Case Summary (G.R. No. 221538)
Facts
Edgar Y. Teves was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan under Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 for possessing a prohibited pecuniary interest in a cockpit, in violation of Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. He was fined ₱10,000.00. Herminio G. Teves moved to disqualify him from the 2007 congressional race on the ground that the conviction involved moral turpitude, invoking the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
Procedural History
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division canceled Edgar Teves’s certificate of candidacy. When Teves petitioned for reconsideration, the en banc denied relief on October 9, 2007 as moot, citing his electoral defeat. Teves then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, alleging abuse of discretion, non-mootness of his qualification issue, and misclassification of his conviction as involving moral turpitude.
Issue
Whether petitioner’s conviction under Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 for possessing a prohibited interest in a cockpit constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, thereby sustaining his disqualification from public office.
Applicable Law
Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (as amended) and the 1987 Constitution, any person sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude is disqualified from candidacy unless pardoned or after five years from service of sentence. Moral turpitude is defined by jurisprudence as an act of baseness or depravity contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, typically reserved for crimes mala in se rather than mala prohibita.
Definition and Test for Moral Turpitude
The Court applies the “mala in se vs. mala prohibita” distinction and examines all surrounding circumstances. A crime involves moral turpitude only if its very nature or the manner of its commission reflects inherent immorality or depravity.
Elements of the Offense
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 punishes a public officer who (1) has a direct or indirect financial interest in any business, contract, or transaction; and (2) is prohibited by law from holding that interest, regardless of whether he intervenes in his official capacity.
Sandiganbayan Conviction
Teves was held to have owned and benefited from the cockpit. His later transfer of management to his wife did not divest his ownership, which was presumed conjugal. The conviction fell under the second mode of Section 3(h): possession of a prohibited interest.
Analysis of Moral Turpitude
- Mala Prohibita Character: The prohibition of cockpit interests arose only with the 1991 LGC. Prior to that date, no impropriety attached, indicating absence of inherent baseness.
- Lack of Malicious Intent: Teves did not use his official capacity to secure the interest nor conceal it with evil design; his transfer of management occurred before the prohibition took effect, reflecting ignorance rather than fraudulent intent.
- Penalty Consideration: The imposition of a fine (instead of i
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 221538)
Facts of the Case
- Edgar Y. Teves was a candidate for Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental in the May 14, 2007 elections.
- On March 30, 2007, Herminio G. Teves filed before the COMELEC a petition to cancel Edgar Teves’s Certificate of Candidacy.
- The ground for disqualification was his prior conviction in Teves v. Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 by possessing a pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit.
- In that case, he was fined ₱10,000.00 and the alleged interest was prohibited under Section 89(2) of the 1991 Local Government Code.
Procedural History
- Petition docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to COMELEC’s First Division.
- May 11, 2007: COMELEC First Division disqualified Teves and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy.
- May 28, 2007: Teves filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
- October 9, 2007: COMELEC en banc denied the motion as moot and academic because Teves lost the May 14, 2007 elections.
- Edgar Y. Teves elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.
Issue
- Whether the conviction of petitioner Edgar Y. Teves under Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 involves moral turpitude and thus carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
Petitioner’s Contentions
- COMELEC First Division and en banc abused discretion and exceeded jurisdiction by declaring the case moot without resolving the disqualification issue.
- The main question remains justiciable because its resolution affects future elective bids.
- No Supreme Court decision (e.g., G.R. No. 154182) supports that R.A. 3019, Section 3(h) convictions per se involve moral turpitude.
Respondents’ Contentions
- A conviction for Section 3(h), R.A. 3019 is for a crime involving moral turpitude and carries perpetual disqualification.
- Teves concealed his interest by transferring management to his wife and attempted to mislead authorit