Title
Terocel Realty, Inc. vs. Mempin
Case
G.R. No. 223335
Decision Date
Mar 4, 2020
Petitioner's motion for execution in unlawful detainer case barred by 5-year prescriptive period; expropriation case not a supervening event; mandamus improper remedy.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 223335)

Factual Background

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 28, Manila rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 166014 on April 26, 2000 in favor of Terocel Realty, Inc. in an unlawful detainer action, directing Leonardo Mempin to vacate Lot 68, Block 5-E in Sampaloc, Manila. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Manila affirmed that decision by judgment dated August 10, 2001 which became final. Petitioner moved for execution on September 13, 2001. The RTC, Branch 12, by Order dated January 08, 2003, granted execution and issued the corresponding writ of execution. A sheriff’s report dated July 01, 2003 stated that respondent refused to vacate. Subsequently, the City of Manila filed an expropriation complaint in December 2003 docketed SP No. 03-108565 and raffled to RTC-Branch 47; that complaint was dismissed by RTC-Branch 47, the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and this Court affirmed in City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, with the Entry of Judgment dated August 06, 2012.

Subsequent Events in the Trial Court

After finality of the expropriation proceedings, petitioner again sought execution of the unlawful detainer judgment by filing a motion for execution on February 15, 2013. MeTC-Branch 28 denied that motion on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed five-year period for execution by motion. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the MeTC was denied by Order dated July 30, 2013.

Proceedings Below and Relief Sought

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC-Manila, docketed SCA No. 13-131042, seeking to compel MeTC-Branch 28 to issue the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 166014. The RTC, Branch 54 ruled that mandamus did not lie to direct a lower court on how to resolve a motion for execution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in its Decision dated July 23, 2015 and denied reconsideration by Resolution dated March 08, 2016. Petitioner then brought the present petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court identified the contested questions as: (1) whether the expropriation complaint constituted a supervening event that suspended or interrupted the five-year period for execution of judgment by motion in the unlawful detainer case; and (2) whether a writ of mandamus lies to compel execution of judgment by motion beyond the five-year period prescribed in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner maintained that the filing of the expropriation complaint and the subsequent writ of possession affecting the property were supervening events which had the effect of suspending or freezing the five-year period to seek execution by motion in the unlawful detainer case. Petitioner contended that these interlocutory events prevented timely enforcement and therefore justified issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel MeTC-Branch 28 to execute the judgment.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent answered that the expropriation case and the unlawful detainer action are distinct proceedings that may proceed independently and that the expropriation complaint did not operate to toll or suspend the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion. Respondent further asserted that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to compel a court to issue a writ of execution where the claim to execution is prescribed.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 23, 2015 and Resolution dated March 08, 2016. The Court concluded that petitioner’s second motion for execution filed on February 15, 2013 was barred by prescription and that mandamus was not an available remedy to compel enforcement of an already stale judgment.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court applied Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a final and executory judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry and thereafter, before it is barred by the statute of limitations, may be enforced by independent action; the statute of limitations for such action is ten years under the Civil Code. The Court found that petitioner had filed an initial motion for execution within the five-year period but abandoned pursuit of that execution. When petitioner filed a second motion twelve years after entry of the RTC judgment of August 10, 2001, that motion was seven years beyond the five-year period and even beyond the ten-year limit for enforcement by action, as of September 20, 2011. The Court emphasized that the expropriation complaint did not constitute a supervening event that tolled the five-year period. Citing Republic v. Mangrobang, the Court observed that ejectment (unlawful detainer) and eminent domain (expropriation) proceedings address different issues and that a decision in one does not necessarily determine the other. The Court noted that its exceptional precedents allowing execution by motion beyond five years involved circumstances in which the judicial debtor himself caused the delay for personal advantage; that factual predicate is absent here because respondent did not institute the expropriation case, was not a party to it, and was at best a prospective or inchoate be

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