision.

Indictment, Plea, and Evidentiary Record

The Information charged that on or about 4 February 1992 Edgar Teves, while Mayor, “willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause[d] the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license” for the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of a named person, and alleged that Edgar “had a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and [his wife].” Upon arraignment the petitioners pleaded not guilty. The parties stipulated to the authenticity of documentary evidence and the prosecution relied on documentary exhibits (with some exhibits rejected by the Sandiganbayan); no testimonial evidence was introduced.

Sandiganbayan’s Findings on the Charged Act (First Mode)

The Sandiganbayan found that the allegation that Mayor Teves caused issuance of a cockpit permit on or about 4 February 1992 was not well founded, because under the LGC of 1991 (effective 1 January 1992) only the Sangguniang Bayan had authority to issue such licenses and the mayor was no longer a member or presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. Consequently, the Court held the first mode (intervening or taking part in an official capacity in connection with a pecuniary interest) was not proved for the acts alleged in the Information.

Sandiganbayan’s Findings on Possession of Pecuniary Interest (Second Mode)

The Sandiganbayan nonetheless convicted the petitioners on the ground that petitioners possessed a direct pecuniary interest in the cockpit, a possession that the court deemed prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. The factual basis relied upon included: Edgar’s sworn registration applications (1983 and 1989) identifying him as owner/manager; his 1990 affidavit stating he turned over management to his wife but not asserting divestment of ownership; Teresita’s later renewal applications and license forms showing her as owner/licensee/operator; and the presumption under Civil Code Article 160 that conjugal partnership of gains governs property relations between spouses absent evidence to the contrary. The Sandiganbayan concluded Edgar’s interest was direct and prohibited.

Legal Issue Framed for Decision

The pivotal legal issue was whether a public officer charged in the Information for unlawful intervention (the first mode under Section 3(h) RA 3019) may nevertheless be convicted, together with his wife, for the separate mode of violating Section 3(h) — namely, possession of a pecuniary interest prohibited by law (the second mode) — when the possession-of-interest mode was not expressly charged in the Information.

Statutory Elements and Two Modes under Section 3(h), RA 3019

The court identified the essential elements of Section 3(h): (1) the accused is a public officer; (2) the accused has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and (3) either (a) the accused intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest (first mode), or (b) the accused is prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having such interest (second mode). These constitute two alternative modes of committing the offense.

Rationale for Applying First Mode to the Facts — Failure of Proof

Applying the first mode to the charged facts, the court agreed with the Sandiganbayan that Mayor Teves could not have issued or caused issuance of the cockpit license in 1992 because that authority rested with the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 447(3) of the LGC effective 1 January 1992; the mayor was not a member. Therefore the first mode (unlawful intervention by the mayor in 1992) was not proved and the Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the petitioners of the charged intervention.

Application of Second Mode and the Variance Doctrine

The Supreme Court majority determined that documentary evidence established Edgar’s ownership and therefore a direct pecuniary interest in the cockpit; additionally, the conjugal partnership presumption meant such ownership implicated both spouses. The offense actually proved was the second mode under Section 3(h) — possession of an interest prohibited by law (Section 89(2) LGC). The majority held that the variance doctrine (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120) allows conviction of an offense proved though not specifically charged where the offense proved is included in or necessarily included in the offense charged; here the first two elements alleged in the Information (public officer; pecuniary interest) overlap with elements of the second mode, so the offense proved was deemed necessarily included in the offense charged and conviction on that basis was permissible.

Statutory Construction and Choice of Penalty

Because Section 3(h) of RA 3019 is a general provision and Section 89(2) LGC is a specific prohibition relating to cockpits, the court applied the rule that the special statute (and the later enactment) prevails over the earlier general statute. The LGC prescribes a lighter penalty (Section 514: imprisonment of six months and one day to six years, or fine P3,000–P10,000, or both) than RA 3019 (Section 9: imprisonment 6 years and 1 month to 15 years, perpetual disqualification, and confiscation). Considering the timing (the LGC prohibition became effective 1 January 1992 and the alleged offense occurred 4 February 1992) and the proximity to the prohibition’s advent, the court exercised leniency and imposed the lighter statutory punishment — a fine of P10,000 on Edgar Teves.

Treatment of Teresita Teves — Conspiracy and Acquittal

The court acquitted Teresita Teves. The Information had charged her essentially as a conspirator in the alleged intervention; the Sandiganbayan had already absolved her of the intervention charge. Conspiracy to commit the second mode must be proved separately beyond reasonable doubt and requires proof of intentional participation and overt acts furthering the common design. The majority found no sufficient evidence that Teresita knowingly induced or conspired with Edgar to commit the possession-of-interest offense; rather, her documentary filings reflected actions consistent with her claimed status as owner/licensee/operator. As a private person, liability under Section 4(b) of RA 3019 requires knowingly inducing or causing a public official to commit an offense, which was not established.

Final Disposition by the Supreme Court Majority

The Sandiganbayan decision was modified: (1) Edgar Y. Teves was convicted of violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019 as possession of prohibited pecuniary interest in a cockpit under Section 89(2) LGC and fined P10,000; (2) Teres

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-17113)

Case Caption, Citation and Nature of Relief Sought

488 Phil. 311 EN BANC; G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004.
Petitioners: Edgar Y. Teves (former Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental) and Teresita Z. Teves (his wife).
Respondent: The Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 2337.
Relief sought: Petition to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center; petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari to this Court on 26 August 2002 (Rollo, pp. 8-29).

