G.R. No. 46437 - Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons

Case Summary (G.R. No. 46437)

Factual Background

On October 10, 1934, Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila for falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from two years to three years, six months and twenty-one days, and to pay a fine of P 100, with a maximum term to expire on October 28, 1937.

Parole Grant and Conditions

On November 14, 1935, the Governor-General, Frank Murphy, granted a parole to Tesoro. The parole was accepted subject to conditions that he remain in the City of Manila unless authorized to change residence, refrain from committing any other crime and conduct himself in an orderly manner, and report to the Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence monthly for the first year and quarterly thereafter; the parole expressly provided that breach of any condition would render the original sentence again in full force and effect.

Criminal Accusation and Dismissal

On December 3, 1937, Tesoro was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with adultery allegedly committed with Concordia Dairo, wife of his brother-in-law Jose Nagar. Affidavits accompanied the complaint, and the matter was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where the provincial fiscal filed an information; the information was later dismissed for nonappearance of the complainant.

Administrative Complaint to the Board

In February 1938, Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, repeating the facts underlying the criminal accusation and charging Tesoro with violation of his parole conditions. The Board summoned Tesoro for a hearing on February 3, 1938; he requested a postponement to the following day and on February 4 denied the charge by letter and submitted an alleged retraction by one of the affidavit-makers. A parole officer, Simeon Figalang, submitted a report on February 4, and the acting chairman of the Board recommended to the President the arrest and recommitment of Tesoro.

Executive Order and Recommitment

On February 19, 1938, the President issued an order, invoking Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, that Tesoro be arrested and committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons to serve the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence on the ground that he had violated the parole condition by committing adultery with Concordia Dairo. Pursuant to that order, Tesoro was rearrested and recommitted.

Habeas Corpus Proceeding and Appeal

Tesoro filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons. The trial court denied relief, and Tesoro appealed to the Supreme Court, which rendered the present decision.

Issues Presented

The principal issues were whether the power conferred by Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code to grant and revoke paroles survived the adoption of the Constitution; whether the Board of Indeterminate Sentence lawfully investigated and recommended revocation; whether a judicial conviction was necessary before the Executive could determine that a parole condition had been violated; and what period of imprisonment the parolee must serve after recommitment.

Contentions of the Parties

Tesoro contended that the Constitution, by omitting parole power from its enumeration of the President's clemency powers, had impliedly repealed the parole authority in Section 64(i); that the Board had no authority to investigate and recommend revocation; that a judicial conviction was necessary to establish commission of a crime for purposes of parole revocation; and that, if the alleged misconduct occurred after the maximum term had expired, the parole and its conditions had likewise expired and his liberty had become absolute. The Respondent defended the lawfulness of the Board's investigation, the validity of the Executive's exercise of judgment under Section 64(i), and the recommitment to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence.

Constitutional Power to Grant and Revoke Parole

The Court held that the Constitution’s grant to the President of the power to pardon “upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose” necessarily included the power to grant and revoke paroles. The omission of the specific word “parole” from the constitutional text did not effect an implied repeal of Section 64(i), and to construe otherwise would produce the absurd result of discharging conditionally released prisoners unconditionally upon adoption of the Constitution.

Authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence

The Court held that by accepting the parole terms requiring periodic reporting to the Executive Secretary, Tesoro voluntarily placed himself under the Board’s supervision. The duty to report implied a reciprocal power of inquiry and investigation by the Board, and the incidental power to investigate was necessary for any rational exercise of the power to recommend revocation. The President was not precluded from employing a governmental agency, here the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, to assist in making the requisite factual inquiries.

Necessity of Judicial Conviction to Revoke Parole

The Court ruled that condition No. two of the parole, which prohibited the commission of “any other crime,” required only the commission of a crime, not a prior judicial conviction, to constitute a breach. Under Section 64(i) the President was authorized to order arrest and recommitment of a parolee “who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence,” and the Executive’s judgment in such matters was not subject to judicial review as to the factual findings on which it rested.

Temporal Effect and Duration of Subsequent Confinement

Addressing Tesoro’s claim that any misconduct after October 28, 1937, occurred after expiration of his maximum term and thus after termination of his parole, the Court rejected the contention. The Court applied the doctrine, as stated in People vs. Tapel, that when a conditional pardon or parole is violated, the prisoner is returned to the state existing at the time of the pardon and must serve so much of the original sentence

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 46437)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Eufemio P. Tesoro was the petitioner and appellant who sought relief by writ of habeas corpus after recommitment.
The Director of Prisons was the respondent and appellee in custody of the petitioner.
The petitioner was convicted on October 10, 1934, by the Court of First Instance of Manila for falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate term from two years to three years, six months and twenty-one days, plus a fine of P100.
The Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner parole on November 14, 1935, subject to stated conditions, and the petitioner accepted those conditions.
The petitioner was arrested and recommitted pursuant to an order of the President dated February 19, 1938, issued under Section 64 ( i ) of the Administrative Code.
The trial court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the petitioner appealed to the Court which rendered the present decision.

Key Factual Allegations

The parole conditions required the petitioner to live in Manila, not change residence without consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, avoid committing other crimes, and report periodically to the Executive Secretary of the board.
On December 3, 1937, a complaint for adultery was filed in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, against the petitioner arising from allegations involving Concordia Dairo.
The criminal information was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal and was dismissed for nonappearance of the complainant.
Complainant Jose Nagar subsequently lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence in February, 1938, alleging violation of the parole conditions.
A parole officer, Simeon Figalang, submitted an investigative report to the board, and the acting chairman recommended arrest and recommitment to the President.
The President ordered the arrest and commitment to the Director of Prisons to serve the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence on the ground that the petitioner had violated the parole by committing adultery.

Statutory Framework

Section 64 ( i ) of the Administrative Code authorized the Governor-General to grant conditional pardons and paroles and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of parolees who, in his judgment, failed to comply with conditions.
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines vested the President with power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remissions after conviction "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose."
The Court noted that Act No. 1561 formerly provided that time at large under parole would not count as time served upon violation but that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code.
The Court observed that Act No. 4103, section 8, prescribed that a parole violator shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence upon re-arrest, but found that Act inapplicable to the present parole which was granted under the Administrative Code.

Issues Presented

Whether the power conferred by Section 64 ( i ) of the Administrative Code to grant and revoke paroles was impliedly repealed or curtailed by Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII of the Constitution.
Whether the Board of Indeterminate Sentence had authority to