Factual Background (Documentary Record and Chronology)

Edgar Y. Teves filed a sworn application for registration of the Valencia Cockpit with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission on 26 September 1983, stating he was the owner and manager (Exh. A).
He made a renewal application dated 6 January 1989, again stating he was owner and manager (Exh. B).
Edgar executed an affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves" because he could not devote full time as manager due to other work pressure (Exh. E).
Management transfer: effective January 1990, Edgar allegedly transferred management to Teresita; documentary evidence thereafter shows Teresita signing as Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager in applications and lists.
Teresita’s documentary submissions:
- Renewal applications dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991 listing herself as Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager (Exhs. F and J).
- Renewal application dated 6 January 1992 listing herself as Owner/Licensee (Exh. M).
- Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel submitted 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, for calendar years 1991 and 1992, signed as Operator/Licensee (Exhs. I and N).
No testimonial evidence was adduced at trial; the parties agreed to the authenticity of prosecution’s documentary evidence and prosecution offered Exhibits Aa to Av (Rollo, pp. 56-63; parties dispensed with witness testimony).

Indictment / Information (Allegations and Specifics)

The Information (filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor) charged Edgar and Teresita Teves with violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019 as follows:
- Alleged acts occurred "on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto" in Valencia, Negros Oriental.
- Allegation: Edgar, being then Municipal Mayor, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring with his wife Teresita, "did willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves," Edgar "having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves." (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Legal theory pleaded in the Information: unlawful intervention in issuance of a license (first mode under Section 3(h)), with an allegation as to Edgar’s direct pecuniary interest included as factual matter.

Procedural Course at Sandiganbayan (Pre-trial, Evidence, Motions)

Petitioners arraigned 12 May 1997 and pleaded not guilty.
Pre-trial and trial were set; prosecution and petitioners agreed to authenticity of prosecution’s documentary evidence; prosecution dispensed with witness testimony and offered documentary evidence (Exhs. Aa–Av) (Rollo, pp. 56-63).
Petitioners filed Comment/Objections and moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on 23 February 1998 (Rollo, pp. 69-71).
On 29 July 1998, Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits Aa to Sa but rejected Exhibits aT, aU and aV (Rollo, pp. 80-81).
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and denied motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 72-79; 82-90, 93).
Petitioners filed a Manifestation dispensing with presentation of witnesses, asserting evidence on record inadequate to support conviction (Rollo, p. 31).

Sandiganbayan Decision (Trial Court Findings and Penalties Imposed)

Sandiganbayan promulgated judgment on 16 July 2002 (Rollo, pp. 30-47).
Findings:
- Convicted petitioners Edgar and Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
- Sentenced them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment: nine years and twenty-one days minimum to twelve years maximum.
- Ordered confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government.
- Imposed perpetual disqualification from public office.
Basis of conviction stated by Sandiganbayan:
- Petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the cockpit because (a) nothing on record showed Mayor Teves divested himself of pecuniary interest; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita was of record as owner/licensee; and (c) spouse property relations from 1983 to 1992 were presumed to be conjugal partnership of gains; thus the cockpit was conjugal property and petitioners had pecuniary interest.
- That pecuniary interest was prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 and thus fell under acts penalized in Section 3(h) RA 3019.
Sandiganbayan concurrently absolved petitioners of the specific charge of causing issuance of a business permit or license on or about 4 February 1992 (for lack of basis)—i.e., absolution on the first mode allegation.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Whether a public official charged with unlawful intervention in issuance of a license (Section 3(h) RA 3019, first mode) may be convicted, together with his spouse, for possessing a pecuniary interest (second mode) when mere possession of such interest was not expressly charged in the information.
Whether conviction for the second mode (possession of a prohibited interest) is permissible under the variance doctrine (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court) when the information charged the first mode (intervention) and trial evidence proved ownership/possession.
Whether petitioners’ constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated by conviction on a mode not charged.
Whether Teresita Teves could be convicted as conspirator or as a principal without separate proof of conspiracy or inducement.
Which statute’s penalty or remedial measure should govern the convicting offense: RA 3019 (general anti-graft law) or the Local Government Code (specialized prohibition and penalty for cockpits).

Legal Provisions and Doctrinal Framework Applied

Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act):
- Proscribes: "Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest."
- Identified two modes: (1) having a pecuniary interest in connection with which the official intervenes or takes part (first mode); (2) having an interest prohibited by the Constitution or any law (second mode).
Section 89(2), Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 — Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest:
- Prohibited for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Variance Doctrine:
- Sec. 4: Conviction for offense proved when it is included in or necessarily includes the offense charged.
- Sec. 5: Defines when an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved (common essential elements).
Section 9, RA 3019 — Penalties:
- Imprisonment of not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years; perpetual disqualification; confiscation/forfeiture of prohibited interest.
Section 514, LGC of 1991 — Penalty for Section 89 violations:
- Imprisonment six months and one day to six years, or fine of P3,000 to P10,000, or both, at court’s discretion.
Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains:
- Article 160: Presumption that property of the m
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